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CONT'D.

Outside Edges of green card indicate the edges of the camera field

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f. 6.3

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GERMANY - III

14,500

CONT'D.

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GERMANY - III

14,500

ROLL CONT'D.

51

Outside Edges of green card indicate the edges of the camera field

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GERMANY - III

14,500

ROLL 51 CONT'D.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

x [illegible] Emerson
x Confessional church

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Buxton DATE: 29 January 1945

FROM: William L. Langer

SUBJECT

The attached memorandum on the religious situation in Germany has been read by appropriate members of the R&A staff. The paper is a good review of a complicated situation and is quite interesting. However, it is the opinion of our analysts that the paper exaggerates somewhat the importance of the confessional church and at the same time tends to underestimate resistance against the Nazi regime offered by the Catholic bishops.

William L. Langer
Chief, Research and Analysis Branch

Attachment

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SECRET

20 December 1944

Date

To: General Donovan

15,501A

I have looked at the attached file. The paper on the Confessional Church is interesting and informative. However, before dissemination it should (if this is possible) be shown to Dr. Langer.

[illegible] gives that the lists and biographical sketches attached are incomplete they should be returned as requested.

Office of the Executive Officer

Outstanding

card indicate the edges of the camera field

Even No. rolls

Exposure is ½ of f.63

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NEW YORK 20, N.Y.

1944 DEC 1 AM 10 35

9/30 3. x Rado, Sandy x Comparetti Church

9 December 1944 OSS

R.T.

To Lt (jg) S J Putnell, Jr

From John C Hughes

I attach copy of letter written to General Donovan December 4th which I think is self-explanatory. Will you be good enough to ask someone to check on the lists referred to therein, as I wouldn't like them to go to the general files and, as stated in my letter to the General, think it best to hold them here until a more complete list can be made up. These were handed to the General by Mrs Rado last Sunday, December 3d, and although she intended to leave the memorandum itself with the General, she had expected to bring the lists back with her.

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4 December 1944

Major General William J Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
Washington DC

My dear General:

I am very glad, indeed, that Mrs Rado had an opportunity to see you yesterday and that she left with you the memorandum on the history and significance of the Confessional Church in Germany. I, myself, have read this memo with considerable interest and think it gives an excellent out-line of this very important movement. I have no doubt that you maywish to call it to the attention of certain people to whom you send special material. However, I would like to suggest that, if you have occasion to do this, you withhold the biographical sketches which were sent to you as samples to illustrate the type of work being done by Mrs Rado's section here.

Perhaps you will be good enough, at your convenience, to return these to us, together with the list of pastors, so that we may keep them until a more complete coverage can be secured as a result of the work now being done by the Biographical Records Section in New York.

In other words, Mrs Rado and I both think that it would be a mistake to give any dissemination to this partial list or to the few biographical sketches which were sent as illustrations only.

Sincerely yours,

John C Hughes

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 20, N.Y.

SECRET

4 December, 1944.

Major General William J. Donovan,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

My dear General:

I am very glad, indeed, that Mrs. Rado had an opportunity to see you yesterday and that she left with you the memorandum on the history and significance of the Confessional Church in Germany. I, myself, have read this memo with considerable interest and think it gives an excellent outline of this very important movement. I have no doubt that you may wish to call it to the attention of certain people to whom you send special material. However, I would like to suggest that, if you have occasion to do this, you withhold the biographical sketches which were sent to you as samples to illustrate the type of work being done by Mrs. Rado's section here.

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In other words, Mrs. Rado and I both think that it would be a mistake to give any dissemination to this partial list or to the few biographical sketches which were sent as illustrations only.

Sincerely yours,

John O[illegible]

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TO : Major General William J. Donovan DATE: 2 December 1944.

FROM :

SUBJECT:

In view of the fact that there are not many organized groups - anti-Nazi or non-Nazi - in Germany we know of, we concentrated on finding clergymen - Protestant and Catholic ones - on whom Allied authorities could rely. Under occupation and after a lost war, the Church usually gains in importance.

Attached is a study of the Protestant Church situation in Germany - our reports are more understandable if one is familiar with the background. The second chapter of the memorandum on the Political Significance of the Movement of the Confessional Church gives the key as to how these people could be used to advantage and what we can expect from them and where we ought to be cautious about them.

Attached to the memorandum is a report on Pastor Niemöller and nine reports as samples of the three representative Protestant groups.

Attached is also a list of the names we have covered in reports up to now. We are still collecting more information and more reports are forthcoming.

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Memorandum on the History and Significance of the Confessional Church (Bekenntniskirche) in Germany and Brief History of the Relations between State and Church in Germany during the Weimar Republic and before 1918

Chapter I: State and Protestant Church under Hitler

1) Some time before Hitler came to power the Nazis organized a campaign designed to conquer the German Protestant Church from within. The "German Christian Movement", created for that very purpose, used in its early stages fifth column tactics within the Protestant Church ostensibly prompted solely by religious motives. It advocated dissociating the religion of Christ from its Jewish background. It disowned the Old Testament and refused to accept it as the word of God. Next, it attempted to interpret and express the religion of Christ in terms of the Nazi doctrine of "blood and soil" and the superiority of the "Aryan" race. After Hitler's advent it gradually dropped the pretense of being concerned solely with the interpretation of the Gospel of Christ. Its object became more and more openly the glorification and sanctification of Nazidom, and it went to that end to all practical propaganda as well as threats. In other words, the German Christian Movement became in due course a Nazi organization in the guise of a Church but claimed to be the legitimate Protestant Church of Germany. The supreme aim was more complete Nazification of Germany by aiding Nazism primarily to succeed abroad, to remain, at least superficially, a Christian institution.

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2) Immediately after Hitler's accession to power the Nazis, in line with their policy of unifying and centralizing the administration throughout the Reich -- ostensibly to promote its efficiency, in reality to infiltrate it with party members -- tried to centralize the Government of the Protestant Church. To that end a Ministry for Church Affairs and the position of Reichsbischof were created. Moreover, the exercise of all functions of supervision and the administration of Church affairs the State had retained were put in the hands of the Nazis. Wherever vacancies occurred in the theological faculties of universities or State-owned theological seminaries, they were filled with Nazis (German Christians.) As a result, the Board of Examiners for the theological examinations soon consisted only of Nazis, and only Nazi candidates had a chance of passing and thereby of qualifying for the Ministry; but all these steps and measures were of merely secondary importance. To muzzle the Protestant Church and its following, the man who had to be won over or, if they resisted, ousted or removed, were the Protestant pastors.

At first Hitler proceeding with considerable caution. Friedrich von Bodelschwingh Sr. of Bethel near Bielefeld was appointed to the office of Reichsbischof upon the unanimous vote of representatives of the various Protestant Churches. Representing the best conservative traditions in the Protestant Church, he was known throughout Germany for his exemplary moral and charitable work. (In his sentiment with regard to the religious and charitable institutions his father [illegible].) In short, a man who enjoyed universal respect and had nothing whatever to do with the German Christian Movement. But this conciliatory

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(posture failed completely. After less than six months von Bodelschwingh resigned and returned to Bethel. His successor as Reichsbischof was an Army chaplain from Königsberg, Ludwig Müller, a German Christian and Nazi. Known to only a few German pastors, he had neither a good theological background nor a forceful personality. In fact, he was an insignificant person -- vain, conceited, ruthless, mean, and fairly stupid.

From the moment he was appointed Reichsbischof the fight in the Protestant Church was on. Individual pastors had been aware of the danger Nazidom represented for their faith and their Church already when Hitler took over; but the majority indulged in wishful and confused thinking, some swayed by the appeal of Nazi slogans to their patriotic traditions and sentiments, others responding to their desire for power or for social reform. Müller's appointment as Reichsbischof aroused not only a flood of protests (thousands of pastors read from their pulpits a declaration expressing their determination to disobey any order Müller and the Nazi-controlled Administration of Church Affairs) but was the beginning of a conservative movement which called itself "Bekennende Kirche" (Confessional Church).

The origin of the Confessional Movement cannot be localized at any one point. It arose simultaneously throughout Germany, as the expression of a spirit of resistance to the Nazi encroachment on the independence of the Protestant Church. Martin Niemöller, pastor of a small church in Berlin, a wealthy suburb of Berlin, and known as a hero of World War I, enjoys perhaps the highest prestige as a symbol of the leading figure today, because of the

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Christian with which he advocated the movement in the beginning and because his martyr role received the widest publicity. However, he was not alone in initiating the movement, nor can he be called its true spiritual leader, or even its most fundamental thinker.

The growth of the Confessional Church is the more remarkable when one considers that it occurred against the will of the Nazis and despite their active opposition -- yet under their very eyes. Synodical meetings were held, attended by representatives from all over Germany, most of them pastors but many of them laymen. A "Provisional Government of the Church" was established, a "Pastors' Emergency League" was organized to help pastors whose financial support was withheld by the Nazi-controlled Church Government. Substantial funds were collected, theological schools to train ministers were organized and staffed, and boards of examiners set up to qualify students of theology for the Ministry. Above all, the Confessional Church Movement intensified religious life and theological thinking, preached and practiced tolerance and helped not only the Nazi and the poor but also the persecuted.

The Nazis did everything in their power to crush the movement. Pastors who had joined the "Confessional Church" were deposed by decree of the Nazi-controlled Government -- their salaries stopped; but the pastors often simply disregarded the order and simply continued to preach and to perform all their duties, supported by their congregations or by the "Pastors' Emergency League". Sometimes a Nazi-minded pastor was usually sent out to take over the church building and the parsonage by force (often with the help of Storm-troopers). If that was impossible, because the new

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pastor could not expect any support from the congregation in question, the church building was locked. If all this proved ineffective because the pastor would not yield to threats and had too much support from his congregation to be removed by physical force, he was denounced to the Gestapo, whereupon he was either arrested and sent to a camp or, at least, ordered to leave the district and forbidden to speak in public. After the outbreak of the war these measures were supplemented by drafting recalcitrant pastors for military service whenever their age and physical fitness permitted.

Organizationally the Nazis tried to appease the Confessional partners. So-called "Kirchenausschüsse" (church committees), composed mainly of pastors who were known as "Irenik", i.e. opposed to every kind of partisanism, were organized to act as a assembling body to the Government of the Church. Whenever a pastor fell for their ruse, he was given a larger congregation or a promotion or some other reward. But the "Kirchenausschüsse" did not function long. When the Confessional members saw that they could not carry their views, they resigned. The whole manoeuvre, like many other measures and institutions the Nazis tried, finally had to be abandoned. Nor was the Confessional element always on the defensive. In many instances it even succeeded in removing congregations from a German Christian pastor. When the publications were suppressed, mimeographed circulars were circulated, and if they were confiscated, the Church could not be ruled by word of mouth. Prayer services for pastors who had been arrested and imprisoned were held -- if a church

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walking was found locked against them, congregations met in the streets. In short, it was the kind of struggle that could not but kindle a spirit of resistance, conspiracy, and eventually open revolt.

It went through many phases, its success varying in different sections of the country. By and large, however, there can be no doubt that the Confessional Church won the fight. Of a total of 17,600 pastors in 1939 only about 4,500 Protestant pastors were German Christians. Not nearly all the others joined the Confessional Movement but the majority did and most of those who did not cooperated or sympathized with the Confessional Church or at least did not help the Nazi-controlled Church Government. Probably the movement would have achieved even greater success had it not been for the continuing tendency and wish of many pastors to obtain recognition for the Confessional Church as the one and only legitimate Protestant Church, entitled to enjoy the traditional support of the State. At any rate, besides differences of temperament and character, this tendency is chiefly responsible for the conflicting reactions one observes in many pastors even if they were one in their antagonism to the Nazis.

3) As a result of the fight in the Protestant Church, three groups can be distinguished among the Protestant pastors in Germany:

a. The German Christians who put Nazism first, Christianity second.

b. The active and militant members of the Confessional Church who are willing to make every sacrifice, and who suffered persecution and hardship to preserve a truly Christian Church and

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the freedom to preach the true Gospel.

c. A middle group, whose members may or may not have joined the Confessional Movement but who, while definitely opposed to the German Christians, are so much inclined to peaceful cooperation with the State that they abstain from any participation in active resistance.

Chapter II: Political Significance of the Confessional Movement

As we saw, the Nazis set out to apply their methods of unification (Gleichschaltung - coordination) to the Protestant Church. They used every weapon -- compromise, intimidation, threats, persecution, bribes, as well as promises, rewards, and appeasement. They succeeded in every field except this one. The Confessional Movement grew and spread despite all their efforts to crush it. This fact alone gives the Confessional Movement great political significance. By its nature that significance is symbolic or potential rather than actual. The Confessional Church never aspired, much less achieved, political influence, but it instilled a spirit of resistance in its adherents, it made them critical of the Regime and its basic philosophy, and it afforded Germans at least one forum before which they could register a protest, however silent and weak. And, under the circumstances, this protest could not help but have a political flavor. Pastors as well as laymen who joined the Confessional Church thereby professed that they were not Nazis, at least in one important respect.

However, in overlooking its potential value for political reconstruction in Germany, great caution is indicated. Most of the leaders are interested in the growth of their religion, in social work,

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or in Church policy, but not in political ideologies and institutions. Their fundamental attitude to "the government" is the traditional Lutheran obedience in all "temporal" matters owed to the "ruler", whoever he may be. Democracy means nothing to them. In fact, many of them are by tradition against it. Yet, for the purpose of finding the men and women who might be the leaders of a German democratic regeneration, the existence of the Confessional Movement is of inestimable value, because the minds of its members have not been poisoned, because they will have the prestige of having resisted the Nazis, because they have learned to operate as a coherent group, and, last but not least, because they must feel an urge to find a new political system preventing the recurrence of Nazism and similar philosophies.

From this viewpoint the Confessional Movement is undoubtedly a great asset for German political reconstruction. However, a word of caution is perhaps not out of place also here. The Nazis are, of course, well aware of the potential significance of the Confessional Movement in Germany's political life. It would be in keeping with their fifth column tactics if they were themselves to choose a religious viewpoint as a cloak for their subversive activities. Cooperation with Protestant pastors of undoubted sincerity and independence may be the main means of wrecking attempts they may make along such lines. In this field these pastors can be counted upon to cooperate, however it is by no means certain that they will cooperate with the Allies in all other respects.

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Chapter III: Relations between State and Protestant Church under the Weimar Republic

1) The Revolution of 1918 which abolished monarchy in all German States led to a withdrawal of most of the organizational ties between State and Church that had given the Church the character of a State Church. The Lutheran Church adopted the designation "Bistümer" (Bishoprics) for the Church districts into which it was subdivided and accorded the title of "Bishop" to clergymen in charge of the Church organizations in each district. The administration of most of the other Churches was placed in the hands of boards elected by the ministers. In the sections of Germany that coincided territorially with the former States, the Church (as mentioned later on) continued to call itself "Landeskirche", although it was no longer a State Church in the strict sense. However, in some districts, especially in a part of the West of Prussia, a considerable degree of integration of Church and State administration was preserved, and everywhere the State continued to collect Church taxes and the Churches continued to depend on the State for the allocation of their proceeds as well as for subsidies.

2) Moreover, the attitude of the Protestant clergy during this period changed little. As the attitude and background of the Protestant clergy are vital for an understanding of the integration of German pastors this report sketch, step are discussed in some what greater detail.

a. Traditionalists

Many, if not most, Church [illegible] -- as well as their wives -- were descendants of a long line of pastors (sometimes Church

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families). The forebears of a smaller, yet substantial number of pastors were teachers in elementary schools who wanted their sons to get along in the world. They are commonly said to belong to teacher-families (Lehrerfamilie). The great majority of the others come either from officer-families (Offiziersfamilie) or from university-connected civil-servant-families (Beamtenfamilie). In short, most pastors, school teachers, higher civil servants and professional officers belong to the same social group whose members have the following elements in common:

They are conscious of their traditional role as "pillars of the State" (and formerly "of the throne").

Nearly all are poor. Their way of living is simple, and they do not aspire to greater wealth.

They are accustomed to, depend entirely on a fixed salary and old-age pension, highly uniform for all members of the group; the amount of their salary is determined primarily by their age, years of service, number of children, etc., and only secondarily by ability or success.

Their salary and pension are paid by the State.

The recognition and esteem the members of this group enjoy are due in considerable degree to their office; in other words, it is not due primarily to their individual personalities.

b. Education:

The education of a Protestant pastor usually consists of:

Elementary School -- 8-9 years

High School (Gymnasium) -- 9 years

University (first stage of theological training -- 3-4 years

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Theological Seminary or Apprenticeship (Lehrvikariat)
to an older pastor (second stage of theological
training) — 2 years

At the end of the first and second stages of his theological training each student is required to take an examination. The boards of examiners for both examinations are appointed by the Church administration from the members of the faculty of a university or seminary and from members of the Church Government. Accordingly, all examiners are appointed and paid by the State. The degrees conferred on successful candidates are ecclesiastical; (many pastors, especially those interested in an academic career, take, besides, a university degree called "Licentiat der Theologie". Dr. of Theology is an honorary degree.)

c. Theological:

For many decades the controversy between a conservative (orthodox) and a liberal (modernistic) school of thought, each having many shades, dominated the life of the Protestant Church in Germany — as it does in this country to this day. The work of the famous theologian Karl Barth (now at Basel, Switzerland) gave a new turn to the evaluation of theological thinking in Germany. Barth acknowledged the method of historical criticism — therefore he followed the liberal school — but, at the same time, claimed absolute authority for the Bible — therefore he was orthodox.

d. Political:

Owing to the historical relations of the Protestant Church to the Reich and the State and also to their theological background, most Protestant pastors — especially those of the older

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generation -- were imbued with a strong sense of loyalty to their former Monarch, although not to the point of advocating or preparing for the restoration of the Monarchy. It is no contradiction to say that, traditionally, Democracy and Christianity are conceived as irreconcilable opposites by many German pastors. To the German clergy Democracy always retained a taint of what they considered its origin, namely, the French Revolution, and therefore appeared as a product of rationalistic enlightenment and irreligious philosophy. However, the general trend of political thinking, accentuated by a sense of frustration, largely due to the bad economic conditions of the working classes (unemployment, etc.), made itself felt, mainly among the younger pastors. One group turned toward a Christian Socialism and cooperated with the Republic; the other, misled by the plank in the Nazi platform concerning their Party stood for positive Christianity, began to look toward Hitler. Both groups were relatively small. The great majority of all Protestant pastors were "Deutsch-Nationale" or at least "Deutsche Volkspartei"; in other words, more or less conservative and anti-socialistic. Consequently, most of them accepted the Weimar Republic with questionable reluctance -- in any event, without enthusiasm.

Chapter IV: Relation between State and Protestant Church until 1918

1) The relation between State and Church in Germany has its roots in the former Feudal structure of Germany. During the Middle Ages each of the "Länder" of which Germany was composed was ruled by the "Prince". The Saxony chapter of the new Faith Martin Luther (cf. in other parts of the country [illegible]) had proclaimed [illegible] to be only to a new [illegible] Church but to the

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Christian Church in his realm, duchy, principality, etc. To this Church his Christian subjects belonged as a matter of course according to the then recognized principle: cuius regio eius religio (the sovereign's faith must be theirs). The Prince exercised great influence on the appointment of the ministers of "his" Church. In some States, e.g. Prussia, he held the hereditary position of "Supreme Bishop" (Summus Episcopus) himself. Thus State and Church were linked together more and more closely until, finally, the "State-Church" emerged.

The Church the Prince adopted prevails to this day in the territory that once formed the feudal entity and in important parts of Germany still calls itself "Landeskirche", although the links between Church and State have become so tenuous that it can no longer qualify as a "State Church". However, the designation of "Landeskirche" still has a certain justification: Separate Churches of other denominations, which also under State supervision, enjoy neither the same prestige nor the same degree of State support.

(The greater part of Protestant Germany is Lutheran; only in the Rhineland and Ruhr area does the Reform (Unitarian) Church prevail. (The majority of the population in the Rhineland and Ruhr area are Roman Catholics.) In a substantial part of Prussia the Lutheran and Reform Churches were merged to form the "United Protestant Church").

B) During the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries most Church property was confiscated by the State in a process called "Secularization". The State, in compensation for these properties, pledged the permanent financial support to the churches. This compensation [illegible] as the child age, still [illegible] the State pays [illegible] affairs of the Church.

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The State took upon itself the raising of "Church taxes" from the members of each Church. (In Germany every individual, until he terminates his membership formally, is considered a member of the Church in which he was baptized or to which his parents belonged.) In consequence, no Church in Germany was ever self-supporting in the sense that it collected from its members funds sufficient to cover all expenses. On the contrary, all churches look to the State for the proceeds of the Church taxes and for subsidies to the extent that these proceeds are insufficient. As a basis for the allocation of taxes and subsidies every congregation is required to submit its annual budget in advance for governmental approval.

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

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

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31 October 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace.

I believe the President will be interested in the attached report. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

WJD:mtt

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31 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Knowing of your concern that Nazism should not survive this war by any underground, I believe you may want to see the attached memorandum on the anti-Nazi activities of the Protestant and Catholic churches in Germany. This memorandum was prepared early in September 1944 by Dr. H. Schoenfeld, an outstanding figure in the Evangelical Church who left Germany in June of this year and now maintains his German contacts from a residence taken up in Switzerland.

Already the anti-Nazi church elements organized in cells and "leading groups" of both the clergy and the laity, have served thousands of Jews, prisoners of war, foreign churchmen and labor draftees from extermination, deportation and other Nazi cruelties. This was accomplished not only through intercession with government officials but also by clandestine action, including at great personal risk. Dr. Schoenfeld's memorandum, which emphasizes the anti-Nazism among the Catholic and Protestant clergy, provides a list of prominent persons [illegible] of Nazis participating in this movement.

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Surrounding the collapse of East Germany, this movement has formed a Self-Help ("Selbsthilfe") organization, headed by central committee responsible for maintenance of transportation, distribution of food, restoration of spiritual welfare and reorganization of the German educational system. In his conversation Dr. Schmidbauer implied a proposal for close liaison between the Self-Help organization and the Allied forces of occupation.

[redacted]

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Office of Strategic Services — RNMENT

Germany

TO : General Donovan

DATE: 21 October 1944

FROM : Secretariat

Evangelical Church
Catholic Church

SUBJECT: Memorandum by German Church leader entitled "The Service of the Church Within the Framework of the Resistance Movement against the National Socialist Regime in Germany"

Declassified

This report stresses particularly the spheres of activity in which the Church (Christian Evangelical and Roman Catholic), has proved itself a particularly effective organ for combatting Nazism. This is in large measure due to its corporate structure, ability to mobilize Christian lay forces, and system of leading groups and "cells" which provide the services of experts in Church affairs, government, education, industry, and agriculture.

Anticipating the collapse of the Nazi system the Church has organized a "Self-Help" organization which can perform many necessary functions in a devastated Germany. Central Committees for food supply, spiritual welfare and the reorganization of the educational system are a part of the program. At present the establishment of an advisory group is contemplated to provide liaison between the "Self-Help" organization and the Allied occupying forces.

By clandestine activity as well as overt persuasion, the Church has forestalled or mitigated characteristic Nazi acts directed against hundreds of thousands of Jews, hostages, prisoners of war and labor draftees.

Included in this document is a list of the outstanding personalities in this movement, with a brief outline of their activities.

TOP SECRET

W. B. Kantack
Capt., A.C.
Reports Officer

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

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THE SERVICE OF THE CHURCH WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AGAINST THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST REGIME IN GERMANY.

1. In the dispute with the Nazi Regime during the past seven or eight years in general, and during the recent years in particular, the main decisive contribution of the German Evangelical Church, and the Roman Catholic Church, has been the bitter, constantly renewed, successful battle of resistance of these churches against the repeated attempts of the Party and Reich Government to disrupt the unified structure of the church body as a whole, and to destroy the administrative structure of the church in order to divide the corporate [illegible] into individual church communities. Such a division would have placed the individual church communities in a situation of penury. Three attempts have been made during the war to destroy the corporate character of the churches. This destruction was only avoided through the energetic intervention of the most courageous among leading Churchman, and through the efforts of prominent Christian laymen in Government, Army, industry, and [illegible]. At the same time, it was possible to save the church centers of [illegible] and other organizations, from seizure and expropriation; [illegible] the basis for further development of the battle waged by [illegible] groups and community "cells".

[illegible] was also possible to preserve the material basis for a [illegible] the broad strata of the population in all [illegible] through sermons and pastoral counsel, through lectures [illegible] conferences were pointing all classes of the people for [illegible] against the principles of national socialist ideology, [illegible] the master race, lawlessness, [illegible] repeated week after [illegible] in their resistance [illegible] in of [illegible]

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therefore, often in danger of succumbing to National Socialist propaganda or nihilism. Noteworthy is the success of the leading church forces in bringing about the reestablishment of Christian instruction for tens of thousands of young people and children from the evacuated communities, thereby establishing the basis for reorganization of education, and providing a foundation upon which it will be possible to build, once National Socialism has been abolished.

III. In the collective action of the resistance movement in Germany in behalf of the non-Aryan population, and especially of non-Aryan Christians, the leading exponents of the Evangelical and Catholic Churches have often constituted the deciding, crystallising nucleus, by their ability to mobilize Christian lay forces in all districts of Germany. Around this nucleus were prominent members of the armed forces, industry and agriculture. In this way, the steps taken with the Reich Government carried sufficient weight to become a leading factor. Furthermore, through open, as well as secret collaboration of the leading groups and the "cells", it was possible in many thousand individual cases, to save non-Aryan members of the German population from deportation and extermination. It was possible to hide many thousand persons in the same cities, although by this act clergymen and Christian laymen risked their lives. Through collaboration of the leading groups with the "cells", it was possible to remove threatened persons to other districts, thereby saving lives. There were thousands of cases where efforts to save the persecuted were more or less successful. However, the struggle was continued [illegible] the last few months. The churches also contributed [illegible] preventing the deportation of 400,000 non-Aryans [illegible] Breslau.

[illegible] the resistance forces to obtain humane [illegible] the outbreak of war, the Church has mobilized their [illegible] Furthermore, [illegible] for members of war, as [illegible] movement in the [illegible]

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positions in the Army and Government. This proved especially useful in the effort to rescue one million Russian prisoners.

On the basis of their experience in the struggle against the National Socialist regime, the representatives and liaison agents of the Evangelical and Catholic churches among the leading Christian elite in the occupied countries have offered their constant and useful support. It was necessary to acquaint the leading men of the Christian elite with particular resistance methods over a wide area. Through close collaboration between the churches' liaison agents and the political resistance forces in Germany and the occupied countries, it was possible to lend particular weight to the collective action of these circles in the occupied countries. This was particularly useful in the struggle to bring about the preservation of the corporate organization of [illegible] in Holland, France and Denmark. The struggle for the preservation of Christian schools in Holland was likewise supported in this manner. Furthermore, it was often necessary to protect the safety of leading churchmen [illegible] through the efforts of the churches' liaison agents in [illegible] Germany. Through this action it was possible to [illegible] Prof. Kramer and Dr. Gravemeyer, [illegible] cell. This method alone made it [illegible] Protestant churchman, Dr. Marc Boegner, [illegible] many members of the French clergy from detention [illegible] efforts of these liaison agents, it was also [illegible] Pastor Niemöller and [illegible] further pressure and to main-

[illegible] in this case [illegible] in favor of an [illegible]

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at the disposal of foreign workers, to collect them and provide for their spiritual welfare. Collections taken up in German communities often made it possible to procure the services and provide for the support of Dutch and French vicars. The functioning of Christian laymen was also made possible through efforts of the church and its agents. This was accomplished only by bitter struggles against both the Gestapo and Dr. Ley's Labor Front organization. A relationship of mutual trust was created between the leading church groups and the prominent church representatives of the German Evangelical Church, as well as the Catholic Church, a relationship which proved valuable in the work of collaboration in matters pertaining to the "Self-Help" organization Selbsthilfe.

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The Oecumenical Contacts of Dr. H. Schonfeld which he has been able to maintain in a large measure throughout the war.

I. Contact maintained since 1929-30 with Dr. Leiper and Dr. Cavert, U.S.A.

Contact maintained since 1937-39 with Rev. Roswell P. Barnes and Mr. John Foster Dulles.

The first three, named above, are secretaries-general of the American Federation of Churches; collaboration embraces social-ethical, economic and international problems.

II. a. In contact since 1930 with Lord Bishop of Chichester for collaboration in spiritual matters, as well as for the support of the church's work in assistance to non-Aryan Christians.

b. Since 1932-33 in contact with Dr. J. Oldham, the spiritual director of the oecumenical preparatory work, preceding the World Church Conference at Oxford on "Church, State and People". Through him many contacts have been maintained with the representatives of the British trade unions and industrialists, with leading men in the British educational field, as well as politicians. At present, contact has also been established with Dr. Oldham's work as the author of "Christian [illegible] Letter".

Since 1933-37, in contact with W. Temple, then Archbishop of York, now Archbishop of Canterbury, collaboration in the preparation of the Oxford Conference, especially in the treatment of social and economic problems.

[illegible] in contact with Prof. H. [illegible] Kramer, the spiritual leader of the Dutch Reformed Church.

[illegible] in contact with Dr. Visser, the Hague, in central matters and questions of the convention of the Dutch Dutch Reformed [illegible] for the war, especially in matters pertaining [illegible] resistance forces in Holland; [illegible] in connection with Dr. [illegible] and questions.

[illegible] with the Prime Minister, parcel and food action in-

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d. Since 1931 in contact with Dr. Conrod, secretary-general of the French Reformed Church; collaborative action during the war, particularly in intervention on behalf of French prisoners of war, as well as of French workers in Germany; participation in the protective action on behalf of arrested French clergymen and non-Aryan Christians.

e. Since 1936-37 in contact with Bishop Dr. Berggrav, Norway. Collaboration during the war in matters pertaining to international questions and the organization of oecumenical collaboration between the leading Scandinavian, British, French and other church leaders; in the oecumenical movement in behalf of a just and lasting peace, support of the Norwegian resistance forces within the church; participation in the protective action in behalf of Bishop Berggrav; support of the spiritual care of Christian workers and workers in Germany.

f. Since 1936-37 in contact with Bishop Fuglsang-Damgaard, Copenhagen, leading figure of the Danish Church; collaboration during the war, support and protection of the church resistance forces [illegible] participation in the spiritual care of Danish workers in Germany.

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NOMENCLATURE.

The following lists the names, and gives a brief summary of the activity, of vitally important personalities in the German "Self-Help" organization of the Church. (Selbsthilfewerk der Kirchen).

I. A close relationship was established between leading representatives of the German Evangelical Church and the Roman Catholic Church in Germany for the purpose of building up the "Self Help" organization.

a. Bishop Dr. Wurm of Stuttgart, the speaker of the entire German Evangelical Church (compare further on with II, a), kept in continuous contact with the Catholic Archbishop Grober of Freiburg (responsible for all of Baden) on vital questions pertaining to the development of the organization. Archbishop Grober is known, through his statements and speeches, as one of the most courageous leaders in the Catholic Church, a man who has played an outstanding part in rallying together the Catholic forces of resistance.

b. Contact was maintained in Bavaria between the well-known Lutheran Bishop Meiser and Cardinal Faulhaber in Munich; these two men and their colleagues are responsible for the Bavarian leading group.

c. A corresponding collaboration came into existence for the Rhineland and Westphalia between the leader of the Protestant church in Westphalia, Dr. Koch, and the well-known Catholic Bishop of Münster, Count Galen.

d. The central collaboration directives emanating from Berlin were shaped jointly by Dr. Eugen Gerstenmaier, leader of the ecumenical [illegible] office of the German Evangelical Church, and the Catholic [illegible] of Berlin, Count Praysing, who is also well-known for his courageous participation in joint church action against the Party and the government of the Reich.

e. [illegible] between Protestant and Catholic representatives of the [illegible] are responsible for the [illegible] German "Self Help" organization, is accomplished in [illegible] fashion.

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entire "Self-Help" organization is led by:

a. Bishop Wurm of Stuttgart who, together with the heads of the secret Reich Advisory Council of the German Evangelical Church, has succeeded in rallying to the cause an overwhelming majority (85-90%) of the established Protestant churches and parishes in Germany, and has recruited and guided the application of Christian principles in the resistance movement. In the battle against euthanasia he became well-known, carrying out a joint action for the protection of thousands of medical cases from destruction, as well as for protection of thousands of Non-Aryan Christians. He is also noted for the protection of oppressed populations in occupied territories and for the protection of foreign workers. Evidence of this activity can be found in statements made by him, which are known to the British and American public.

b. Dr. Eugen Gerstenmaier, Berlin, who is the head of the Oecumenical Central Office of the German Evangelical Church, which is also the central office for the direction of Group A II. Dr. Gerstenmaier is known for his unusually capable and energetic [illegible] in the [illegible]zation of the church's resistance forces, [illegible] the development of the entire network of leading groups in the struggle against the Gestapo on behalf of foreign workers, [illegible] and for participation in liberating and protecting [illegible] and leading [illegible] the resistance forces of the [illegible]. He maintains extensive contacts with [illegible] and socialist labor in the [illegible] system. He maintains close contact with [illegible] in the area [illegible], outside of Germany, with [illegible] Bern.

[illegible] German, [illegible] from [illegible], and known [illegible] particularly [illegible] German Christians. He [illegible] for large scale relief

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action. For almost two years he maintained contact in the concentration camps at Oranienburg and Dachau with captive French, Polish, Czechoslovakian and Dutch clergymen. Above all, he has contacts among the workers, as well as representatives of the "Red Aid" (Rote Hilfe). At present he has emerged as one of the leading spirits representing the church's attitude in the struggle waged by the church resistance forces. On the basis of this he is especially well qualified to handle the central organization of the work to be done by the Central Commission for the provision of material care.

Pastor Licentiate W. Mann, Andernach (Rhineland) is particularly well qualified as liaison agent of the Central Commission A, by reason of his extensive contacts with industrial and labor representatives throughout the entire Rhineland and Westphalia. He was formerly the head of the Church Office for Social Work of the Rhenish Protestant Church and was responsible, at the same time, for the ecumenical work and organization within the association of [illegible] of the Rhineland and Westphalia. [illegible] has been in close contact with all oecumenical [illegible] as well as with Baroness, John Foster Dulles, Leiper [illegible], the [illegible] as well as with the Archbishop of [illegible] and Bishop of Chichester, Dr. Bell, in Great [illegible] [illegible] in Holland.

[illegible] of the leading representatives in the Central [illegible] of the German "Self-[illegible]

[illegible] as well as on [illegible] for the [illegible] the [illegible] domain of [illegible] with leading [illegible] basis of the distinguished [illegible] in realizing the

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best evangelising forces to the cause, he was entrusted with the management of Central Commission B. He maintains liaison with other churches, notably with the Lord Bishop of Chichester.

Dr. W. Bachmann, Berlin. As head of the service for the spiritual welfare of prisoners of war and internees, he has shown outstanding abilities in mobilising the forces of the church in spiritual matters and under difficult circumstances. He is known for his courageous intervention in behalf of American, Anglo-Saxon, French, Dutch, Serbian and Russian prisoners of war. He holds a key position in the defense of an all-embracing Christian service by other organizations and churches in Germany for the spiritual welfare of foreigners of war and internees. He has also intervened for the spiritual welfare of foreign workers.

Dr. Thielicke, Stuttgart, is entrusted with the spiritual education of the leading circles in Wurttemberg and beyond. He has developed a distinguished literary activity in the analyzation of [illegible] ideology and has opposed it uncompromisingly. He has done outstanding work for spiritual welfare in the younger [illegible], especially among the laboring classes. Because of [illegible] as many years of evangelizing activity in [illegible] Germany, of the contacts he has thereby established [illegible] in many districts, he has also been chosen as [illegible] in the Central Commission B.

[illegible] Stuttgart, who held a liaison for many years between [illegible] resistance movement of the church, was extremely valuable in the shaping of a Christian point [illegible] view which was penetrated to all [illegible] reason he was entrusted [illegible] Commission B.

[illegible] and Evangelists [illegible] He has done extra-[illegible] on behalf of

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[redacted] socialists of Christian thought and life in all districts of Germany. He maintains excellent relations with all ecumenical activities, especially with Dr. Oldham and the Lord Bishop of Chichester, and with the leading younger generation of Christians in Great Britain. He is also in contact with leading men in the Lutheran Churches of Europe and the U.S.A.

The [redacted] who are included in leading Württemberg and Baden circles. [redacted] Stuttgart, holds a leading position in the struggle for the settlement of great questions of social import in Württemberg and Baden. Therefore, he is in close collaboration with the representatives of labor and their liaison men in the [redacted] government. At present, he also has special contacts with the resistance forces in concentration camps, and the [redacted] are active in this connection. He formerly [redacted] had relations with leading resistance forces of [redacted] Holland. He has outstanding

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administrative officials who have adopted an uncompromising attitude toward the National Socialist regime, and who have ...ed the leading groups and "cells" under the direction of ... ...s. He is in very close contact with President Max ... ...ich.

... ...

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among others, the two following central circles have been formed in [illegible] since 1938 for the purpose of combating the National Socialist regime. These circles have undertaken the task of organising the [illegible] resistance forces in Germany.

The Circle around Count Helmut Moltke and Count Peter York von [illegible] - Circle A I

a) Political attitude toward the outside: Germany can only be capable of existing as part of a unified federative Europe, developed along Christian-social lines. Political attitude toward the interior: after the fall of centralization, a political structure corresponding to the above must be built.

[illegible] officials and workers from Christian and socialist [illegible], industrialists, agriculturalists, and officers, all of whom have a key position in the social and economic life of the army, and the governmental and communal administrative machine.

[illegible] reformation of a democratic self-governing administrative [illegible] Germany which, after the collapse of the National [illegible] regime, will be capable of taking over the administration of the country even in the village communities.

[illegible] Circle A II

[illegible] the same as in Circle A I.

[illegible] members of the clergy, and laymen of [illegible] and intelligentsia of every class of the population [illegible] working classes who, until recently, had not [illegible] interest in politics. This central group is in [illegible] regarded as an ally of the Catholic Church [illegible] only engage in activities

[illegible] the Church revival, [illegible] Christian principles [illegible] two central groups [illegible] organically [illegible]

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that leaders of A II were in a position to bring to the cause results of their extensive mobilisation of broad strata of the population against National Socialism in all districts of Germany and particularly the benefits of their extensive relations with labor.

This resulted in a close collaboration for the following purposes: penetration of Germany and Austria by reliable liaison men; formation of leading groups and subordinated "cell" systems in all districts.

Of value in this collaboration was the fact that in the struggle against party and Reich Government, the Evangelical Church, as well as the Catholic Church in Germany had preserved the corporate organization of the church communities in every part of Germany and Austria. On the basis of the preservation of this organization, it has been possible to develop the system of small groups in all districts, even down to individual communities. This system of leading groups and "cells" was organized to provide the services of experts in every domain, such as, the [illegible] government, self-government, educational system, industry and agriculture. These leading groups and "cells" educated broad masses of the people for a consistent opposition to Nazi propaganda. The collaboration of both parties A I and A II and the support of the resistance movement [illegible] German territory, proved valuable for the execution of large scale actions. For example, the constantly renewed success in obtaining humane treatment for prisoners of war and especially in the [illegible] and one million Russian prisoners from [illegible]

[illegible] and allows to be coupled [illegible] and support for leaders of [illegible] and German workers.

[illegible] joint action by [illegible]

[illegible] collapse of the Nazi system [illegible] territory, a "self-[illegible]

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organisation of the German Evangelical Church and the Catholic Church in Germany was prepared in conformity with the aims of Circle A I. It is to be expected that the collapse of the National Socialist system will result in the complete discontinuation of the functions of the central and local Nazi food and transport authorities, for all leading offices of the administrative machine are held by Nazi officials. After the collapse, these officials will, in all probability, no longer be tolerated by the workers, and it must be expected that they will be immediately eliminated. In such a situation the churches will have the only organization embracing the entire German territory and reaching into the smallest local communities of the country. At that moment they alone will be in a position to handle the entire food and food distribution [illegible].

Therefore, a Central Labor Commission (Central Commission A) was [illegible] the German Evangelical Church under the direction of Bishop [illegible]. Central Commission A is managed by Friedrich v. [illegible] Bethel, and Pastor Grüber, Berlin, for the assumption of [illegible]. Central Commission A is supported by the leading groups [illegible] are responsible for the individual districts [illegible] the services of the subordinate "cells" in [illegible]. These sailing groups are composed of experts among industrialists, [illegible] and farmers alike. The assumption of the transport [illegible] elements constituting [illegible] with the general organization [illegible]. A further Central Committee [illegible] O. W. [illegible] had [illegible] and [illegible]

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obtained full support from the established churches and parishes in combating the spiritual disintegration and great mental void which will befall the population after the collapse of Germany. Together with pastoral activities, this will include an all embracing spiritual orientation of broad masses of the German population through sermons, publications, radio broadcasts and all possible personal efforts by Christian forces for the accomplishment of this enormous task. Furthermore, based on the expert knowledge of the leading groups, the reorganization of the educational system will be initiated with a radical purging action which will eliminate all Nazi elements from the teaching body.

The work of both Central Commissions and their organs is undertaken on behalf of all strata of the population, regardless of the church they belong to, and especially in behalf of the millions of foreign workers. Thanks to the churches' efforts, they have their own confidential liaison men among these workers. (see Memorandum on the churches)

With consideration of the expected collapse of the National Socialist regime, and the fact that the Allied military command must be strongly interested in a rapid return to calm and order, and as smooth as possible a resumption of work in German industry and agriculture, the following is primarily proposed:

The establishment of an advisory group attached to the general staff of the occupying forces in Germany. This advisory organ would represent [illegible] the German "Self-Help" organization described in paragraphs [illegible] and [illegible]. Upon withdrawal of combat troops, this advisory group would [illegible] the highest echelon of the occupying authorities (inter-[illegible]).

The [illegible] of this mediating agency will be to regulate collaboration between the highest Allied military authorities and the "Self-Help" [illegible] and the subsequent development, German [illegible]

[illegible] churches and [illegible] organs of the German [illegible] as a result of [illegible] cooperation as "buildings"

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as a result of their close contact with the victorious powers. Therefore, the above-mentioned advisory organ should immediately be represented as a liaison agency between the oecumenical aid society of the World Council of Churches, the "Self-Help" organization of the Roman Catholic Church and, above all, the corresponding American and British aid societies and the German "Self-Help" organization. In this manner, immediate collaborative work will be freed from a considerable danger which it would be impossible to overlook. Thus, the work of collaboration will be raised from a purely political form of contact to that of a solitary aid organization composed of the Christian elements recruited by the large churches, elements who have stood together throughout the entire war despite any political differences of opinion.

It may be advisable to include men from the oecumenical aid society of the World Council of Churches and the collective aid society of the Roman Catholic Church in the above-mentioned advisory group. These men could act as advisory liaison men, as their long-standing collaboration with the personalities in the German "Self-Help" organization (I) have made them thoroughly acquainted with the personalities in question.

The "Self-Help" organization, embracing the entire Reich territory and described under I, is the only remaining organization capable of functioning immediately in post-Nazi Germany. Only establishing a collaboration devoid of friction between the provisional occupation authorities and the "Self-Help" organization can [illegible] be avoided in Germany.

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September 15, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Since the meeting with you on September 9th attended by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Hopkins, and myself, I have had an opportunity to read the latest papers submitted to you by the Secretary of the Treasury on the treatment of Germany. There is no need to make any extended or detailed reply to these papers. My views have already been submitted to you in other memoranda. I merely wish to reiterate briefly that I still feel that the course proposed by the Treasury would in the long run certainly defeat what we hope to attain by a complete military victory, - that is, the peace of the world, and the assurance of social, economic and political stability in the world.

The point of difference is not one of objective, - continued world peace - it is one of means. When we discuss means, the difference is not whether we should be soft or tough on the German people, but rather

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whether the course proposed will in fact best attain our agreed objective, continued peace.

If I thought that the Treasury proposals would accomplish that objective, I would not persist in my objections. But I cannot believe that they will make for a lasting peace. In spirit and in emphasis they are punitive, not, in my judgment, corrective or constructive. They will tend through bitterness and suffering to breed another war, not to make another war undesired by the Germans nor impossible in fact. It is not within the realm of possibility that a whole nation of seventy million people, who have been outstanding for many years in the arts and the sciences and who through their efficiency and energy have attained one of the highest industrial levels in Europe, can by force be required to abandon all their previous methods of life, be reduced to a peasant level with virtually complete control of industry and science left to other peoples.

The question is not whether we want Germans to suffer for their sins. Many of us would like to see them suffer the tortures they have inflicted on others. The only question is whether over the years a group of

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seventy million educated, efficient and imaginative people can be kept within bounds on such a low level of subsistence as the Treasury proposals contemplate. I do not believe that is humanly possible. A subordinate question is whether even if you could do this it is good for the rest of the world either economically or spiritually. Sound thinking teaches that prosperity in one part of the world helps to create prosperity in other parts of the world. It also teaches that poverty in one part of the world usually induces poverty in other parts. Enforced poverty is even worse, for it destroys the spirit not only of the victim but debases the victor. It would be just such a crime as the Germans themselves hoped to perpetrate upon their victims---it would be a crime against civilization itself.

This country since its very beginning has maintained the fundamental belief that all men, in the long run, have the right to be free human beings and to live in the pursuit of happiness. Under the Atlantic Charter victors and vanquished alike are entitled to freedom from economic want. But the proposed treatment of Germany would, if successful, deliberately deprive

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many millions of people might be freed from want and freedom from fear. Other peoples all over the world would suggest the validity of our fundamental tenets and question the long range effectiveness of our economic and political principles as applied to the vanquished.

The proposals would mean a formidable revolution in all of the basic methods of life of a vast section of the population as well as a disruption of many accustomed geographical associations and communications. Such an operation would naturally and necessarily involve a chaotic upheaval in the people's lives which would inevitably be productive of the deepest resentment and bitterness towards the authorities which had imposed such revolutionary changes upon them. Physically, considering the fact that their present enlarged population has been developed and supported under an entirely different geography and economy, it would doubtless cause tremendous suffering involving virtual starvation and death for many, and migrations and changes for others. It would be very difficult, if not impossible, for them to understand

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any purpose or cause for such revolutionary changes other than mere vengeance of their enemies and this alone would strongly tend towards the most bitter reactions.

I am prepared to accede to the argument that even if German resources were wiped off the map, the European economy would somehow readjust itself, perhaps with the help of Great Britain and this country. And the world would go on. The benefit to England by the suppression of German competition is greatly stressed in the Treasury memorandum. But this is an argument addressed to a shortsighted cupidity of the victors and the negation of all that Secretary Hull has been trying to accomplish since 1933. I am aware of England's need, but I do not and cannot believe that she wishes this kind of remedy. I feel certain that in her own interest she could not afford to follow this path. The total elimination of a competitor (who is always also a potential purchaser) is rarely a satisfactory solution of a commercial problem.

The sum total of the drastic political and economic steps proposed by the Treasury is an open

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confession of the bankruptcy of hope for a reasonable economic and political settlement of the causes of war.

I plead for no "soft" treatment of Germany. I urge only that we take steps which in the light of history are reasonably adapted to our purpose, namely, the prevention of future wars. The Carthaginian aspect of the proposed plan would, in my judgment, provoke a reaction on the part of the people in this country and in the rest of the world which would operate not only against the measures advocated but in its violence would sweep away the proper and reasonable restrictive measures that we could justifiably impose.

I have already indicated in my memorandum of September 9, 1944, the lines along which I would recommend that we should go pending further light on other questions which can only be obtained after we have acquired greater knowledge of conditions and trends within Germany as well as of the views and intentions of our Allies.

HENRY L. STIMSON
Secretary of War

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Our discussions relate to a matter of method entirely; our objective is the same. It is not a question of a soft treatment of Germany or a harsh treatment of Germany. We are all trying to devise protection against recurrence by Germany of her attempts to dominate the world. We differ as to method. The fundamental remedy of Mr. Morgenthau is to provide that the industry of Germany shall be substantially obliterated. Although expressed only in terms of the Ruhr, the fact of the matter is that the Ruhr and the adjacent territories which Mr. Morgenthau would include in his program constitute, particularly after the amputations that are proposed, the core of German industry. His proposition is

> "the total destruction of the whole German armament industry and the removal or destruction of other key industries which are basic to military strength."

In speaking of the Ruhr and surrounding industrial areas, he says:

> "This area should not only be stripped of all presently existing industries but so weakened and controlled that it cannot in the foreseeable future become an industrial area--all industrial plants and equipment not destroyed

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by military action shall either be completely dismantled or removed from the area or completely destroyed, all equipment shall be removed from the mines and the mines shall be thoroughly wrecked."

I am unalterably opposed to such a program for the reasons given in my memorandum dated September 5 which is already before the President. I do not think that the reasons there stated need again be elaborated. In substance, my point is that these resources constitute a natural and necessary asset for the productivity of Europe. In a period when the world is suffering from destruction and from want of production, the concept of the total obliteration of these values is to my mind wholly wrong. My insistence is that these assets be conserved and made available for the benefit of the whole of Europe, including particularly Great Britain. The internationalization of the Ruhr or the trusteeship of its products--I am not prepared at the moment to discuss details of method--constitutes a treatment of the problem in accord with the needs and interests of the world. To argue that we are incapable of sustained effort to control such wealth within proper channels is to destroy my hope for the future of the

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world. I believe that the education furnished us by the Germans in two world wars, plus the continuity of interest which such a trusteeship would stimulate is sufficient insurance that we can be trusted to deal with the problem. The unnatural destruction of this industry would, on the other hand, be so certain, in my judgment, to provoke sympathy for the Germans that we would create friends both in this country and abroad for the Germans, whereas now most of the peoples of the world are thoroughly antipathetic to them.

The other fundamental point upon which I feel we differ is the matter of the trial and punishment of those Germans who are responsible for crimes and depredations. Under the plan proposed by Mr. Morgenthau, the so-called arch-criminals shall be put to death by the military without provision for any trial and upon mere identification after apprehension. The method of dealing with these and other criminals requires careful thought and a well-defined procedure. Such procedure must embody, in my judgment, at least the rudimentary aspects of the Bill of Rights, namely, notification to the accused of the charge, the right to be heard and, within reasonable limits, to call witnesses in his defense. I do not

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mean to favor the institution of state trials or to introduce any cumbersome machinery but the very punishment of these men in a dignified manner consistent with the advance of civilization, will have all the greater effect upon posterity. Furthermore, it will afford the most effective way of making a record of the Nazi system of terrorism and of the effort of the Allies to terminate the system and prevent its recurrence.

I am disposed to believe that at least as to the chief Nazi officials, we should participate in an international tribunal constituted to try them. They should be charged with offences against the laws of the rules of war in that they have committed wanton and unnecessary cruelties in connection with the prosecution of the war. This law of the Rules of War has been upheld by our own Supreme Court and will be the basis of judicial action against the Nazis.

Even though these offences have not been committed against our troops, I feel that our moral position is better if we take our share in their conviction. Other war criminals who have committed crimes in subjugated

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territory should be returned in accordance with the Moscow Declaration to those territories for trial by national military commissions having jurisdiction of the offence under the same Rules of War. I have great difficulty in finding any means whereby military commissions may try and convict those responsible for excesses committed within Germany both before and during the war which have no relation to the conduct of the war. I would be prepared to construe broadly what constituted a violation of the Rules of War but there is a certain field in which I fear that external courts cannot move. Such courts would be without jurisdiction in precisely the same way that any foreign court would be without jurisdiction to try those who were guilty of, or condoned, lynching in our own country.

The above are the two main points with which I differ from the proposed program submitted by the Secretary of the Treasury.

Partition

I have an open mind on partition and although I have given the matter substantial consideration I have,

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as yet, come to no conclusion as to wisdom or method of partition. I feel we cannot deal effectively with that subject until we have had an interchange of views with the English and the Russians. I, myself, seek further light on this subject. I, certainly, would not discourage any spontaneous effort toward separation of the country into two or more groups.

Annotation

I understand that there is some general recognition of the probability of Russia or the Poles taking East Prussia and some parts of Silesia. I suggest that we interpose no objection to this but that we take no part in the administration of the area. On the Western border the primary question is the matter of dealing with the Ruhr but it has also been suggested that the Rhineland and the Saar be delivered to France. Naturally I am in favor of the automatic return of Alsace and Lorraine to France but though my mind is not irrevocably closed against it, I feel that the burden of proof lies on those who suggest giving France more territory. She will come out of this war with her Empire practically intact, with a reduced population and already possessing

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a very valuable bit of ore in the Longwy Briey area. To give her a substantial territory of German-speaking and German-bred people would create another problem in the balance of Europe. To counteract this, I would give France a share in the benefits of the internationalization of the Saar and the Ruhr and the advantage which this gives of what would in effect be an international barrier between France and Germany.

There are certain other methods of punishment affecting the personal lives of individual Germans proposed by the Secretary of the Treasury to which I am opposed as constituting irritations of no fundamental value, and, indeed, of considerable danger, but these are primarily matters of administration which I think need not be discussed at this time. In some part, at least, they had best be determined by those who have the primary responsibility for the administration of the occupation.

As a suggestion, I propose that during the interim period, which is all that we can deal with at the moment, the President be recommended to approve a program generally in accord with the memorandum submitted by

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the Secretary of State at the meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Tuesday, September 5, except for a modification of subparagraph 2(h) of that memorandum and certain other slight modifications on which I hope we can all agree, which suggested changes I append hereto.

H.L.S.

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September 9, 1944

SUGGESTED CHANGES IN CABINET COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS AS STATED IN PAPER SEPTEMBER 4, 1944.

To paragraph 2(a) should be added the following:

"At least for an indefinite period Germany shall be denied the means or power to manufacture or design aeroplanes or gliders of any sort whether military, commercial or private, and Germany shall have no license to operate any airlines. During this period no schools or courses for the study of air flight in any form shall be permitted.

All machines, plants and other instruments which are peculiarly adapted to the manufacture of arms and lethal weapons of any sort shall be dismantled or destroyed."

Paragraph 2(b) should be rewritten to read as follows:

"Dissolution of the Nazi Party and all its affiliated and associated organizations should be effected immediately and all members of the Gestapo, viz., the so-called security or political police, prominent Nazis in whatever activity they may have operated, substantially if not all members of the S.S. organizations, and others who are suspected of having taken part in or had responsibility for the perpetration of war crimes, should be apprehended and held for further disposition. Prompt and summary trials

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shall be held of those charged with such crimes and punishment should be swift and severe.

Studies should be instituted at once to determine the procedures to be followed in such trials, and they should be cleared with the British, Russians, and French as quickly as possible, so that they can be communicated to the appropriate occupying authorities without delay.

All laws discriminating against persons on grounds of race, color, creed, political activity or opinion, should be annulled."

To paragraph (e) should be added the following:

"The territories of Germany which are to be ceded to other countries are understood to be all or most of East Prussia and some parts of Silesia. The question of the Rhineland and the Saar is closely connected with the treatment of the Ruhr. We recommend as the present view of the United States that a strong control over the products of this area must be maintained by means of some form of international trusteeship of its products and resources. It should not be obliterated as an industrial productive center, but it must be actively managed by others than Germans and otherwise completely taken from German domination.

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On the other hand no efforts shall be made to rebuild any of the destroyed plants in Germany until permission is given by appropriate Allied or United Nations authority."

Substitute for paragraph (h) the following:

"The primary objectives of our economic policy are: (1) the permanent elimination of German economic domination in Europe and (2) the conversion of German economic capacity in such manner that it will be so dependent upon imports and exports that Germany cannot by its own devices reconvert to war production.".

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I have considered the paper entitled "Suggested Recommendations on Treatment of Germany from the Cabinet Committee for the President", dated September 4th, submitted to the Committee by the Secretary of State and have discussed it with my colleagues on the Committee.

With the exception of the last paragraph I find myself in agreement with the principles stated therein and they are in conformity with the lines upon which we have been proceeding in the War Department in our directives to the Armed Forces.

The last paragraph, however, is as follows:

> "h. The primary objectives of our economic policy are (1) the standard of living of the German population shall be held down to subsistence levels; (2) German economic position of power in Europe must be eliminated; (3) German economic capacity must be converted in such manner that it will be so dependent upon imports and exports that Germany cannot by its own devices reconvert to war production".

While certain of these statements by themselves may possibly be susceptible of a construction with which I would not be at variance, the construction put upon them at the discussion this morning certainly reached positions to which I am utterly opposed. The position frankly taken by

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some of my colleagues was that the great industrial regions of Germany known as the Saar and the Ruhr with their very important deposits of coal and ore should be totally transformed into a non-industrialized area of agricultural land.

I cannot conceive of such a proposition being either possible or effective and I can see enormous general evils coming from an attempt to so treat it. During the past eighty years of European history this portion of Germany was one of the most important sources of the raw materials upon which the industrial and economic livelihood of Europe was based. Upon the production which came from the raw materials of this region during those years, the commerce of Europe was very largely predicated. Upon that production Germany became the largest source of supply to no less than ten European countries, viz: Russia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Roumania, and Bulgaria; and the second largest source of supply to Great Britain, Belgium, and France. By the same commerce, which in large part arose from this production, Germany also became the best buyer or customer of Russia, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, and Austria-Hungary; and the second best

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customer of Great Britain, Sweden, and Denmark. The production of these materials from this region could not be sealed up and obliterated as was proposed this morning, without manifestly causing a great dislocation to the trade upon which Europe has lived. In Germany itself this commerce has built up since 1870 a population of approximately thirty million more people than were ever supported upon the agricultural soil of Germany alone. Undoubtedly a similar growth of population took place in the nations which indirectly participated in the commerce based upon this production.

I cannot treat as realistic the suggestion that such an area in the present economic condition of the world can be turned into a non-productive "ghost Territory" when it has become the center of one of the most industrialized continents in the world, populated by peoples of energy, vigor and progressiveness.

I can conceive of endeavoring to meet the misuse which Germany has recently made of this production by wise systems of control or trusteeship or even transfers of ownership to other nations. But I cannot conceive of turning such a gift of nature into a dust heap.

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War is destruction. This war more than any previous war has caused gigantic destruction. The need for the recuperative benefits of productivity is more evident now than ever before throughout the world. Not to speak of Germany at all or even her satellites, our Allies in Europe will feel the need of the benefit of such productivity if it should be destroyed. Moreover, speed of reconstruction is of great importance, if we hope to avoid dangerous convulsions in Europe.

We contemplate the transfer from Germany of ownership of East Prussia, Upper Silesia, Alsace and Lorraine (each of them except the first containing raw materials of importance) together with the imposition of general economic controls. We also are considering the wisdom of a possible partition of Germany into north and south sections, as well as the creation of an internationalized State in the Ruhr. With such precautions, or indeed with only some of them, it certainly should not be necessary for us to obliterate all industrial productivity in the Ruhr area, in order to preclude its future misuse.

Nor can I agree that it should be one of our purposes to hold the German population "to a subsistence level" if this means the edge of poverty. This would mean

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condemning the German people to a condition of servitude in which, no matter how hard or how effectively a man worked, he could not materially increase his economic condition in the world. Such a program would, I believe, create tensions and resentments far outweighing any immediate advantage of security and would tend to obscure the guilt of the Nazis and the viciousness of their doctrines and their acts.

By such economic mistakes I cannot but feel that you would also be poisoning the springs out of which we hope that the future peace of the world can be maintained.

It is primarily by the thorough apprehension, investigation, and trial of all the Nazi leaders and instruments of the Nazi system of terrorism, such as the Gestapo, with punishment delivered as promptly, swiftly, and severely as possible, that we can demonstrate the abhorrence which the world has for such a system and bring home to the German people our determination to extirpate it and all its fruits forever.

My basic objection to the proposed methods of treating Germany which were discussed this morning was that in addition to a system of preventive and educative punishment they would add the dangerous weapon of complete economic

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oppression. Such methods, in my opinion, do not prevent war; they tend to breed war.

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

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FROM : Maj. C. Rado

x religion
x Kelly, Hermann
x Vendu, Roy, Tom
x Rado, Emmy C.

SUBJECT: A sample of Nazis to organize illegally

This is the first time that I came across what I believe to be a definite plan of Nazi underground organization.

I have read and glanced at hundreds of letters to German POW's. This letter attracted my attention, because it is written with a great many details and the German censor permitted many mistakes to pass in this communication. This letter might have been written in order to give encouragement to the POW and to tell him that they are preparing for eventualities or else it might mean that the POW should begin to organize work along similar lines in his camp.

At the present time religious sects are not encouraged in Germany, they are sometimes persecuted even, the plan under the Nazis was to centralize religious activities and to have the state lead them. The Nazis knew that resistance to them comes from religious quarters, they probably speculate that we know this too and consequently plan some of the future illegal activities under the cloak of religion.

In reading this letter one must substitute the religious terms and put Hitler and Nationalsozialismus in its instead.

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The letter deals with the religious activities of a "Baron von der Ropp", who is organizing "evangelical work" and training people to live the life of the Gospel.

On the surface the letter looks harmless. The activities described might well be those of an anti-Nazi underground, but there are certain indications, which suggest that this letter deals with the preparation for a most dangerous form of Nazi underground after the abolition of the Hitler regime. The camouflage is such that only persons trained in the pre-history and history of the Nazi movement may be able to discover it.

The name von der Ropp suggests an old nationalistic German family. The few data which the letter gives on his life history all point in the same direction. (the name is of course be false or assumed but even in this case the data given in the letter would carry the same connotation.) He was a landowner in the "Baltikum". (The Baltikum was, at the end of the First World War, the breeding ground of the ultra-nationalistic Free Corps, which were the precursors of the Nazi movement. Many of the large landowners in this region protected and promoted the Free Corps leaders.) The letter furthermore mentions, that during the First World War, von der Ropp "helped to open the

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threads of high politics on the side of Germany". It also states, that "in the years preceding 1935 (that is to say during the first years of the Hitler regime), von der Kopp was training young men in Berlin's workers district "in disciplined sport and work service" in empty barracks.

These indications are in themselves not conclusive, but they are sufficiently strong to warrant OSS intelligence work directed to the unmasking of forms of Nazi camouflage. (It has already been ascertained that a Friedrich von der Kopp was, in 1934, the leader of an organisation called "Christliche Kampfschar" and that he had his residence or office in the building of the Wehrmacht command in Berlin.)

May I suggest that careful contact be established with the addressee.

[illegible]

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Office of Censorship, USA Confidential Postal Censorship

FROM: H. Faber
Ludwigsburg
Scherndorferstr. 91
Wurtt. (Germany)
Signed: "Hans Faber"

TO: OB.GEFR.
Hermann Kolb
7 WG 36466
Camp Trinidad, Colo.

Date of communication: June 28, 1944
Date of postmark: June 29, 1944
Kind of mail: Air
Language: German
Previously censored by: Germany 5611
Previous relevant records: NYPW 30636-R/Extraction
Division: POW Table: 1414 A Examiner: 11901 D.A.C. 12161
Reviewer: 12146 Examination date: Sept. 11-12-1944 Typed: Sept.12

COMMENT
GERMAN LAYMAN ORGANIZES SMALL CIRCLES OSTENSIBLY FOR RELIGIOUS PURPOSES

In letter to Prisoner of War, friend writes:

".....From Saturday, June 3, up to June 12, BARON VON DER ROPP spoke every evening in the largest church here (about 1200 seats). He preached the Gospel so simply as I have hardly ever heard it from an evangelist. On two Sundays he preached in the morning. The church was always full to overflowing. Following the morning service one Sunday, there was a Communion with 600 participants (!). The spirit of God has not become powerless, but still inspires today. During these days we have been permitted to experience that it summons "all the Christians on earth...." We hope that now the light of the Gospel will really shine brightly in our community and show itself effectively in our lives.

The unique feature of ROPP'S work is shown, among other things, in the fact that he makes great efforts to insure that what he has started shall continue. He aims at Bible circles of about 15 people to be led by a layman and meeting regularly in a private home, if possible. They are to be purposeful groups in the community, ready for any service which the individual can render, and they are to be brotherly groups, helping each other to live the true Christian life. The leaders of the circles are appointed by the community and trained regularly (monthly)

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by a clergyman. May God give the work His blessing!"

VON DER HOPP himself has had his own peculiar experiences. I can tell you a few of the things I know about him. He is now about 65 years old, originally a land-owner in the BALTIC PROVINCES (BALTIKUM), lost nearly everything there as a result of the first world war, was a mining engineer by profession, practising as such in Westphalia and especially in Africa, and in the first world war also helped to spin the threads of high politics on the side of Germany. Originally indifferent to Christ and the Church, he experienced a decisive conversion to both, and now, for many years already, has devoted himself entirely to the service of the Church as an evangelist. Besides this, in the years preceding 1935 he carried on a unique work among young men from BERLIN EAST SIDE, training them physically and spiritually in 40 weeks courses in an empty barracks, in disciplined sport and work service, and endeavoring to lead them to Christ through intensive evangelical work. In addition to this he has translated the Gospels in his own language, written hymns and set them to music. Truly a witness to Christ of a special stamp in our modern times! I am very glad to have met him....."

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TO : General W. J. Donovan DATE: Sept. 1944

FROM : Emmy. C. Rado

SUBJECT: A sample of Nazis to organise illegally

This is the first time that I came across what I believe to be a definite plan of Nazi underground organization.

I have read and glanced at hundreds of letters to German POW's. This letter attracted my attention, because it is written with a great many details and the German censor permitted many numbers to pass in this communication. This letter might have been written in order to give encouragement to the POW and to tell him that they are preparing for eventualities or else it might mean that the POW should begin to organize work along similar lines in his camp.

At the present time religious sects are not encouraged in Germany, they are sometimes persecuted even, the plan under the Nazis was to centralize religious activities and to have the state lead them.

The Nazis knew that resistance to them comes from religious centers, they probably speculate that we know this too and consequently plan some of the future illegal activities under the cloak of religion.

In reading this letter one must substitute the religious terms and put Hitler and Nationalsocialism in it instead.

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Confidential Postal Censorship

FROM: H. Faber
Ludwigsburg
Schorndorferstr. 91
Wurtt. (Germany)
Signed: "Hans Faber"

TO: OB.GEFR.
Hermann Kalb
7 [illegible] 36466
Camp Trinidad, Colo.

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

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TOP SECRET

TO : General Donovan

FROM : Secretariat

DATE: 21 October 1944

SUBJECT: Memorandum by Dr. Wilhelm Hoegener submitting a Proposal for a New Political Structure in Germany.

The general thesis of the attached paper by Dr. Wilhelm Hoegener, former member of the Reichstag and Bavarian Diet, is a plan for the establishment in Germany of a federation of states or a federal state. Although at the outset it is proposed to decentralize the German state, the blueprints for the Reich give the federal government jurisdiction over foreign policy, political economy, social policy, etc. The states have jurisdiction only over such matters as police administration, cultural policies and administration of justice. A constitutional court of justice would settle disputes between individual states, and states and the Federal government. The counties would be given the constitutional right of self-administration.

The borders of these states would be roughly those of pre-Bismarckian Germany with the exception of Prussia which would be subdivided. Apparently the national borders would be approximately those of Germany before the Anschluss although the exact status of East Prussia is not clarified.

W. B. Kantack
Capt. A.C.
Reports Offi

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

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

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P[illegible] A NEW POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN GERMANY

[illegible] Prussia

[illegible] the almost total disintegration of their state structure [illegible] Years War from [illegible] lows, the German people and its [illegible] political forces in order to regain their [illegible] unity. The [illegible] of the [illegible] unity finally emerged [illegible] of the totalitarian States, the Asiatic veneration of [illegible] must be made to [illegible] the heathen idol [illegible] power of the State must be overthrown. The German subjects [illegible] the free [illegible] the rulers of the [illegible] state must [illegible] German [illegible] must begin [illegible] a new [illegible] German [illegible] must [illegible] first of all, a reorientation [illegible] to willingness [illegible] It must be emphasized [illegible] way to the [illegible] Prussia [illegible] on [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible]

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Prussia's will was decisive in the Reich and the evil spirit at Potsdam penetrated the entire German people. The dashing reserve officer became the social ideal of the German middle class. Prussia's warlike spirit was passed down like an eternal disease from father to son in the Prussian [illegible]tary nobility, whose strongest support was the great landed Prussian estates. Until 1918 Prussia was basically a feudal State, a relic of medieval times.

Essentially the Weimar constitution confined the outlines of the German [illegible] as Greater Prussia. The efforts to partition Prussia were not successful. Article 18 of the Weimar Constitution [illegible] attained a difficult goal [illegible] of submitting territorial changes to a referendum, but so little was [illegible] made of this. To be sure, the authority of the Reich was strengthened at the cost of the realms. As a result, the Prussian Junkers, as well as [illegible] bureaucracy, [illegible] and also obtained decisive influence [illegible] Prussia [illegible] overcame. However, as a result [illegible] and democratic [illegible] of Prussia and Saxony, it was [illegible] democratic [illegible] to Prussia. Rather, a political [illegible] to close, it [illegible] Reich [illegible] what the Prussian [illegible] chance [illegible] The [illegible]

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The new division of the Reich should be made as quickly as possible, [illegible] would be best to accomplish this immediately after the occupation of [illegible] by the Allied forces. Every military experience has shown that [illegible] fundamental changes advantage must be taken of the psychological moment, as [illegible] gains as time passes and conditions [illegible] become [illegible]

[illegible] separation of Prussia from the Reich and its division [illegible]

The [illegible] between the [illegible] and the states will depend [illegible] of Germany as a federation of states (Staaten) [illegible] as a single state possessing [illegible] and should be transformed [illegible] states will be easily [illegible] states [illegible] international [illegible]

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Should Germany again be formed into a federation of states, the separation of powers between the federal assembly and the states would best be [illegible] in the following manner: The constitution would give the states jurisdiction in definite domains, such as police administration, cultural matters, and the administration of justice. The Reich, however, would definitely be given jurisdiction over foreign policy, political economy, social policy, etc. All disputes between the federal government and the states, as well as among the states themselves would be settled by a constitutional court of justice. Besides this federalism, the counties would also be given the constitutional right of self-administration. To better [illegible] reclaimed sovereignty of the states, this would constitute an element needed for counter-acting any new centralizing or totalitarian [illegible]. It will not be possible to free the German people from the [illegible] by external measures alone. Besides destroying [illegible] it will be necessary to deprive the reactionary forces [illegible] power. These which helped National Socialism into the saddle, and [illegible] German militar as the great land-owners east of the Elbe and [illegible] heavy industry.

[illegible] Dec 11 1945

[illegible]

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October 11, 1944.

Dear Miller

I am sending to you two reports dealing with Catholic influences in Germany, which have come to us from the OSS group in New York which you know all about. Occasionally, these reports reproduce material of interest to Catholic readers in this country which has been received from OSS correspondents in London, Lisbon and, occasionally, Stockholm. The background information and comment is added for our information and they endeavor to maintain a high standard of accuracy and objectivity.

We shall continue to supply this material to you from time to time when we believe it to be of use in your work.

With warm regards.

Sincerely yours,

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OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION

RD 8. Foreign News Bureau

SE SWISS DISCUSSES ROLE OF CATHOLICS IN FUTURE OF GERMANY

The Swiss newspaper Tages-Anzeiger fur Stadt und Landschaft Zurich recently named several German Catholics who might be instrumental in creating a "new democratic government" in Germany. It pointed out that among Catholics in Germany there are also "many supporters of the leftist movement" and "convinced torch bearers of National Socialism."

As reported to the Office of War Information today, the article mentioned Heinrich Bruening, now a professor at Harvard University, and Joseph Wirth, who is in Switzerland, as German Catholic politicians before 1933 who are "highly esteemed in the Allied countries."

"A third leading personality of the former Zentrum (Center) Party," the article said, "is Father Ludwig Kaas" who holds "an equally respected and influential post" at St. Peter's in Rome. It added that he "will have to perform one of the most important jobs, once the change in Germany has become a reality."

The article named Gerhard Count von Preysing, Bishop of Berlin, and Clemens August, Count von Galen, as two "outstanding personalities" among the Catholic clergy who "would not deny their support to any government of moderate character."

The Zurich newspaper went on to say that it should be noted that there are also "many supporters of the leftist movement" and "convinced torch bearers of National Socialism" among German Catholics, [illegible] that there are two parties, [illegible] among the Catholic masses of Germany. The former [illegible] among the Catholic masses of Germany. The latter [illegible] Church.

The "supporters of the leftist movement," the article added, are [illegible] circles of Labor and are of "radical change" and would be [illegible] to organize a Popular Front [illegible] with the Socialists, the Communists and the [illegible] parties."

"We hardly believe that they will find the full understanding of the Vatican," the newspaper stated, adding that "neither do Nazi-minded Catholics enjoy much sympathy there."

The article [illegible] the ideological difference between Catholicism and National Socialism will be "much more [illegible]" by the Church in the future.

[illegible]

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following is a comment on an article which appeared in the Swiss n... "Tages-Anzeiger fuer Stadt und Landschaft Zurich", dealing with the re... ...o Catholics in the future of Germany. Extracts from the article were r...ased to the press by the Office of War Information on October 7, 1944.

COMMENT:

The "Tages-Anzeiger" has the largest circulation of any newspaper in Switzerland, largely because its editorials, local news and classified ads are them any newspaper. It has not a reputation of being well informed on matters outside Zurich and eastern Switzerland. Persons interested in world affairs read the "Neue Zuercher Zeitung" (Radical Democratic, Protestant, excellent coverage of foreign news), the "Neue Zuercher Nachrichten" (Nationalist) and the "Volksrecht" (Socialist). The "Nachrichten" are well informed on Catholic affairs, and the "Volksrecht" is reliable in news concerning the labor movement and the Socialist Parties in different countries.

The "Tages-Anzeiger" article does not contain a single information which would indicate that the writer has access to exclusive sources. None of the statements are vague, others are fantastic or inadmissible.

Dr. Heinrich Bruening, now Professor at Harvard University, and Dr. Joseph Wirth, now living in Geneva, Switzerland, are said to be [illegible] Catholic politicians who are [illegible] in the Allied countries. After the recent death of the [illegible] Dr. Bruening are listed the only surviving former [illegible] Government before Hitler. [illegible] the respect of many foreign diplomats, in [illegible] Wirth is [illegible] a politician rule. Both [illegible] Wirth [illegible] Dr. Bruening has changed in the structure and [illegible] considered necessary by the United Nations. Dr. Bruening has [illegible] from making any [illegible] Germany in public [illegible] Wirth, who could not make [illegible] between political refugees [illegible] Switzerland are under [illegible] opinions, in getting [illegible] by attacking Catholic [illegible] majority of the [illegible] Catholics in Germany, [illegible] ability of either one playing a leading role in future German politics will [illegible] here mentioned.

The reference in the [illegible] to "Father Leiber [illegible] he said he told the [illegible] Dr. Bruening that [illegible] Pius XII [illegible] Pius XII [illegible] President of the United States, [illegible] Ambassador of the Holy See [illegible] Switzerland [illegible] Father Leiber [illegible] Pius XII [illegible]

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alleged sympathy which Pope Pius XII is showing him (the Pope, the former Eugenio Pacelli, knew Brueningser Kaas for many years in Germany) may give him indirectly some influence on the Vatican. It is unlikely that the most convinced anti-Nazis among the German Catholics have or will have any confidence in Brueningser Kaas who in 1933 was responsible for persuading (with arguments which were in fact, though not necessarily intentionally, deceiving) the majority of the Center Party Deputies in the Reichstag to vote for Hitler's plenary powers. At that time, Dr. Bruening opposed Brueningser Kaas, unsuccessfully. Brueningser Kaas' reported plan not to return to Germany is probably based on his opinion that a large number of German Catholics would not welcome his return.

Count von Preysing, Bishop of Berlin, and Count von Galen, Bishop of Muenster, are described as two "outstanding personalities" among the Catholic clergy who "would not deny their support to any Government of moderate elements". Both Bishops, relatively young, very courageous and powerful personalities, have shown that they are strongly anti-Nazi. Of course, they - and all other Bishops - would loyally cooperate with any Government (whether of "moderate elements" or not) or any settlement which would respect the rights of the Church and basic human rights. Whether any of them would want to engage actively in political affairs is extremely doubtful.

The "Pope-Brueningser" does not specify what is meant by the Pope's members of the leftist movement" among the German Catholics. If it means that the are - and have always been - a liberal and progressive element in the conservative and reactionary clergy among the German Catholics, the paper simply repeats something that is of common knowledge. In the Center Party, there was a left wing and a right wing. Dr. Bruening was considered as a man of the left, Dr. Brueningser Kaas as a man of the right, and Prelate Kaas as holding a middle-of-the-road position. [illegible] outside the Center Party [illegible] on the right, there was the Catholic Workers' Movement, with [illegible] members in the Reichstag. [illegible] was in the Reichstag [illegible] Bruening's friend Stegerwald, a former [illegible] Minister-President and Vice-Chancellor [illegible] Party, there was the Christian Social Party [illegible] there in the Parliament [illegible] Catholic Bruening, Stegerwald, Imbusch, Kaas, Joos, Gockeln, Hamacher, Lambach, Schmitt, Schreiber, Wirth, Wolff, Wuermeling, Zimmermann, Zurhorst, Zwickel, Zwiesele, Zwirner, Zwoch, Zyrenner, Zywietz, Zzzzzzzzz, Zzzzzzzzzz, Zzzzzzzzzzz, Zzzzzzzzzzzz, Zzzzzzzzzzzzz, Zzzzzzzzzzzzzz, Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzz, Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz, Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz, Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz, Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz, Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz, Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz, Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz, Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz, Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz, Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz, Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz, Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz, Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz, Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz, Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz, Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz, Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz, Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz, Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz, Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz, Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz, Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz, Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz, Zz

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The formation of a "Committee for Religious Affairs" among German war-prisoners in Russia marks a new development in the Moscow-sponsored Free German movement. Whereas only two or three clerics, Catholic and Protestant, spoke for "Free Germany" during the first year and a half of its existence, there are now a sufficient number of them to form a special committee. This "Religious Committee" was formed during a two-day conference of the Free German Committee, in Moscow, June 10-11. Its members broadcast numerous messages to Germany, and, on August 1, the Committee issued an "Appeal to German Christians" signed by 23 chaplains, clergymen and theological students.

The "Religious Committee" evidently enjoys some measure of autonomy within the Free German movement, which is composed of captured generals, officers, soldiers and Communist exiles under the chairmanship of the Communist poet Erich Weinert. Unlike the usual Free German broadcasts, those of the Religious Committee contain little, if any, direct political propaganda. They call for the overthrow of Nazism but the argument is almost entirely on religious grounds. Thus the appeal, using the opening words "With Burning Hearts" of the famous encyclical of Pius XI against Nazism, declares: "With deep concern we take part in the fate of our people", and after stating how the Church has defied Nazism, it ends with the call to the German people to "refuse obedience (to Nazism) everywhere and at any time, for the Bible commands you to obey God rather than men".

The addresses given during the conference by individual members of the Committee, which includes Protestant clergymen, Catholic priests, theological students, and possibly some laymen, with one exception, make no reference to the Soviet or to Communism. Thus Major [redacted], described by his uncle, the Bishop of [redacted], as a "fighting parson" who "prays for his men-of-war-fellowships and the [redacted] of their wives and children", is reported to have urged the large class, while the Church should keep out of politics, religious world be taught in the schools. The only reference to the Soviet was made by the Rev. Joseph [redacted], Chaplain of the German 7th Infantry Div. and captured at Stalingrad on the eve of the first Soviet counter-offensive. Speaking over the Moscow radio on August 1943, he said: "Our comrades of the Pope are made available to us here and are our companions, our friends and our rule of goodwill." Adding that the clergy were willing to cooperate under practical conditions, he declared: "Only Nazi aims should suffer the upon the eyes of the German [redacted] as to spiritual life in the Soviet Union.

The influence of the Free Germany Committee will undoubtedly be broadened by the cooperation of the clerical group, but its religious appeals would have their unfavorable side if there was made there were any [redacted] considerable amount of freedom. This may well account for the [redacted] Liberalism of the Soviet authorities, particularly the military, in their [redacted] interested in facilitating the attempts of the Red Army and [redacted] defense in all German circles. While the Soviet's granting of [redacted] the above mentioned broadcasts to Germany may be taken as an indication of [redacted] Soviet policy towards religion, it is clear that this privilege is [redacted] conflict with Soviet domestic, [redacted] the totalitarian [redacted] and the [redacted] of the Free Germany Committee.

[redacted] of the priests and [redacted] the Soviet Union [redacted] the religious question [redacted] the Committee [redacted] to the Committee [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

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FNB

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES — 19 October 1944

FOREIGN NATIONALITIES BRANCH — FN Number S-191

MEMORANDUM for the Director of Strategic Services
Secretary of State

SUBJECT: A Prominent German on the Problem of Germany.

The considered views of one of the most highly placed and experienced of the German anti-Nazi exiles on the reconstruction of German life after the defeat are submitted herewith. The person in question is referred to as R; his name will be supplied upon request.

Thousands of executions since the attempt on Hitler's life 20 July have removed, in R's opinion, the only group of competent leaders who might have taken over in Germany on a national scale after the Nazis give in or disintegrate. R. foresees that German social and political life will have to be built up again from the lowest units -- villages, cities, counties; meanwhile essential services, such as police, transportation and nourishment, must be centralized within larger areas as rapidly as these come under Allied control.

For this work of basic reconstruction the Allied authorities can look for help among the older generations of the Social Democratic Party, the Center Party (and its offshoot, the Bavarian People's Party), the trade-unionists and

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Catholic clergy, remnants of the civil service, and certain trade unions; but at best help of this kind will at the beginning be dispersed and local.

Skilled workers from the old trade unions (freie und Christliche Gewerkschaften) are recommended particularly. The system of shop councils could prove helpful in sorting out skilled workers of the right kind and for obtaining the cooperation of workmen generally. Farmers will tend to be passive but can be developed into a stabilising factor, especially in the West and parts of the South.

S. writes in concrete terms and with discrimination. Knowledge of German history and direct experience with administration at the highest level -- up to the time Hitler took over -- enable him to explain conditions realistically and by local reference rather than over-all generalisation. Memorandum No. I (attached) deals with the political forces which the Allied authorities can harness to the tasks of social and political re-ordering. He warns against any attempt to impose returned emigre leaders.

Memorandum No. II examines in concrete detail the actual reconstruction of the administrative services. A third memorandum, still to be supplied, will deal with the rehabilitation of economic life.

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Confidential talks with R. make it possible to amplify the memorandum in respect of two subjects upon which R. preferred not to enter at length in writing. One such subject was the 20 July coup. The other was the Russian impact upon Germany.

The 20 July Coup. The history of the 20 July coup goes back as far as 1933, when, as explicitly noted by him at page 4 of Memorandum No. I, R. assisted in establishing "private contact" among leading members of the Social Democratic, Centre and moderate parties of the Right. The critical tie was with members of the German General Staff, whom R. ordinarily refers to simply as "the Generals."

The Social Democrat, Wilhelm Leuschner, who was hanged last month, had a chief part in the long-sustained conspiracy. Karl Goerdeler, former mayor of Leipzig, and another victim of the purge which followed 20 July, also figured prominently. The military figures were primarily those who came into the staff under the late General Oesterr when he was Reichswehr Minister. R. expresses high admiration and warmth of friendship for Oesterr. He remembers Oesterr's early perception of the special vulnerability to air attack created by Germany's central position in Europe. Germany could

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only secure herself, Groener used to argue, by possession of adequate glacis on both West and East.

R. also speaks heartily of General von Hammerstein-Equord who, under Groener, succeeded General Heye as head of the Reichswehr. With General von Seeckt R. was never so impressed -- which is contrary to the general opinion. Von Seeckt, he feels, was not so able and moreover was heavily "mortgaged" by an ambitious wife.

During the '30's R. lived as a distinguished but rather discreet exile in England and the United States and to some extent on the Continent. During much of this time the conspiracy went on. The purpose was to bring an end to the Nazi regime by a coup in which "the generals" would of necessity bear the finally decisive part.

There were meetings with Goerdeler at Brussels and other points. High personalities in England and France were involved, including MacDonald and Daladier. "The generals," R. related, were prepared to act against the Nazis and for avoidance of the new world war which was plainly developing -- on two main conditions: (1) that Germany's eastern frontiers be rectified, and (2) that Britain should guarantee that during the war or there-

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weeks of civil war which would attend the suppression of the Nazis France and Poland should not march in.

R. had occupied himself with the problem of the eastern frontiers in 1933. He had reason then and later to believe that Pilsudski would be amenable to a readjustment whereby Germany would regain Danzig and the Corridor, while a union of Latvia and Lithuania with Poland would provide Poland with an adequate seaport at Memel.

The persons in Germany with whom these projects were clandestinely discussed in the course of the '30's were by and large the group whose liquidation the Nazis accomplished finally and completely this summer.

There were difficulties apart from Hitler. R. designates Lord Vansittart as perhaps the chief of these. Vansittart's influence not only in England but at the Quai d'Orsay R. describes as wholly destructive. R. opines that Vansittart's "present hysteria" is the product of a guilty conscience now it has become plain what his obstructionism has brought upon the world.

There were other difficulties still. MacDonald was not discreet. Certain London bankers kept up close ties with the Nazis. R. recalls that some dangerous things

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which he had perforce to say to some persons in the City were passed on to Schacht in Germany. R. regards Schacht most adversely -- all out for himself and totally unreliable.

Then there were the other German refugees. Among these R. particularly denounces Georg Bernhard, then in Paris. He says that journalistic utterances of men of this type called the attention of the Nazis to matters which very much needed to be kept quiet.

R. left England in rather a despairing mood and settled down in the United States. In 1939 Adam von Trott zu Solz -- another of those recently hanged -- came here in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations. Jerome Greene of Harvard brought Trott in touch with R. R. had not previously known Trott as one of the group but Trott identified himself satisfactorily. He learned from him that General von Falkenhausen was heading things up for "the Generals." Falkenhausen's appointment to Brussels seemed to R. bad news. He thought it plain that Falkenhausen had been sent there so that he might be watched the more easily.

Later on the replacement of General Beck came as bad news also. R. seems to have counted on General von Fundstedt as well. He spoke admiringly of Rundstedt's ability to

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appraise situations with the coldest intellectuality. Last June Rundstedt saw the game was up in France. If Hitler had let him execute a timely withdrawal to the German frontiers, the situation would be different now. Hitler made the same basic mistake in the West as in Russia. He would not face facts in time".

R. pretends to no inside information at present respecting events in Germany. He reads newspapers assiduously and refers especially to the London Times. He thinks Himmler planted the 20 July coup so as to uncover the opposition. Stauffenberg** -- now dead himself -- believing Hitler dead, flew to Berlin, and word to revolt went out from the Ersatz Heer Headquarters. For a few hours, in Silesia and probably elsewhere, the authority of the Nazis was in suspense; but troops which might have proved dependable -- as against the Nazis -- were at the front and the SS soon prevailed.

* Articles on German military affairs appearing in recent issues of Foreign Affairs (New York) under the pseudonym X, are by R.

** Of the Swartzenberg Catholic nobility -- not previously known to R.

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Swedish Information Respecting Trott. It is interesting to note that some confirmation comes through Sweden of Trott's activities as an outside contact-man. The following passages from the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter were printed in the 30 September 1944 issue of the Neue Volkszeitung of New York. R. has referred to them as broadly authentic.

"The hanging of the seven German politicians has dispersed the central group of the German opposition which was composed of trade union, church and other political and oppositional elements," Dagens Nyheter is quoted as saying. "Trott zu Solz was the contact man of this group. He was charged with feeling out the opinion abroad toward a new German government which the group considered forming. For this purpose he made repeated visits to Stockholm. Contacts of this kind were also tried in other places, but Trott's activities were probably the most important ones.

"The information which he was able to give about developments inside Germany explained that the opposition had been strongly encouraged by military developments. Also that the central group in Berlin was only waiting for action as soon as a practical opportunity should arise.

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The group had grown in the past few years more and more; and the trade union representatives held important positions in the central committee, since the German opposition had recognized that in the reconstruction of a new Reich the workers would play a big role. The opposition group found another basis among the masses through persons with strong ties with the Catholic and Protestant church movements. Also prominent German intellectuals and even persons within the administrative branches of the Government, like Trott, were represented.

"Many people within the German opposition regarded Goerdeler and his followers rather sceptically, both for their conservative past and their close connections with heavy industry. Goerdeler's personal friendship with Hjalmar Schacht was also disliked. However, the members of the group were ready to cooperate with whoever could help in destroying Hitlerism. That is why they had contact with ill-reputed Count Helldorf, notwithstanding his very dubious past, and with some other SS officers.

"Trott zu Solz himself doubted that an armed uprising of the people would be possible in view of the distribution of forces in the Reich. He was inclined to believe that the opposition would only be able to make itself felt after

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military breakdown of the Nazis. Well, at the end he most probably had to realize that the German opposition will first have to demonstrate something positive before it will be considered seriously abroad."

(Note that the foregoing has been translated from Swedish to German and from German to English.)

The Russian Impact. The anti-Nazi conspiracy which R. believes this summer's purge has now effectively destroyed seems to have been oriented by a sense of affinity with the West. It turned on those German generals who were anti-Russian -- as distinguished from those pro-Russians more Nihilist in their views.

R. is filled with a lively apprehension lest even now some sort of combination exists between the Russians and the Nazis. Whatever events may prove in that regard, he foresees in the tripartite occupation of Germany many difficulties and dangers from the point of view of European civilization.

R. doubts that Hitler would find it psychologically possible to compound again with Russia, but R. has become convinced that Himmler has replaced Hitler in control, and a combination between Himmler and the Russians would seem

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to R. altogether natural. A couple of weeks ago the course of military operations in Finland suggested to him something arranged.

R. has all along been strongly impressed by Russia's nearly total abstention from bombing operations over German cities. He anticipates that the Western Powers will find their relations with the German population rendered much more difficult in consequence.

What concerns him most deeply, however, is Communist penetration from the part of Germany which the Russians are expected to occupy into the Western and Southern parts which are to be occupied by the British and Americans. He says that he deliberately slighted, in the enclosed memoranda, this aspect of the problems of occupation, because he is naturally reluctant to appear to be building up a Russian bogey. In very private conversation, however, he voices grave doubt that the Russians will refrain from developing their especially favorable situation in Germany to the detriment of the British and American positions.

As he mentions in Memorandum No. 2, by 1933 nearly one-third of the SA were former Communists. He insists that Communists have provided the only organized group

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in Germany which has offered no resistance whatever to the Nazis. A few Communist leaders have been killed, he says, but most of them have survived. Thaelmann was reported in 1939 to be employed by the Gestapo and his life was spared, according to R., until the 1944 summer purge. Torgler has remained at liberty in Southwest Germany. Plock and a dozen others escaped to Russia. A few are in Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland and France.

R. expects that the Russian occupation authorities will bring with them a large organization of German prisoners of war who have been carefully schooled. These will provide the means of contact with German Communists and former Communists who have meanwhile been Nazis. Also the returning war prisoners -- posing as heroes of Stalingrad and what not -- will make an impression even on moderate elements of the population.

R. foresees in Eastern Germany incitation to attack upon the homes and property of wealthier persons, who will be denounced as being responsible for Hitler. He asserts that this tactic has already been adopted in the parts of Poland under Russian occupation.

Worst still, he fears that trade unionists, both Socialist and Christian, who have continuously opposed the

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Nazis will be among the first to be extirpated by the Russians or interned in Russia, as the Russian means of intimidating the older labor organizations, whose defense of democratic principles, R. asserts, has been particularly strong in Pomerania and Silesia.

Russian plans may reach beyond the Russian assigned area, R. goes on to say. The Russian network of prisoners trained to contact former Communists and to capture the allegiance of disillusioned Nazi youth may well be extended into the zones of British and American occupation. R. cannot believe that the Russians will be content to leave the British and Americans in undisturbed possession of their "plums," as he feels the Russians will deem the British and American positions in West and Southwest Germany to be.

Among other things the Russian-trained workers may be expected to seek to ingratiate themselves with the occupation authorities by tendering denunciations of Nazi sympathizers. R. recounts that this method was used by the Communists during the passive resistance in the Rhineland and the Ruhr district during 1923. Some Communists joined the free corps who were fighting the French; others, he says, became informers to the French secret service. These latter never betrayed the Communist members of the

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German secret defense organisations, he avers, but only members of other parties and in particular German police officials.

The younger Nazi generation will certainly be easy prey for political machination of all sorts, R. believes. He points out that these young Nazis have had no political experience whatever. Finding no hope in the peace terms and being disposed against the Western Powers by the bombings of their homes, they will readily make common cause with the Communist organizers.

R. recommends that prisoners of war returning from Russia should be kept under close observation and their communications and advice accepted with the greatest caution. As the British and American forces of occupation withdraw in due course he believes that numerous centers will emerge for the establishment of local Communist rule. The only safeguard, he asserts, will be to build up in Western and Southwestern Germany a strong police force loyal to the constitutional government.

Advice by former Germans. At several points in the accompanying memoranda R. insists that emigre Germans must not be allowed to come upon the scene. That includes himself, he points out vigorously in conversation. The only

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role he sees for himself while in emigration, he says, is to set an example of restraint to other emigrants who might be eager to accept their former political positions again at the hands of the forces of occupation.

However, at page 21 of Memorandum No. I, R. suggests the possible usefulness later on of a small committee of German emigrants who have become citizens of the United States or other Allied or neutral countries and who would advise the Allied occupation authorities "privately" as to the character of particular groups and individuals.

Asked whom he had in mind for example, R. mentioned Wilhelm Sollmann, now living among Quakers in Pennsylvania, Gerhart Seger and Max Brauer in New York, Tarnow in Stockholm, Vogel in London, and Wirth in Switzerland, who he believes became an Austrian citizen. These names are simply illustrative. Should a practical need arise for suggestions, R. would like to consider very carefully those he might recommend as suitable and those who for one reason or another would be unsuitable.

Of Trevirenus R. spoke with what sounded like rather qualified approval. He thought Trevirenus to be now a British subject. He rejected Carl Spiecker as probably a British agent.

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He spoke without enthusiasm but without explicit disapproval of Edmund Stinnes, Jr., who is living at Haverford, Pennsylvania. Theodore von Kersig he thought to be too emotional.

DeWitt C. Poole

cc. Brig. Gen. John Magruder
Shepard Morgan, Esq.
Allen W. Dulles, Esq.
Ernest Brooks, Esq.
Ferdinand Mayer, Esq.
John Hughes, Esq.

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Political Forces Available for German Reconstruction

Twelve years of suppression of all free political thought and speech, and the physical extermination of a large number even of the local leaders of the old parliamentary parties will create special difficulties for the rebirth of parliamentary democracy in Germany. The evacuation of perhaps millions of persons from bombed areas, the transfer of workmen from their former locations, the scrapping or transfer of all machinery not serving immediate war purposes, and the absence of a large number of farmers and skilled workmen in foreign captivity will delay the resumption of essential production, without which there cannot be a political atmosphere favorable to the revival of old political traditions. In addition, it will be impossible to house the millions of evacuees from bombing in their home localities immediately after hostilities cease. For all these reasons it may not be even technically possible for a period perhaps as long as three years to hold elections for a national constituent assembly which would reflect an unemotional and considered public opinion. This does not preclude a tentative, advisory assembly, as described later.

Political thought and action must be built up again from the lowest units -- villages, cities, and counties. If military circumstances require the occupation of Germany in more or less gradual stages, these local units will also be

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There is one concrete factor which will largely affect the timing of any elections in Germany, local and regional as well as national. A normal political atmosphere for elections cannot be created without every effort to return the evacuated population to their original localities and to construct emergency accommodations for them where towns have been wholly or partly destroyed by bombing.

The European, and especially the German, is more conservative politically in his familiar environment and in close contact with his relatives and friends. The transfer of vast numbers of workmen to new industrial centers during the last war and the evacuation of more than a million Germans from former German territory after the war -- people who were not at home in their new surroundings -- were largely responsible for the radical trend of the elections of 1919 and later. Fascism and Communism spread in the districts where the population had been largely increased during the war from elsewhere.

The Communist revolution in Munich in 1919, for example, was made by the many thousands of workmen brought there for newly established factories, and by refugees who came directly from Russia and Poland. The frequent Communist riots in central Germany were caused in the same manner. Nazism developed in just these areas of rapid industrial growth, and

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the best administrative support of the Allies in their extremely difficult task of social and economic reconstruction.

At the same time, many branches of the central administration in Berlin will have to be reactivated under the supervision of an Inter-Allied commission if economic and financial chaos is to be avoided. These central administrative units will probably have no executive authority in the country immediately after the breakdown of the Nazi regime except that which they derive from the backing of an Allied commission and the force of Allied arms.

As the question of the reconstitution of administrative services by the occupation forces as they advance into Germany is reserved for a second memorandum, the following memorandum will describe the possible grouping of political forces after the defeat of the Nazi Government.

It is impossible at the moment to predict how soon elections ensuring political moderation can be held for a national assembly, which should in any case be provisional in character and should allow for a revision of its conclusions by a final constituent assembly five years later. In fixing the date it is necessary to recognise the grave risk that if elections are too long delayed, one extremist group supported by one of the Allied powers may be able to conduct an organized agitation without the counter-balance of an elected assembly, producing conditions which cannot be in the permanent interest of European stability.

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There is one concrete factor which will largely affect the timing of any elections in Germany, local and regional as well as national. A normal political atmosphere for elections cannot be created without every effort to return the evacuated population to their original localities and to construct emergency accommodations for them where towns have been wholly or partly destroyed by bombing.

The European, and especially the German, is more conservative politically in his familiar environment and in close contact with his relatives and friends. The transfer of vast numbers of workmen to new industrial centers during the last war and the evacuation of more than a million Germans from former German territory after the war -- people who were not at home in their new surroundings -- were largely responsible for the radical trend of the elections of 1919 and later. Nazism and Communism spread in the districts where the population had been largely increased during the war from elsewhere.

The Communist revolution in Russia in 1918, for example, was made by the many thousands of workmen brought there for newly established factories, and by persons who came directly from Russia and Poland. The Communist Party in central Germany were caused in the same manner. Nazism developed in just those regions where the [illegible]

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again after 1928. In eastern Germany, which was immune to Nazism in its early period, the hundreds of thousands of persons evacuated from former German territory and settled near the Polish frontier provided the only suitable ground for the expansion of Nazism there after 1928. By contrast, districts in which there was little change in the population, whether Catholic or Protestant, showed no radical political tendencies until 1929. (The apparent sudden rise of Nazism in these regions in 1930 is explained by the fact that the post-war generation had then attained a near majority of votes.)

The dangers latent in the present situation are greatly increased by the evacuation of the German-speaking populations of Bessarabia, the southern Tyrol, the Baltic states, and recently of Rumania and Hungary to Germany. These evacuees have probably added more than a million to the number of homeless persons in Germany today. What this means can be estimated from the fact that after the last war, including the boom years of 1926 and 1927, Germany had an average unemployment of between 2,000,000 and 2,500,000, or 10% of the maximum employable population. This would have continued after 1933 if it had not been for the rearmament made by the Nazis at the expense of the country's future prosperity.

The execution by the Nazis of most surviving parliamentary and local party leaders in the summer of 1934, as

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already mentioned, greatly complicates a forecast of the political evolution in Germany. The expectation of various emigrants that their old parties can be reanimated may prove illusory, if only for the reason that the younger generation will have no conception of a multi-party system. Nevertheless, tacit or open opposition to the Nazi regime has survived at least among the older generation in the old Social Democratic Party, the Centre Party and its offshoot the Bavarian People's Party, and the moderate parties of the Right -- the smaller parties, including Stresemann's party, having practically disappeared by 1932.

Close private contact among leading members of these parties was established immediately after the dissolution of all former parties by Hitler in the summer of 1933. William Leuschner, who was hanged in September 1944, was the most prominent Social Democrat in this group. Locally, such contact has probably survived even the recent purge, but surely not to such an extent that it will offer the occupation authorities as they enter each successive locality a representative political front, particularly as the entire male population below forty will be absent. Before discussing the means of contact between the local occupation authorities and these groups, it is necessary to explain some of the factors which have influenced the attitude of the members of the former parliamentary parties.

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The great bulk of members of the former parties are still uninformed about events in 1933. The fact that Hindenburg, who had been reelected to the presidency one year before by the moderate parliamentary parties, made no effort to protect their leaders from arrest and persecution produced general confusion and depression. The communication of information through former party channels was difficult because local and regional party officers in particular were arrested or kept for months under the strictest observation. A special enabling act was voted by the Reichstag in March 1933, to a Cabinet with a non-Nazi majority, for a period of six months. In that time the leaders of all other parties, including the German National Party, who held the largest number of Cabinet seats, were placed under arrest by the Nazis. Hindenburg's dissolution of the Reichstag in October 1933 was contrary to his pledge not to extend the extraordinary powers of the enabling act beyond the six-month limit and represented his practical abdication. It permitted Hitler to confirm his extraordinary powers in a plebiscitary election under cover of the popularity of Hindenburg's name.

The popular confusion caused by Hindenburg's failure to act against Nazi atrocities was greatly increased by the former Allies' acceptance of open Nazi rearmament and the restoration by the Allies of national financial sovereignty.

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which had been withheld from every republican Government, to the Nazi Government at the beginning of 1937. Up to the outbreak of war there was reason for members of the former parliamentary parties to think the foreign and financial policies of their old parties unjustified.

This is one reason that the first years after the defeat of the Nazis will be extremely critical from the point of view of a restoration of democratic ideals. The younger generation have forgotten the older parties. Furthermore, the overwhelmingly party system of the Weimar Republic had ceased to appeal to them even before Hitler came to power.

The political parties of 1918, except for the Social Democratic Party, owed their existence to various traditions deeply rooted in German society for hundreds of years. The three independent groups which united in 1919 to form the Democratic Party, for example, represented the old city democracies, which were crushed by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic occupation and emerged again after 1815 in the states with representative governments and in the Prussian provinces in the 1850's, when parliamentary institutions were restored there. These groups did not unite because [illegible] economic interests were diverted and they had [illegible] traditional ideas, but chiefly because they were favoring free trade [illegible]

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The Conservatives of the East, who were originally free traders, refrained from political agitation in the rest of the country in order not to antagonize the National Liberal Party, with which they had established a close economic collaboration in the 1880's on the basis of moderate protectionism. At the same time the Conservative Party differed widely in its federalism and in religious questions from the National Liberals, who favored centralization and a bureaucratic control of the churches. Protestants in the West and South who differed from the National Liberals in these last two respects formed the Christian Socialist Party, collaborating closely with the Centre Party, which supported political and administrative decentralization and opposed state interference in religious affairs.

The Social Democrats, under the impulse of Marxian doctrine, attacked religion as such and captured the workingman who had flocked into new manufacturing centers in the rapid industrialization of the 1870's and 1880's, and were therefore alienated from the Protestant church by its distant bureaucratic attitude. Workmen who remained in their old home were in general a highly conservative political element, though they pressed for the early introduction of social security legislation. They remained members of the small democratic parties, the Christian Socialist Party, or the Centre Party. These workmen rejected class

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politics just because they were imbued with a much older democratic tradition. They achieved more progress in social legislation before the existence of the Social Democratic Party than it, with its abstract and radical arguments, was ever able to do. They were also responsible for three attempts to organize a strong national trade union movement, which each time was either suppressed or failed because the socialist members insisted on the acceptance of their own revolutionary and anti-religious tenets.

In the years just before 1914 the so-called revisionist movement in the Social Democratic Party to throw off revolutionary and anti-religious Marxism and establish a strong labor party in the British sense gained increasing strength. There were signs everywhere of a demand by the younger generation for a revision of the German party organizations. Thus efforts in 1919 to combine existing parties and to found new ones did not result merely from the collapse of 1918.

Unfortunately Ebert and his Provisional Government were forced, in order to prevent revolution and to legitimize the national government, to hold elections for a constituent assembly as early as January 1919. This interrupted many reconstruction conversations among certain leaders of the old parties, and the new organizations were

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retained, some with changed names. If elections to the Weimar Assembly could have been postponed for another four months the result would have been different. In the actual event there were only two changes in party structure. Three groups of the moderate Left united, as mentioned above, to form the Democratic Party, which was initially successful but in time lost its farm votes to the Right and its labor votes to the Social Democrats under Ebert's leadership. The eastern Conservatives merged with the Christian Socialists and a part of the National Liberal Party to form the German National Party.

The National Assembly did not represent the feelings of the population, because hundreds of thousands of [illegible] prisoners of war were unable to participate in its election, and because hardly any of its members had been in the front lines, a fact which was bound to lessen its authority with 10,000,000 veterans. The unfavorable reaction made itself felt, and there were attempts, in 1920 by the Centre Party and in 1930 by the Young Conservatives, to form a strong moderate party independently of old party lines. The first attempt was overwhelmed by the rapidly increasing inflation of the autumn, by bad regulations and world economic crisis.

The Christliche Volksdienst, a kind of Protestant Centre Party representing the Confessional Church, the groups which left the German National Party in 1929 and

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1930, the Centre Party, and the remnant of the Democratic Party, with the toleration of the Social Democratic Party, established a stable parliamentary majority against Communist and Nazi attacks for the first time in 1930. If economic conditions had improved soon enough, they could have maintained a parliamentary regime, even though some of them had begun to lose their younger voters.

Stringent economic conditions were not alone responsible for the increase in the strength of the extreme parties--Nazi and Communist. War veterans were sceptical of the good work of the Weimar Assembly, as already mentioned, and were embittered by the knowledge that some of them -- intellectuals particularly -- had not yet found employment twelve years after the war. In addition, it could be calculated in 1928 that the post-war generation, born after 1900, would, because of the heavy losses of the war generation, soon already form a majority of the electorate in 1932.

This post-war generation was characterized by nervous instability, largely due to adolescent crises at a critical age and to lack of normal school and home training during the war. The vast majority of them were indifferent to party politics, were extreme pacifists, and in economic and social questions held utopian views. Except in the Social Democratic Party, the Centre Party, and, for a time, the German National Party, they could not be interested in practical politics. As the programs of the

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old parties had no meaning for them, they fell an easy prey to Communist and Nazi propaganda, which played on purely emotional reactions in politics, as has been the case after every revolutionary break in European history. They wanted to substitute novel social solutions for personal toil and effort. In the critical days after Hitler came into power the emotional instability of this generation was felt even by the parties which had brought members of this generation into the Reichstag in time to secure the partial support of this generation.

The particular form of proportional representation introduced in Germany by the Weimar Constitution permitted various Utopian groups to elect a few representatives in the Reichstag. In general, it favored radical groups that refused to share in the responsibilities of coalition government, hoping that under the stress of the times they might obtain majorities in parliamentary elections or in a plebiscite. Thus the Nazi and Communist parties were able to coordinate their actions to disrupt and discredit normal parliamentary procedure.

The Weimar Constitution itself, half of which consisted of purely rhetorical declarations, fostered Utopian thinking. It was also loaded with procedural democratic safeguards solicited from foreign constitutions, which might have had their value under the Empire but were only hindrances to

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parliamentary government. The articles of the Weimar Constitution which stood the strain of critical periods were those adopted almost literally from the Bismarckian constitution.

As the most urgent function of the Weimar National Assembly was to provide a constitutional government to negotiate the final peace settlement with the Allies, its proceedings were hurried. Its members soon realized that many questions, such as the financial relation between the central government and the states and the eventual position of Prussia, would have to be left open. When the constitution was written the terms of the Peace Treaty were unknown, and their economic and social consequences could not possibly be foreseen. The Weimar Constitution is a medley of often incompatible provisions copied from foreign constitutions. Parliamentary practice was modelled on the French constitution; the election of the president and the institution of the Staatsgerichtshof, on the United States constitution; the use of plebiscites, on the Swiss constitution; and additional checks on the power of the government unknown elsewhere made the position of every cabinet weak and insecure.

This was recognized by the end of 1919, and the Prussian constitutional assembly which met six months later avoided the mistakes of the Weimar Assembly. The

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Prussian constitution provided a stable majority in the state until 1932. (The greater stability of parliamentary majorities in the states was partly due of course to the fact that the Reich government alone was responsible for the execution of impractical peace terms.)

With little exaggeration, one can say that in the Reich there was a triple sovereignty: of the people, the Reichstag, and the president, the cabinet being left with the difficult task of compromising differences among the three. Under the trying general conditions that existed, this situation was bound to end in the dictatorship either of the president or of a leader basing his position partly on popular votes and partly on force. Totalitarian rule has frequently been introduced in European history by the reference of national questions to plebiscites.

This short historical sketch may be helpful in forecasting events in Germany after the collapse of the Nazi regime and the entry of Allied troops. It is also useful to remember that a survey made by the Gestapo at the beginning of 1939 showed even the names of the old parliamentary parties -- with the exception of the Social Democratic and Centre Parties -- to be unknown to children in the elementary schools. The mass of Communist supporters had climbed onto the Nazi bandwagon in the first four months after Hitler came to power, and the Gestapo report

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of 1938 showed that the school children's only association with the Communist Party was the Reichstag fire. Only 2% of the children knew the names of Ebert and Stresemann. Whatever this actually means, it satisfied Himmler and Goebbels that they had wholly conquered German youth.

This might lead to very pessimistic conclusions if it were not that young Germans have always shown a great appetite for systematic study, which for the past twelve years they have had little opportunity to indulge. It will be a most urgent task to enable the boys taken from school at sixteen to make up for their lack of systematic study. It is not dogmatic political re-education that youth needs, but an opportunity for thorough liberal, scientific, or technical training. The superficial political indoctrination practised by more or less socialist governments in certain German states after 1918, vilifying earlier German political institutions, produced a Nazi generation, while teachers who did not go to these extremes at the expense of regular instruction produced good democrats.

In considering in detail the methods to be adopted by the Allies in restoring German political life, everything depends on whether the country is occupied step by step, or whether a sweeping military success permits the

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occupation forces to establish a joint commission in Berlin immediately. In the latter case, it would of course be possible to maintain the Weimar Constitution, in spite of its weaknesses, by formally abrogating all Nazi decrees altering the constitution. Changes made in the past twelve years in the actual administrative machinery, even under such decrees, would have to be left temporarily in effect. The revision of the constitution should be the work of a national assembly, which can meet only after political life has been built up again from below.

The purge of the summer of 1944, following the elimination of so many people of marked political views in the fall and winter of 1943, of course makes this task extremely difficult. The number of persons with pre-Nazi political experience surviving must be ascertained before any final opinion can be formed about it. Former political leaders who have not shared in the hardships of the past twelve years of revolution, suppression, and calamity would hardly be acceptable to the people, and any attempt to impose emigrant leaders in German politics might cause the occupation authorities otherwise unnecessary difficulties. The creation of political parties must be a slow process, based on an acceptance of the practical tasks of reconstruction in collaboration with the occupation authorities.

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When evacuees from bombed areas are returned to their own localities, the friendly relations which have grown up even under Nazi persecution among inconspicuous members of the former parties will be a very important factor in consolidation. During the 1930's former socialists, members of the moderate parties, and Protestant and Catholic clergy in all parts of Germany, even the largely Protestant East, established warning systems against Nazi Party or Gestapo attacks. Although this close understanding probably exists at present only among people of a certain age, it is nevertheless the core around which a new political life must grow.

These groups, and municipal civil servants, will be automatically available to the occupation authorities for the most important jobs of reconstruction and administration. The breakdown of an over-elaborate totalitarian administration creates much greater difficulties for the mere survival of the people than would otherwise occur. To judge from the experience of 1919, the German people will choose for the practical solution of these difficulties, quite independently of their possible political choices, men whom they have always trusted for their efficiency and impartiality and who have real administrative -- and therefore stable political -- judgment.

The successful encouragement of this internal development by Allied occupation authorities must on no account be

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frustrated by attempts to impose the abstract constitutional or economic programs of German emigrants. The schemes published so far by emigrants would none of them hold up for more than a few months. It would be better for the future of Germany and Europe if political slogans could be forgotten altogether for a time, and every effort devoted to the essential task of preventing starvation and to the gradual resumption of production. The Weimar National Assembly wasted much valuable time in theoretical political argument instead of concentrating its attention on economic and social reconstruction.

It will be a problem to determine how far former party traditions survive and, in combination with the religious or legal principles which make large groups of the population opposed to any totalitarian regime, can contribute to the political reconstruction of Germany. A second, closely related problem will be the identification by the Allied armies in their progressive occupation of Germany of the individuals who represent these traditions and principles.

The most numerous group are, of course, the workmen. It may be said with some assurance that the skilled workmen formerly organized in the socialist trade unions (the so-called Freie Gewerkschaften) and the Christian trade unions (Christliche Gewerkschaften) still hold mainly the

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political allegiance. They belong largely to the older generation, but as the younger generation will be absent in the army, it is they, in so far as they have not been evacuated, who will be immediately available in the areas occupied by the Allies, and in the eastern parts of Germany especially they will be of the greatest value.

While the vast majority of skilled workmen in the socialist trade unions are loyal to their surviving union leaders, the unskilled workmen, who were in large part Communist before the Nazis gained power and then changed over to the Nazi Party, are not to be relied on for reconstruction without special guarantees. Neither the skilled nor the unskilled members of the Christian trade unions are likely to have altered their former political views, with the single exception of the association of white collar workers.

The Christian trade unions, 50% Catholic and 50% Protestant, had their strongholds in western and southern Germany. Their opposition to the Nazi Party has been openly expressed on several occasions in strikes, which twice in the Ruhr District ended successfully for the masses of the workmen but led to the arrest and internment in concentration camps of their former leaders. Their bitterest opposition to the regime has been strengthened through the survival until 1936 of the Catholic and

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Protestant workmen's associations, which were not concerned directly with trade union questions, but rather with promoting general social legislation and combatting the anti-religious ideology surviving in the socialist trade unions. They have stood with those socialist trade unionists who were more concerned with trade union policy than with anti-religious agitation. The opposition of both groups has been most marked in western and southern Germany, Hanover, Hamburg, Bremen, East Prussia, Pomerania, and upper Silesia.

Since 1936 the biennial shop council elections provided for by law have been indefinitely postponed by the Nazis, for in the elections of 1936, 60% of the workers of the Ruhr district, for instance, voted against the Nazi lists. The results of these elections could not be invalidated, but Nazi chairmen were frequently imposed on the elected shop councils. The council members who came from the old trade unions, and who have remained in their former places of work, have surely not lost the high political understanding which has characterized them in the past in western and southern Germany. It will be important for the occupation authorities, with the help of municipal civil servants and Protestant and Catholic clergymen, to identify the members of the shop councils elected in 1933.

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Here again, German emigrants in American uniform would not be a satisfactory channel of communication, as the strongly anti-religious antecedents of many of them are probably not forgotten in Germany. Former members of the Social Democratic and Christian trade unions in north-western, western, and southern Germany are in close contact, and when the confidence of one group is gained that of the others will follow.

The former shop councils should resume their pre-Nazi functions, and new shop council elections should be held at their request. It would not be advisable for an Inter-Allied commission or for Allied army commanders on their progress into Germany to order new shop council elections without a demand from the old members. Such action would have different results in the Russian occupation zone and in the West, especially as opinion in Saxony has always fluctuated between the extreme Right and Left.

The attitude after the collapse of the Nazi regime of former Communist workmen is much more difficult to guess. From the latter part of 1932 the vast majority of Communists, whether at the instruction of the Third International or not, entered Nazi Party organizations, especially the SA, as quickly as possible. At that time the Nazis were cooperating closely with the Communists,

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not only in Parliament but also in the organization of wild strikes throughout the country. There can be no doubt that many Communists joined Nazi organizations to save their skins, but many have also become genuine Nazis. The most violent former Communists have been especially selected to torture members of other parties, particularly socialists and socialist trade unionists, in the concentration camps. Instructions were issued as early as May 1933 that brutal types with Communist experience should be employed for these purposes.

A very few of the Communist members of Parliament have suffered torture and death in concentration camps; most of those who did not go over to the Nazi Party escaped to foreign countries. A distinct trend towards the Nazi Party began among Communist leaders in 1926. Then Roland Freisler -- now president of the Volksgerichtshof, which condemned the members of the resistance movement in July and September 1944 -- returned to Germany after three years' training in Moscow in the organization of revolution. He was not well received by the majority of German Communists, and soon entered the Nazi Party, where he was responsible for the initial organization of the Gestapo.

Under the Nazi regime former Communists have abstained from any show of opposition. Recently, they have

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had instructions to protect their lives and positions under all circumstances. Very well informed persons in contact with workers' groups have reported from Germany that the display of fervent Nazism by former Communists might mean real conversion, or might, on the other hand, be a means of remaining in contact with one another. It is possible that these former Communists have been long prepared for the collapse of the Nazis, and have taken into account the very extensive elimination of the leaders of more moderate labor groups by persecution and torture. The Allies may well be met in Germany by such former Communists proclaiming themselves the leaders of the workmen.

If the occupation authorities are not to rely exclusively on these Communist Nazis, it will be necessary to ascertain what workmen have always held democratic beliefs. One means of doing so, already mentioned, will be to discover the shop council members last elected in 1936. It is unlikely that the panels for these elections included convinced Communists.

It is also true that after Hitler came to power many Communist workmen and some of their former leaders bitterly regretted their tactical cooperation with the Nazis for the destruction of German parliamentary democracy, and also learned to regret the effects of their earlier anti-religious agitation. It is impossible, of course, to learn

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in which Communists this change has occurred, except through the shop council members.

The political attitude of the farmers varies in the different parts of Germany. In the Rhineland, Westphalia, Hanover, Hesse, and most parts of southern Germany, they have not become Nazis. It is known that in certain villages in Hanover and Westphalia the farmers voted 100% against the Nazis in the last plebiscite, after the occupation of Austria, and had courage enough to protest the falsification of the returns from their districts.

The European peasant is always cautious. In Germany his attitude towards the occupation authorities will be passive. If he finds that they allow and assist him to continue production, he will become a most conservative factor, though without wide political vision, seeking only the maintenance of law and order.

In the Catholic parts of Germany, as well as in Protestant sections in which the farmers have remained faithful to the church -- Northwestern and Western as well as large parts of southern Germany -- hatred of the Nazis is extreme. The farmers have staged demonstrations against the persecution of the churches and have succeeded in making the lives of Nazi school teachers in their villages intolerable. They are in close contact with the old nobility whose estates on the average are not larger than those of

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the bigger farmers, and who have stood courageously with the farmers in their defense of the Catholic and Protestant churches.

The political and economic ravaging of the middle classes by the Nazis has been extreme, particularly in the retail trades. Like every Nazi activity, it has varied in intensity in the different Gaue (districts of Nazi Party organization). In the one year 1938 over 600,000 retail shops everywhere in Germany, but especially in Berlin, were forcibly closed. During the war and the recent total mobilization this process will have been carried further. The shops closed naturally belonged to people of non-Nazi views, and the trade of surviving retailers was naturally increased, but even among the latter feeling toward the Nazis at the outbreak of war was by no means enthusiastic. Retailers whose shops were closed were taken, if they were physically fit, into the foot labor corps. The class of small shop owners was very large in Germany, and was never particularly stable politically. Their first object was the elimination of the big department stores, and they followed the parties that promised best in this respect.

The once highly skilled and artistically gifted artisan class has been decimated in the same way as the small shopkeepers, especially since the beginning of 1943.

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throughout German history they have been a most conservative and constructive democratic element, and their attitude is not likely to have changed.

In large parts of Germany the Allied occupation forces will find industrialists who have conformed outwardly to the Nazi Party in order to save their property, but have never been adherents of Nazi ideology, especially in the numerous small and middle-sized firms in Germany. Thuringia, Saxony, the country around Nuremberg, lower Silesia, and certain sections of Wuerttemberg and Baden are exceptions to this general rule.

Among the larger industrialists, a number have always openly opposed the Nazi regime. Many of the managers of big firms in the Ruhr district have also refused to have anything to do with the Nazi Party. Another group, who initially supported the Nazis, were soon disappointed, and without daring to offer open opposition have been constantly discontented. Many of them may have disappeared in the recent purge.

The attitude of intellectuals varies from one profession to another. A majority of university professors have remained aloof from the Nazi Party, and from politics as a whole. Many have tried, where they could do so without losing their jobs, to teach in a manner which revealed to their students the existence of other political ideals

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than those of the Nazis. Very few of them would be able to participate prominently in the political reconstruction of Germany, as academic men are seldom successful in political life.

The attitude of doctors and lawyers varies so greatly among different towns and individuals that no positive statement can be made about it. As almost the entire newspaper press and most publishing houses have been suspended during the war, it is not possible to comment on them. At the beginning of the war there were still on the staffs of conforming newspapers courageous journalists who found round about ways of communicating to their readers news which was unpleasant for the Nazi Party. Some reports in Swedish papers suggest that the recent purge has hit these men especially. Two outstanding German monthlies, the Deutsche Rundschau and the Hochland, carried on the campaign against the Nazis by very clever analogies from philosophy and history, which reminded their readers of older German traditions. Members of the staffs of these two reviews were in close contact with Goerdeler's group. This is as much as can be stated definitely about the general attitude of intellectuals.

The final result of these considerations is that a democratic political life must be built up again mainly on the two trade union groups, the farming populations and

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the Catholic and Protestant churchmen. It may be advisable at a date which cannot be estimated under present conditions to form a small committee of German emigrants who have become citizens of the United States or neutral countries or British subjects to advise the Allied occupation authorities privately as to the character of particular groups or individuals.

In the United States, Great Britain, Switzerland, and Sweden there are half a dozen emigrants whose names will still be remembered by their former associates in Germany, who are honored for their sufferings, and whose political judgment in the past has always been moderate. If they are to be suitable for the purpose they must have been connected with the former democratic parties, they must have some parliamentary experience, they must be deeply rooted in the life of the provinces outside Berlin; they must be familiar with the administrative machinery as well as party politics, and they must have retained even in exile an abhorrence of extremes. Radical liberal Socialists who even in the past had no contact with the real political feeling of the population and whose enthusiastic affiliation of the entire German nation during their exile is known, could contribute nothing to collaboration between the occupation authorities and forces in Germany.

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Any attempt by its members to exploit their position in the interest of a particular party or organization would, of course, be fatal to the success of the committee. Its position should be unofficial and should not be publicized. Its members should be fully aware that they can never again become political leaders in Germany and that their most important function is to establish contact between the occupation authorities and old friends of theirs who know the feeling of the population in the provinces intimately. If the formation of such a committee were announced before the complete occupation of German territory, the Nazis would conduct a propaganda campaign to ensure hostility to its members in the country as a whole.

At this stage of military operations, and while the future territorial limits of Germany are unknown, it is difficult to state precisely the dilemma of immediately post-Nazi German politics. On the one hand it is necessary to form an advisory national assembly in Berlin as soon as possible. Long-range considerations of political stability surely favor the slow growth of political life on a local and regional basis, but economic and social chaos and international political complications may force quite at least an advisory national body.

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It would seem to be urgently necessary for the prevention of political chaos in Germany, leading to chaos in other parts of Europe, that as soon as the occupation authorities have acquired control of local administration and have appointed advisory municipal and county councils in the manner described in Memorandum II, those councils should elect from their own membership representatives to an advisory national assembly. When it is possible to hold general elections, the advisory national assembly would be succeeded by a first national constituent assembly. In this way it would be possible to gain time before holding general elections for the consolidation of political groups and the creation of new ones.

In everything that is said in Memorandum II in regard to the re-establishment of administrative services, it should be borne in mind that this must be accompanied at every level of administration by the formation of advisory bodies of citizens who have at least the confidence of the older generation and who show that they are able to work constructively in collaboration with the Allied authorities.

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MEMORANDUM No. II.

The Reconstruction of Administrative Services*

The problem of administrative reconstruction, as already stated, is two-fold: central as well as local and regional. Whether the two aspects of the problem are considered together depends on whether the Nazi regime collapses suddenly or whether the military occupation of Germany occurs step by step. In the latter case, the task of the occupation authorities will be to bring the administrative organization of the towns and counties, as well as of the higher units of districts and provinces, into operation as soon as possible, always with a view to the later establishment of the necessary central organization in connection with the Inter-Allied commission in Berlin.

The administrative control of individual towns and counties in each successive area of occupation should at the same time permit the old democratic parties to draw together and should provide for their collaboration with the occupation authorities in advisory positions while avoiding any attempt to impose these parties in their old form. The following discussion of the reconstruction first of regional

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* In connection with this memorandum it would be helpful to read the chapter on German administration in Finer, Dictatorship in Theory and Practice (1941).

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administration and second of central administration must be understood in this spirit, as otherwise a sense of democratic responsibility will not be restored.

A. Local Administration

The method and scope of administration in the cities and counties have not changed much under the Nazi regime; free control of the administration by the citizens has simply been eliminated. The old freely elected town councils -- institutions which have existed in varying forms in most parts of Germany for the past thousand years, except during the Napoleonic occupation and the ensuing two decades, in which the French administrative system was retained in the western part of Germany -- have been replaced by Nazi Party nominees. The influence of such Nazi consultative bodies has, however, been negligible, nor has the appointment of Nazi Party representatives to the positions of burgomasters and overburgomasters changed any essential aspect of municipal administration.

Such Nazi burgomasters as attempted to override the regular administration have almost all met with insuperable technical difficulties, not to mention the reaction against their personal corruption. This was so strong, even among Nazi Party members, that within the first three years of

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the Nazi regime many newly appointed Nazi burgomasters had either to be replaced by older, experienced officials or condemned to prison for corrupt practices, as happened in several of the large towns in the Rhine and Ruhr areas. The chaotic results of interference in the administrative machinery by untrained Nazis forced the Nazi Party by 1938 to recall the former burgomasters of many municipalities and to waive the requirement that they be at least nominal party members.

One can say that in general members of the municipal administration, assisted by representatives of the central civil service in regional posts, have maintained a very high level of efficiency in municipal administration and have not, even when required to enter the Nazi Party, been imbued with its spirit. Certain civil servants have been promoted ahead of their colleagues because of Nazi fanaticism; other members of the civil service will not fail to denounce them for this. Loyal, old civil servants in the municipalities as well as in the regional and central administration have kept careful records of the offenses of their new Nazi colleagues, and bitterly resent the injury done by the latter to the prestige of the civil service as a whole.

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In most towns the directors of the financial and other major departments of administration will be professional civil servants whose membership in the Nazi Party or some auxiliary Nazi organization has been purely formal. The so-called Stadtoberrater, the head of the central office of the municipal administration, has an intimate knowledge both of personnel and of administrative routine and could be of the greatest assistance to occupation authorities. He, with other old civil servants, may be able, when the evacuated population of bombed areas has been returned, to draw up a list of representatives of all classes, especially former local trade union leaders, to serve temporarily as an advisory town council. From the nucleus of such an advisory council new political parties can develop, providing the basis for later elections to a national assembly and to local bodies.

Similar conditions exist in county administration. Most pro-Nazi Landräte (county secretaries) are still in office, while the former freely elected county councils have been abolished. The forms and the terminology of county organization in the former states of Germany vary. Thus, while in northern Germany the lowest administrative units are Stadt- or Landkreise, A town with more than 50,000 inhabitants becomes an independent

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Stadtkreis, so that only smaller towns and villages are subordinate to the county.

B. Administration of Districts, Provinces, and States

It may be assumed that with the progress of the occupation members of the district administration (Regierungsbezirk) and of the provincial and state offices will have been removed to the interior. After the occupation of the entire country they must be compelled to return to their posts. This has great administrative and political importance for the smooth performance of the occupation authorities' task.

Regierungsbezirke do not exist in all Laender (former states) -- not, for example, in Baden or Wuerttemberg. They do exist in Bavaria, Saxony, and Prussia. There are from two to five Regierungsbezirke in each state or province. (The provincial unit exists only in Prussia.) The task of the district administration has been the regional control and coordination of all the normal branches of the central administration that extend over the country -- revenue, unemployment, and social security services excepted -- and their direct executive functions are limited.

The importance of the district administration is greater; its members have a comprehensive, over-all legal responsibility

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with the problems of the area. They have succeeded to a large extent in keeping their ranks free of fanatical Nazis. They have great experience in adapting the general provisions of legislation to the peculiar conditions of their district. The district administration has little importance for the process of political regeneration and the formation of political parties in preparation for a constituent assembly. The district administrative courts (Bezirks Ausschuesse) may be of great importance in settling claims for damage and disputed titles to bombed property.

From a political point of view the administration of the states and Prussian provinces may be of much greater importance. As the school systems are centralized at this level, care should be taken to obtain here the lists of teachers in the schools before the Nazi period. Numbers of elementary school principals who refused to join the Nazi Party were demoted to the position of teachers in small country schools. If they could be identified through the Provinzial Schulkollegien in Prussia and corresponding institutions in other states and restored to their former posts, the immediate resumption of education on a sound democratic basis would be guaranteed. Public hospitals and asylums can also be managed only with the help of the provincial or state administration.

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The executive in the Prussian provinces was divided: self-governing institutions were headed by the Landeshauptmann, the general administrative supervision was vested in the Oberpresident. Many of these officials appointed under the former Republic were deposed by Herr von Papen, and the rest by the Nazis. They were until the summer of 1932 eminent men of great administrative experience and tried moderation. There should be an attempt to discover how many of them have survived the massacre and to return them to their previous positions. Advisory councils of representatives of the municipalities and counties should be attached to their offices.

In the Laender (former states) a similar procedure should be followed, but it may be that, as these states had a parliamentary form of government, none of the former political heads of departments have survived. In this case former high civil servants dismissed by the Nazis and reliable members of the civil service who have retained their employment under the Nazi regime should be returned to their former positions. In the Prussian provinces advisory councils should be elected by the local advisory councils. In the Laender the same should be done.

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G. National Administration

In addition to the levels of administration already described, there is the central direct national administration of taxes, customs and excise, the railways, the unemployment services and to some extent the social security system, food distribution, price control, the courts, and the police.

1. Revenue Administration

The national financial administration has no connection with the smaller administrative units, except that in each county -- municipal or rural -- there is a tax collection office. The members of the financial administration have been remarkably successful in excluding Nazis from the revenue service. It is indicative of the attitude of the revenue administration that they assessed Nazi officials so rigorously that in 1937 Hitler was forced to establish a separate tax service for party officers.

The tax machinery should be set in motion at the earliest possible moment of the occupation, and taxes should be collected as strictly as before. It is indispensable that the staffs of the revenue offices be retained or, if evacuated, returned to their regular posts. By now the finances of large parts of Germany, especially the destroyed cities, must be in chaos. The

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deduction of income tax from salaries and wages -- the most important source of revenue -- may not bring significant returns until more or less normal production has been resumed. The revenue staffs have also detailed reassessment records, which will be essential for the establishment of property rights in bombed areas.

The importance of the prompt collection of taxes as far as possible by the old staffs in preventing a complete breakdown of the currency cannot be exaggerated. Some mechanism must of course be devised to absorb the occupation currency introduced by the Allies and to prevent its hoarding and the breakdown of the fixed ratio of one mark to ten cents. (These questions will be discussed in detail in Memorandum III.)

2. Railway Administration

The employees of the Reich railway administration should everywhere be compelled to return to their previous posts, under the supervision of Allied experts. The regional decentralization of railway management should be preserved. The members of the Allied Military Government should force the members of the central railway administration in Berlin to continue their work.

The staff of the railway administration has not been unified to a significant extent. The present Minister of

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Transport and head of the railway administration, Dorpmueller, has resisted with skill the pressure of the Nazis for the promotion of prominent party members.

3. Unemployment and Social Security Administration

The administration of the unemployment service must be kept up as well as possible. It alone will have records of the more than 20 million employed persons, so many of whom have been forcibly transferred to remote parts of the country, and will be of the greatest importance for the return of people to their normal environment. In the local branches of the lower administration especially the staff will have to be closely checked, as they became a domain of the Nazi Party after 1933. Many former Communists have also found places in this administration under the appearance of conversion to the Nazi Party.

For the social security administration, which has not been Nazified, the staffs of the districts in northern Germany and of the former states in the rest of the country will be of great value.

4. Food Administration

It is vitally important for a transition period that the best organization of agricultural production and forestry be maintained, as reestablished with the progress of occupying troops. Otherwise there may well be catastrophic

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difficulties in the production and distribution of food. The Nazi agricultural administration established in 1933 was a corporate unification of many long existing voluntary organizations. It would be impossible to unravel this organization successfully in the immediate wake of hostilities, as it has been in force for eleven years. Ortsbauernschaften, Kreisbauernschaften, and Landesbauernschaften should be set to work as the occupation progresses.

The local agricultural leaders appointed by the Nazis have in their majority not been convinced Nazis themselves, either in western or in much of southern and eastern Germany. The farmers themselves will in most places eliminate the outspoken Nazi leaders in their organizations, and will where necessary elect new leaders, who must be made responsible for the delivery of grain and food at the prices fixed under the Nazi regime.

The present relation between agricultural and industrial prices, which is, with slight variations, that established before the Nazis came into office, should by all means be maintained during the transition period, to prevent a runaway inflation like that following the last war. One of the principal internal reasons for that inflation was the premature abolition of war-time regulations for the

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delivery and pricing of agricultural products. The organization of individual farmers in Bauernschaften as well as the controls of grain, fodder, meat, and dairy products should be kept intact as far as possible.

5. Price Control Administration

Municipal and county authorities should be made responsible for the detailed execution of the control of prices for non-agricultural commodities on the basis of the price relations established in 1936 and subsequent modifications. As soon as possible the Inter-Allied authorities must establish a central price and currency control in close contact with the Reichsbank and the existing price control system. The present directors of the Reichsbank, with the exception of the Governor, are not Nazis. (Measures to combat inflation are further discussed in Memorandum III.)

6. The Courts

After General Eisenhower's suspension of the normal functions of the administrative courts, the future of jurisdiction in Germany will be very difficult. A false impression of the attitude of the courts toward the Nazis has been created in the United States by emigrants, whose reports have confused the regular courts with special courts instituted by the Nazis. In fact the establishment of special party courts like the People's Courts was

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testimony of the resistance offered by the regular courts to Nazi pressure. There have been instances in which the regular courts dared to sentence very prominent Nazis to hard labor or capital punishment. The final administrative court of appeal in Berlin protected the interests of Jews against the government so consistently that in November 1938, Jews were prohibited from appealing to it. Other administrative courts, like those for tax litigation, have also imposed maximum fines on conspicuous Nazis for false income tax declaration, etc.

The German courts were placed in an extremely difficult position by the "plebiscite" conferring unlimited legislative power on the Hitler Government in November 1933. They had no power, nor would they have had it in any country, to investigate the falsification of the plebiscite returns. They were in the position of French judges after the plebiscite establishing Louis Napoleon in power.

The Nazis have succeeded, on the other hand, in bringing a number of their younger members into judicial positions. Many judges who had been reserve officers in the last war, and whose opposition to the regime was known, were mobilized immediately in 1939, and many of them will have been killed.

The best way to select judges who would act on principles of law and equity would be on the recommendation of

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regional and central commissions of older judges whose opinions have never changed. Such judges could readily be named when it would no longer endanger their safety to do so. The direct appointment of judges by the occupation authorities on the basis of lists drawn up by emigrants who have been outside the country for many years would be another blow to popular respect for the law such as existed in pre-Nazi Germany.

7. The Police

The most difficult problem in Germany will be the reestablishment of a reliable police force. Until the summer of 1932 the police, including the very small secret service, were under state (Land) authority. The central government had no control whatever of their composition or organization. This was the more significant as the administration of justice, short of the Supreme Court, was also the function of the states (Laender).

While there were agreements concerning the extradition of criminals from one state to another, the process was nevertheless tedious. During the inflation and later during the banking crisis of 1931 the central government could prosecute a man who by fraud or embezzlement had caused the bankruptcy of important firms only by agreement with the justice minister of the state in which the offender resided.

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and the ensuing delay enabled many such criminals to escape to foreign countries, often with large fortunes. (Some of them have passed under other names as "refugees from Nazi terror".)

The prosecution of political offenses by the central government was practically impossible, although the special Staatsgerichtshof at Leipzig and the Reich attorney-general had the formal right to investigate seditious activities and to try suspects. Frequently even the whereabouts of political criminals of the Right and Left could not be ascertained, as they were protected by the police of states in the governments of which their sympathizers held seats. This was the case with the Communists in Saxony in 1923 and later with the Nazis in Thuringia, Braunschweig, and other smaller states.

Because of this situation the dissolution of the SS and SA by presidential decree in April 1932 failed in its major purpose, which was the discovery of incriminating evidence for the trial of Nazi leaders before the Staatsgerichtshof. Having been warned by the justice ministers of certain small states, the Nazis were able to conceal or destroy their material two nights before the police occupied SS and SA offices.

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For all these reasons, financial and legal preparations had been made before the Nazis came into office for the centralization of police and judicial administration throughout northern Germany, leaving the three southern German states their former authority. The centralization of these functions to some extent after the war will be a major consolidating factor and will be essential to the apprehension of Nazi criminals and the prevention of violence from Left and Right in future. It was shown in 1919 and later that in European countries sedition cannot be met without a centralised police administration. The fact that 90% of the police and the special security police were convinced supporters of the Weimar regime made no difference.

Those who are still in office have remained loyal to their former beliefs, and have saved an unknown number of persons from Nazi persecution. They will provide one of the most solid bases for order and a democratic evolution in Germany. Even in the Ruhr there are a number of former police officers pressed into service, who have risked their lives repeatedly to warn intended victims.

The supervision of the old Republican police from those appointed meanwhile may take some time, and it may be advisable in the beginning to reorganize the police forces intact. The occupation authorities should locate

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the former police presidents of the larger towns. All of them were dismissed either by the Papen Government or by the Nazis. The city of Berlin will require special treatment. Reliable non-commissioned officers might after a time be taken from the army into the police service.

The filling of higher police positions will be extremely difficult. Since 1936 a large number of the old officials have been forced to enter the army, where some of them have been promoted to the ranks of Lieutenant- and Major-General. Whether such officers can be returned after demobilization to high police positions will have to be decided locally with the help of responsible persons in the locality, and not on the basis of lists drawn up by emigrants.

Detailed procedure can be established only after the complete occupation of Germany, when it will be possible even for army officers to state their political opinions openly. The problem in the eastern parts of Germany will of course be especially complicated.

5. The Army

One of the most important guarantees of stable political evolution in Germany will be the orderly demobilization of the German Army. Even the comparatively slight disturbance of demobilization by revolutionary conditions in 1918

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led later to very great administrative difficulties and to a large degree of resentment. Now the problem of demobilization, complicated by the regrouping of the shattered remains of older divisions, is much greater. Active officers of non-Nazi opinions should be charged with this function.

There can be no doubt of the resentment created among surviving officers trained in the old Groener school by the SS and by the recent purge. Such officers will have a better knowledge of outrages committed by the Nazi Party, Gestapo, and SS than anybody else can, and will have taken careful note of them and been impatient for the elimination of their perpetrators. If they are honorably treated in accordance with the long-standing traditions of victorious and defeated armies, they, to the extent that they survive, and the older high civil servants will be most valuable to the Allies in the maintenance of order in Germany. In the later phase of the revival of free political activity in Germany, they will be of little value, as during the period of the Weimar Republic they had, with very few exceptions, no opportunity to acquire political experience, one of the contributing factors in the Nazis' rise to power.

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D. Industrial and Banking Administration

1. Electricity

The production and supply of electricity in Germany is based on regions which vary in size and sometimes overlap. Electric companies, like almost all utility companies, are hardly ever private. Their shares are held by municipalities, states, and up to one-third by industrial groups and private individuals. Power is produced from both coal and water, in a very intricate scheme. The disturbance of this system would make the resumption of normal industrial production impossible.

Nazi representatives in the boards of these companies should be replaced by representatives elected by the local advisory councils, when the latter have been appointed by the occupation authorities. The technical personnel should remain as far as possible in their present positions.

2. Coal

The production of coal and lignite in Germany is organized in regional "syndicates" under government control. Until the Nazis came to power the boards of such syndicates were composed of employer, employee, and consumer representatives. They should be reorganized immediately, their members being named in the transitional period by the advisory councils established in towns and counties. It

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is of fundamental importance for the railways and the supply of electricity and gas, and therefore of interest to the occupation authorities, that the production of coal should not be interrupted, and as soon as Germany is wholly occupied a coal commissioner for the Reich to replace the Nazi commissioner should be appointed by an Inter-Allied body.

3. Forms of Industrial Organization

There is much misunderstanding in the United States of cartel organization. The term is applied here even in the publications of the Department of Justice to bodies which would in Germany be called "trusts," like the I. G. Farben and the steel trust. In Germany cartels, of which there were more than 2,000, are regional or trade associations of small and middle-sized firms to protect themselves against absorption by large trusts.

The majority of cartels in Germany were Konditionenkartelle, organized to maintain standards of fair competition and thus regulating rebates to large purchasers, requiring that goods advertised as of the same grade be in fact of the same quality, and controlling unfair competition. They prevented the formation of large combines or trusts in the textile industry, for example. The only two German textile trusts, Bluemcke and Herdmille, were dissolved after their bankruptcies in 1931.

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while small and middle-sized firms were able, thanks to their cartel organization, to survive the severe economic crisis of the early '30's. Customers were protected by pre-Nazi legislation against exploitation by such cartels, and there was a special court for this purpose.

The Nazis, especially in 1941 and 1942, have greatly reduced the number of cartels by amalgamation. The surviving organizations have a semi-corporate character, and have performed important functions in the supply of war material.

The former cartels should be reinvested in their old status, in which they were most helpful to the economy of the country. There is a special reason for the restoration of the pre-Nazi cartels: most of the manufacturers belonging to cartels used imported raw materials; when such materials are again available they will have to be allocated in relation to the pre-war capacity of different firms via the cartels. Otherwise plants which have accidentally survived bombing will monopolize the market and prevent the re-entry of many firms closed by the Nazis or destroyed during the war. After the last war the dislocation of trade between occupied and unoccupied territory and the extreme scarcity of foreign exchange resulted in the elimination of a number of firms and made it possible for others to attain a somewhat monopolistic position.

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4. Banking and Money

One of the greatest difficulties to be overcome in the progressive occupation of Germany will be the scarcity of currency in the fighting and occupied zones. This problem needs the most careful attention. Possibly the issue of Notgeld -- emergency money -- by municipalities will be unavoidable for some time if the supply of occupation "marks" is insufficient. Experience after the last war and during the passiv. resistance shows that such Notgeld is a very dangerous factor in the development of inflation. Its issue must therefore be limited by the occupation authorities. Where occupation marks are issued they should be absorbed as rapidly as possible by making taxes payable in occupation marks; otherwise rising prices will be inevitable.

Since 1931 the German currency has in fact been an index currency. The whole artificial structure will collapse in a monetary and price chaos if existing price relations are not strictly maintained. The risk of price chaos will be very great in any case, because of the pent-up demand for consumer goods and the even more intensive demand for building materials and machinery in devastated areas.

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E. Conclusions

On the assumption that an Inter-Allied Commission for the temporary control of the central administration will be appointed in Berlin, the following central administrative services should be reestablished at once: justice and police; labor and social security; finance; railways; postal service; price control in the Ministry of Economics; the Ministry of Agriculture's regional and local organization of the production and distribution of food.

In all the central ministries the majority of upper and middle civil servants have remained anti-Nazi at heart. Numbers of them have not even acquired nominal Nazi Party membership, but all have been included in the Nazi organization of civil servants. If normal conditions are to be restored, it is urgent that these men remain in office. They can be invaluable to the occupation authorities if they receive the impression that loyal cooperation will save the German people from complete chaos. They will also be of the greatest importance in a later parliamentary regime, as they, not the younger generation, have experienced strict parliamentary control and know the routine of parliamentary business. Their collaboration can be lost only if German emigrants now in the services of the American Army can be excluded from relations between the occupation

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authorities and the civil service; such emigrants are as a rule either ignorant of administration or have some favorite scheme of their own. In either case they will bring the vital administrative machinery to a stand-still.

It will hardly be possible to introduce a new administrative decentralization immediately with any prospect of lasting success. Neither can the relations existing between the states and the central government at the end of the Weimar period be restored.

Prussia's eventual position was left open by the Weimar Constitution. A draft for the division of Prussia into smaller states, based on the report of the States Conference of 1930, was prepared by the Government that year, and the financial ground for the new arrangement was laid in the First and Fourth Major Emergency Decrees of December 1930 and 1931. The plan was not executed immediately because of the difficulty of securing the consent of President Hindenburg. Any future redistribution of Prussian territory should be based on these proposals, which were carefully considered in every detail. The necessary legislation would of course have to be passed by a constituent assembly and not imposed by occupation authorities if it is to be accepted over any period of time.

The reconstitution of a federal state with ten to twelve

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units, while maintaining the central administrative services mentioned above, would permit the simplification of the intermediate, district, level of administration. Detailed provisions to this effect are included in the plans formulated in 1930-31. The administration of elementary and secondary schools, especially, was to be decentralized.

It must be stressed again that to be successful any such administrative reform can result only from the action of a constituent assembly in providing a new federal system for Germany. The constituent assembly should provide for revision of its preliminary constitution by another national assembly after five years, if developments require such revision.

The following suggestions can be made for the central administration of the country, especially those branches of it which must remain permanently centralized, after the complete occupation of Germany by Allied forces. The first urgent problem will be to bring the Inter-Allied commission for the reconstruction of Germany in contact with the existing administrative machinery. The only present solution seems to be to keep the Reich ministries in Berlin intact. The outspoken Nazi members of the administration will have abandoned their positions before the Allies reach Berlin. The Allied commission should then charge the senior

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civil servants in the ministries with the conduct of the administration under Allied supervision.

Later, able civil servants who have resigned for conscientious reasons from the Reich ministries and gone into neutral branches of the administration or the high administrative courts, or have been removed since 1933 because of their known opposition to the Nazis, can be put in charge of each ministry. The names of such reliable men cannot be listed now, when it is not known how many have survived the terror of the past years or the physical consequences of the humiliation they have undergone. (One very able provincial Oberpraesident, for instance, was forced when deprived of his pension rights to peddle wine from door to door for the support of his large family.)

The senior civil servants of the ministries should meet regularly in a cabinet-like committee to discuss the suggestions to be made to the occupation authorities and to coordinate the execution of the latter's instructions by the various branches of the administration. It is in the interest of the Allies, and is essential for the prevention of chaos in Germany, to keep up coordination among different branches of the central administration. The efficiency of the existing German administrative machinery is in many respects superior to that of other

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countries, but its organization is complex, like the mechanism of a Swiss watch, and the displacement of one wheel can readily cause the whole machine to stall.

There is no danger of failure by senior civil servants in the Reich ministries to execute instructions loyally and correctly. The resentment of older civil servants toward the Nazi regime and the interference of Nazi officials in the administration had reached such a point even before the war that retribution can safely be left to them. Their sometimes secret observance of former administrative practices in spite of the opposition of the regime is illustrated by the fact that the pensions due to civil servants, university professors, or military officers who have left Germany for political reasons have been paid regularly by their former departments into special funds, so that they may one day be collected. The older high civil servants will also be the persons best able to purge the civil service as a whole of Nazi elements.

The probable attitude of older officials described here would be altered by the use of emigrants by the occupation authorities. This would produce unsurmountable obstacles, particularly as refugees have often established for themselves abroad reputations entirely unjustified by their actual positions in Germany.

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It may be unnecessary to warn the occupation authorities that many Nazi bosses have owed their influence in the Nazi Party to their being professional informers, and will try to reestablish their positions under the occupation by denouncing others. The danger is the greater because one of the worst political characteristics of the German is a tendency to hold such denunciations, an attitude which is not unnatural after the almost continuous upheaval and humiliation the country has undergone for the past generation. A vast number of denunciations, on the other hand, will be justified.

The cases of murder, libel, and robbery of German citizens by Nazis in the past twelve years will be so innumerable that as soon as German courts are functioning again they will have to be tried by a summary procedure. Their trial by Allied courts would, of course, produce a reaction the opposite of that which is desired. As a very large percentage of Nazi leaders were of Austrian nationality, they could be delivered to Austrian courts for trial. The treatment of Communists who entered the SS and SA both before and after Hitler's rise to power without any alteration in their original violent tendencies presents, of course, special and complex problems.

In summing up, it can be repeated that administrative

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reconstruction and the revival of representative democracy must proceed hand in hand. At each stage of local and state (or provincial) administration the civil service under Allied control should be advised by a representative council of citizens. The classes from which these advisory councils could be drawn have been described in Memorandum I, as well as above. As soon as possible a central, representative advisory body should be established for the central administration in Berlin.

From all these advisory councils a political grouping will very soon evolve, either in the form of moderate blocs or of a few larger parties. As soon as the occupation authorities believe that such political blocs or, possibly, two or three major parties, could conduct an election successfully, they should consent to the election of a national constituent assembly. This assembly should draft a provisional national constitution, which should provide for the election of a second constituent assembly after five years to revise the constitution in final form. Every effort should be made to prevent the interruption of this political process, so that an elected national assembly can come into existence as soon as possible.

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Three basic questions must be posed:

1. do the Nazis intend to go underground?
3. what forms is the underground likely to take?
2. to what aims will the underground be directed?

(1) It may be considered axiomatic that the Nazis plan to go underground and that preparations are already well under way. This view is derived not merely from available intelligence but follows from the character of the Nazi movement and the nature of Allied policy towards Germany. The occupation forces are committed to the dissolution of the Nazi Party and its affiliates, to the detention of active Nazis and the trial of war criminals. Such policies, even if radically carried out, cannot and, indeed, are not intended to, eliminate the roots of German aggression. German imperialism antedates the Nazi Party which has merely given to it its ruthlessness and its totalitarianism, and has in the past been supported by German militarists, Junkers, industrialists, the petty bourgeoisie and a small sector of labor. Though the direction of German imperialism -- East, West, Southeast, Colonies -- differed according to the material and ideological interests of each specific group, all groups saw in the prospect of territorial expansion the means to escape from the deep contradictions in German society, and all cooperated to destroy German democracy, in the framework of which this expansion could not be organized.

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This basic motive will continue to exist and just as the German imperialist and reactionary counter-revolution was started at the outbreak of the revolution of 1918, so will the new counter-revolution start on the day Nazism collapses.

(2) From the above, the aim of the clandestine movement follows. It will have the following objectives:

a. It must discredit Allied occupation policies and present the Allies as exploiters and oppressors.

b. It must try to split the occupation forces and drive a wedge between the USSR and the Western Powers.

c. It must discredit cooperation with the occupation forces, and

d. Last, but not least, weaken an emerging democratic movement.

The greatest danger to a clandestine Nazi movement is unquestionably an indigenous democratic movement. Allied occupation will cease but German democracy may emerge as a strong force which may have learned certain lessons from the years 1918-1932. It is for this reason that the supreme aim of the clandestine Nazi movement will be the terrorization of German democracy.

The forms of Nazi underground activities will be adapted to this end and will take into account conditions radically different from those prevailing in 1929/1933.

The protagonists of reaction and imperialism after the first World War will

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the Nationalist Parties

the Pressure Groups from Industry and Agriculture

the Socialist Organizations

the Free Corps

Most important were the Free Corps, composed of fanatic and often dispossessed officers and soldiers, dedicated to the fight against external and internal bolshevism and, during the Ruhr occupation, against the French occupation troops.

But the success of the Free Corps was predicated upon the following conditions:

a. They were not only tolderated, but actually called in by the Republican government to crush Bolshevik insurrections.

b. They were not only tolerated but encouraged by the Western powers to fight against the Red Army in the Baltic states.

c. They could, even after withdrawal of government and allied support, continue to operate because:

1. Germany was not occupied.

2. The democratic government was weak and could not rely upon the full support of its own regular army, its bureaucracy and judiciary.

[3] None of the conditions is likely to prevail. Germany will be occupied; the Western powers will not allow Germans to fight external Bolshevism; a German government may not exist at all.

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It follows, therefore, that the Free Corps pattern is not likely to be followed. Wherever such or similar organisations will appear, they will be dealt with by allied military power. Such Free Corps must, of course, not be confused with military resistance by the SS or other elite formations beyond organized military operations of the German army. The problem is not discussed here.

If the Free Corps organisation is not to be the preponderant form of a clandestine Nazi movement, the sociological principles of the Corps and their ideologies are, however, likely to revive and to form the social and ideological basis of the underground Nazi movement. It is, what the Germans call a "buendisch" idea, the idea that the conspirators are members of a racial community, that allegiance to the community precedes supersedes all other obligations, that members of the community who violate its mores are lawless and can be killed, and that every means is justified which fulfills the aim of the community. The prevalent political ideology of the groups is likely to be a new National Bolshevism, which is likely to become the modern German form of nationalism. The pure nationalists (exemplified by Moeller van den Bruck) always considered the alliance of nationalism and capitalism as a convenience rather than as a necessity. This trend will become predominant after the defeat. For the defeat will demonstrate to the nationalistic Germans that the USSR, in spite of her industrial inferiority, has been able to defeat Germany and they are likely to ascribe the superiority of the USSR to the subordination of all vested interests to the common weal. National Bolshevism is likely to attract the nationalist youth, and a small sector of revolutionary

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Communists who are dissatisfied with the alleged betrayal of revolutionary principles by Stalin. It will find support among the many adherents of an eastern orientation in German foreign policy among industry and the generals, as already exemplified in the Free Germany Committee, Moscow, and the Union of German Officers.

The clandestine Nazi organization will utilize all experiences with undercover operations: the terrorism of the Russian Social Revolutionaries; the cell organization of the Communists, the ideological affiliations with related organizations abroad (especially the Falange), the established business relationships of German and foreign business. It will permeate the German civil service, the judiciary and, above all, German leftist political parties and trade unions. It will infiltrate them in order to discredit them in the eyes of the occupation forces. It will try to induce them (rather than do it themselves) to commit sabotage, and to make strikes. It will organize murder of Germans who collaborate and occasionally of Allied officials. It will, above all, stir up discord between the occupation forces of the USSR and of the Western powers.

Available intelligence reports show that preparations for this underground are already far advanced. But in evaluating these reports a sharp distinction must be made between the planners of the Nazi underground and its later leaders. While the reports may indeed tell us the truth insofar as preparations for the clandestine movement are concerned, it is hardly likely that well-known SS leaders will be charged with the leadership of the underground.

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Secret

Military Government will thus be faced with a tremendous task. It is not my task to discuss the means and ways of fighting the Nazi underground. But the analysis indicates that considerable responsibility for fighting it must rest with indigenous democratic forces.

Secret

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

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Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

[illegible] 5 September 1944

[illegible]

[illegible]

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

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[illegible] partition of Germany, the various state governments should be encouraged to organize a central government [illegible] of the newly partitioned areas. Such new governments should be in the form of a loose confederation of states, with emphasis on states' rights and a large degree of local autonomy. Eventually such confederacies would assume sovereign functions, including separate currency and postal systems, power of overseas representation and negotiation, etc.

[illegible] Economy

The basic purpose of the military in control of the German economy will be to facilitate military operations and military support. The Allied military government shall not assume responsibility for such economic problems as price controls, rationing, unemployment, production, reconstruction, distribution, conservation, transportation, or transportation, or take any measures [illegible] maintain or [illegible] the German economy except when [illegible] are essential to military operations and are [illegible]. The measures will be designed to [illegible] the German economy [illegible] such needs as [illegible] German people with such facilities as may [illegible] the [illegible] maintenance.

[illegible] Control Measures

[illegible]

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

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

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TO: Director, OSS

DATE: 22 September 1944

FROM: Stanley P. Lovell

SUBJECT: Vergeltungswaffe 2

I have seen no intelligence from MEO or Bern regarding the actual use by the Germans of the V-2 rocket. From outside sources, especially British officers passing through Washington, I have been told the following:

1. The V-2 has been used several times.

2. It requires almost no launching site and therefore there are no installations as bombing targets.

3. It is launched from highways, etc. in an almost perpendicular position.

4. The trajectory is assumed to be the upper stratosphere, and its velocity is estimated at 2,200 miles per hour.

5. The fuel is said to be alcohol and liquid oxygen.

6. Its descent is utterly silent because: (a) the fuel has long been exhausted on the upward course, and (b) it is traveling much faster than the speed of sound.

7. It carries a payload of 1½ to 2 tons of high explosive, but this is detonated 40 to 80 feet underground due to the tremendous penetration of the rocket.

8. The earth-shock is said to be terrific, damaging all structural foundations and public utilities over a radius of more than a mile.

It is possible that this intelligence has come from Col. Bruce or from Bern, but neither has yet SI has knowledge of it. It is the writer's belief that the V-2 intelligence, now that the weapon has been used, is of the greatest importance, and that we are not functioning efficiently if we ignore it.

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Stanley P. Lovell

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Germany 15,246

~~SECRET~~ X Robot bomb (V-2)

~~SECRET~~ X Hubner

X Debye, Professor

HUBNER explained to subject that in the present state of the war the Germans are relying on a second secret weapon which, if used, will assure them victory. This new weapon, the V-2, is so destructive that the Germans are hesitating to use it before being fully aware of the Allies' ability to take reprisals. The time is so close that Hubner wagered on 22 June that the war would be over in three months, resulting in German victory by use of the weapon or German defeat if the weapon is not successfully used.

HUBNER told subject that an element, iran, (iranium) is the most powerful source of energy known; that this element has been compressed over millions of years into a very small form, and that, theoretically, if released, the energy resulting therefrom would be equivalent to that which was employed to compress the element over this period of time. Professor DEBYE, a Dutchman, was engaged in atomic research on this metal at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin up to 1940, when he was ousted by the Germans because

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they did not trust him. The professor went to the United States where he has continued his experiments. Recently four German scientists communicated with him asking him to return to Germany to continue his experiments; he sent word back that he would do so. Subject does not know the means of communication or why Prof.Debye would be interested in returning to Germany at a time when Germany appears to have lost the war. Meanwhile, the Germans have succeeded in isolating a small quantity of powder involving atomic separation from the element iran; to do so their process has used "heavy water." The product is considered 100,000 times more powerful than dynamite and is of such explosive energy that the Germans have not yet dared to conduct experiments with it. They are concerned over the progress made by Prof.Debye who they understand is using helium for his separation. Before using their secret weapon (which is not the atomic powder) they want to be sure that Prof.Debye's experiments have not reached the point where the British and Americans could respond with a destructive weapon

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so powerful as they believe can be evolved from these experiments.

Accordingly, subject is under instruction from Hubner to ascertain: (1) What department of the Government in the United States is in charge of these experiments; (2) the name of the person to be approached about the experiments--that is, the person acquainted with the progress; and (3) the exact dimensions of the tank of helium gas used in these experiments. Hubner is also interested to know how the American people react to reports of Russian aid to the Japanese in their war against China.

On ascertaining the foregoing, the Germans expect subject to return to Spain to give the answers to the above inquiries.

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SECOND DRAFT

ANNEX No 1 to Appx 3.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SUBSIDIARY INSTRUCTIONS

OPERATION "RANKIN" C*

GENERAL

26 March 1944

SECTION I

GENERAL

Item 1. Situation.

1. Definition of Situation.

a. "RANKIN" C* is [illegible] the cessation of organized resistance, [illegible] primary military objective will be [illegible] the Germans [illegible] the area evacuated, and [illegible] to Germany. In order to [illegible] it will be necessary to [illegible] as rapidly as possible.

b. "OVERCAST (Main)" is defined as the [illegible] the Rhine and the occupation of Austria by [illegible] Germany.

2. Policy.

b. In [illegible] should [illegible] to [illegible] all [illegible] will be [illegible] including [illegible]

d. A small [illegible]

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2. AFHQ will be responsible for the establishment and initially for the command and maintenance of occupational ground forces in AUSTRIA, and UPPER BAVARIA. At a later date (not yet decided) SHAEF will assume full responsibility for the division in UPPER BAVERIA and for the command of the forces in AUSTRIA.

Item 4: Responsibility for Signal Communications - General

1. Supreme Allied Commander, M.T.O.

SAC/MTO will retain the responsibilities as outlined in SECTION I, Item 4 of AFHQ SIGNAL INSTRUCTIONS, and will delegate to his direct subordinates involved in Operation "RANKIN C" the responsibilities as outlined in the following paragraphs. All of these responsibilities will be executed in accordance with current AFHQ SIGNAL INSTRUCTIONS. AFHQ will be placed on distribution of all Signal Instructions issued by directly subordinate headquarters, for the Operation.

2. Responsibilities for Sub-Areas of MTO

a. AUSTRIA and UPPER BAVARIA.

The Military Governor of AUSTRIA (General Sir HAROLD ALEXANDER) will be responsible for installation, maintenance and operation of all ground signal communications within AUSTRIA and UPPER BAVARIA for occupational forces allotted as follows:

1 Inf Div	VIENNA- WIENER NEUSTADT area
1 Inf Div	LINZ area
1 Inf Div	SALZBURG - INNSBRUCK area
1 Armd Div	KLAGENFURT - GRAZ - BRUCK area
1 Inf Div	MUNICH area

b. GREECE and BULGARIA

A British Corps Commander (to be named later) will be responsible initially to SAC/MTO for signal communications in this area and the responsibility will subsequently be passed to Middle East. The occupational ground forces will comprise one British Corps from AAI located initially as follows:

1 Div plus 1 Inf Bde Gp in the SALONIKA area
1 Div less 1 Inf Bde Gp in the ATHENS area

* * * *

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c. FRANCE.

(8) If "RANKIN C" occurs before the passage of command of Seventh Army to SHAEF, French formations will be established under Seventh Army as follows:

1 Fr Inf Div	MARSEILLE - TOULON area
1 Fr Inf Div	DIJON - VICHY - LYON area
1 Fr Inf Div	TOULOUSE area
1 Fr Inf Div	PARIS area
1 Fr Inf Div	MULHOUSE - METZ area
1 Fr Armd Div	ORLEANS - TOURS - LIMOGES area
1 Fr Armd Div	MARSEILLE - LYON area

. . . . .

SECTION II

SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE - SECURITY

Item 1: Signal Intelligence.

. . . . .

Item 2: Signal Security.

. . . . .

2. Allocation of Cryptographic Equipment. Because of the very small quantity of highly classified messages which should be transmitted by electrical means, and the necessity for conserving cryptographic personnel and equipment for use in other theaters, the issue of high grade cipher devices to Civil Affairs, AMGOT, and other semi-military headquarters will be held to an absolute minimum.

SECTION III

RADIO COMMUNICATION

Item 1: General Policy

1. All Commanders will issue orders to prevent destruction, damage or misuse of such fixed wireless equipment (both service and civil) as may be located in the area under their command. They will ensure that such installations are adequately safeguarded against pilferers and souvenir-hunters, and will report full details to G30, AFHQ, through normal channels as quickly as possible.

. . . . .

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Item 3: Frequency Allocation Policy.

1. No radio, radar or other equipment transmitting radio energy will be operated in the Mediterranean Theater without prior authorization by the Supreme Allied Commander of the frequencies and maximum power to be used. The authorization will be requested in the manner described herein.

. . . . .

SECTION VII

PHOTOGRAPHIC SERVICE

. . . . .

Item 2: Personnel

1. Photographic coverage within armies must be effected with the assigned and attached photographic units and personnel. Augmentation will not be provided.

. . . . .

Item 4: Disposition of Photographic Product.

1. Initially all exposed motion picture film and potential news photographs made by U.S. Army Photographic Units with armies or army groups will be rushed by PHO REP RAD, ADLS, or other air courier service to Army Pictorial Service Photo Lab No. 1, ACMB, ITALY, with added marking, "Phone Rome 774001 for Pick-up".

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TSFC (44) 13

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Chief Signal Officer

Copy NO. 12

24 August 1944

MINUTES OF THIRTEENTH MEETING, TACTICAL SIGNAL PLANS COMMITTEE,
1100B HOURS, 23 AUGUST 1944

PRESENT: Colonel MORRISON, AFHQ Sigs, Exec(S).
Grp/Capt. RODGERS, MAAF Plans.
Lt. Col. BURRUS, Sig Sect, SOS NATOUSA.
Lt. Col. McDONALD, Sig Sect, SOS NATOUSA.
Lt. Col. HYDE, CAFSO, MAAF.
Lt. Col. MEARS, AFHQ Sigs, Radio Div.
Lt. Col. SHANCROSS, AFHQ Sigs, Plans Div.
Major GLEASON, AFHQ Sigs, Wire Div.
Major INNOCD, CAFSO, MAAF.
Major MYERS, AFHQ Sigs, SIS Div.
Captain ENGLER, AFHQ Sigs, CSS.
Captain KITSTEE, 2677 Regt (OSS).

Lt. Col. SCURLOCK, AFHQ Sigs, Plans Div., Chairman.
Major CHANDLER, AFHQ Sigs, Plans Div., Secretary.

1. Developments Since Last Meeting. The J.P.S. has ceased work on "RANKIN" planning until the questions raised in SAC (44) 81, dated 19 August, are answered. This paper was read at the meeting and is available to members of TSFC in the Plans Division.

2. Signal Instructions, Operation "RANKIN C" - Second Draft.

a. The CSO has asked if the signal instructions should not contain more detail. It was agreed that this would be difficult at the present stage but should be incorporated at the time definite decisions are made. As the initial step, the following action is assigned.

ACTION: PLANS. Plans Division will prepare a separate draft for the CSO, covering the details of signal personnel and equipment based on the most logical assumptions.

b. The following changes and/or additions are to be incorporated into the Third Draft of these signal instructions.

(1) SECTION I.

(a) Item 3, Para 3.

ACTION: PLANS. Plans Division is to develop the Plain of command diagram.

(b) Item 4, Para 1.

1. The Air Force units allotted to each area are to be included.

ACTION: Both PLANS. MAAF Plans will provide the necessary information as soon as it is available.

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TSFC (44) 13, Para 2 b (6), Cont'd.

(6) SECTION VI, Item 1. Since all areas other than Seventh Army are to be British controlled, it is planned that RAF Air Mail Centers will be used rather than ADLS.

ACTION: PLANS. Plans Division is to prepare an Informal Routing Slip to G-3 for the signature of the CSO requesting that MAAF be directed to assume the responsibility for providing air mail service into the areas for all Allied services.

(7) SECTION VIII.

(a) Item 1, Para 1. Change date to read "10 August 1944" instead of "27 July 1944", and add to end of sentence, "and in accordance with separate directives published by this Headquarters."

(b) Control of Civilian Stores.

ACTION: SUPPLY. Supply Division will discuss the use and control of civilian stores in the occupied countries with G-4(Br) and G-4(A) and include a paragraph in the Supply Section covering this subject.

(8) Use of Term "SAC/MTO".

ACTION: PLANS. Plans Division will check to see that "SAC/MTO" is used rather than "AFHQ" when AFHQ is involved with either CinC MED or MAAF.

(9) RADAR Section.

ACTION: RADAR. Radar Division will prepare a RADAR section if required.

3. Next Meeting. The next meeting of this Committee on this subject will be held in Signal Plans Conference Room No. 140, Tuesday, 29 August 1944, at 1100B Hours.

JAMES F. SCURLOCK
Lt. Col., Signal Corps
OIC, Plans Division

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TSFC (44) 13, Para 2 b (1) (b) 2, Cont'd.

2. The responsibilities of each military commander are to include the control of all civil communications within his area.

ACTION: PLANS. Plans Division will rewrite the responsibility paragraphs to include the above and will coordinate same with G-5.

3. Item 4, Para 2 d. Change to read: "The responsibility for all ground force signal communications in that portion of ITALY as is under command of AAI at the time 'RANKIN C' occurs and for such portion of ITALY as is then still in German occupation will be in accordance with SECTION I, Item 5 of APHQ SIGNAL INSTRUCTIONS."

(c) Item 5, Location of Headquarters.

ACTION: PLANS. Plans Division will include in Third Draft.

(2) SECTION II.

(a) Item 1, Para 1 b (1). Change to read: "Information concerning convoy movements."

(b) Item 2, Para 1. The word at the end of the sentence should be changed to read "should" instead of "will".

(c) Security of Civilian Communications.

ACTION: SIS. SIS Division will contact G-2 with reference to security measures to be applied to civilian communications.

(3) SECTION III.

(a) Item 1, Para 4. In the third line the word "notice" after the word "broadcast" should read "station" instead.

(b) Appendix "B". The radio diagram is not in accordance with JNF assumptions and should include links to Seventh Army and WASHINGTON as well as changes in links from VIENNA.

ACTION: PLANS and RADIO. Plans and Radio Divisions will revise the diagram.

(4) SECTION IV.

ACTION: WIRE. Wire Division will write a paragraph on the control of civil wire communications.

(5) SECTION V, Item 1, Para 8. Add to the end of last sentence: "if feasible."

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Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan

FROM : Roger A. Pfaff, Major, Inf.
Acting Chief, X-2 Branch

DATE: September 4, 1944

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Captured Document (Copy) and Translation

Attached herewith for your information is copy of a document, "Tagung der VI - Referenten in Paris", found by the 31 S.C.I. Unit in the former Sipo and SD Headquarters in Rennes, together with translation prepared by German Desk, X-2 Branch.

This document covers minutes of meeting held by the VI Section of the RSHA in Paris on July 17 and 18, 1943. Even though a year old, it is interesting in presenting the viewpoint of HIMMLER's Intelligence Service towards the French. It is a sample of the type of document recovered by S.C.I. Units.

"VI" refers to the Sixth Bureau, Auslandsnachrichtendienst, (Foreign Intelligence Service) of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, (the Main Office for Reich Security.)

"IV" refers to the Gestapo, the Fourth Bureau of the RSHA.

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(Abw KdO-Spv)

[redacted] 15 [redacted] 1943.

The [redacted] July [redacted] 1943, at 9.00 a.m. with a [redacted] of VI, SS Obersturmführer [redacted] and 6 co-workers of [redacted].

[redacted]

SS Obersturmführer [redacted] stated that for VI-work the Special State Police [redacted]. Agents, couriers, and informers are to be [redacted] this field with money or through special [redacted]. Wherever possible, a receipt should be obtained from these people, stating the amount received. The original receipt is to be taken [redacted] personal file of the agent. A copy should be [redacted] the chief's office. For the location of caches of arms, the agents can receive compensation in cash. Corresponding proposals are to be directed to Section I. When on the basis of [redacted] regarding foreign exchange, gold or jewelry are found in enemy property, section VI has to report immediately in order to assure the confiscated valuables to the RSHA through the H.Qu., where they are urgently needed for the supplying of agents who are about to travel abroad. All changes in the personal card file are to be transmitted to Paris. The central file cards for the agents should contain number, profession, [redacted] particulars, report on territory covered, and [redacted] of training, and a running account of activities. The personal file of the agent should contain his personal form, an evaluation of the criminal receipts and the personal correspondence with the agent. For every agent a report file should be prepared in which the reports delivered by him with comments on their importance must be included.

[redacted]

SS Hauptsturmführer [redacted] named the following intelligence services active in France:

1. The intelligence services of friendly states
2. The intelligence services of neutral states
3. The intelligence service of the Church
4. The intelligence services of hostile countries

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Of the friendly countries, only J[illegible] independent intelligence services in F[illegible] intelligence service is insignificant. [illegible] the case of the Italian intelligence se[illegible] establish its relationship to the French [illegible] The intelligence services of neutral cou[illegible] hostile intelligence services, especially [illegible] the Swiss intelligence, which is only s[illegible] (British IS). The intelligence service[illegible] should in no case be underestimated. It [illegible] through Dominicans and Jesuits. The hos[illegible] services consist of: the IS, the intelli[illegible] Soviets, of the USA, the intelligence serv[illegible] ments in exile and the Deuxieme Bureau. A[illegible] eldest and most dangerous of the intelligence services, [illegible] not have an organisational plan in our possession. From the interrogations of those captured one can conclud[illegible] that i[illegible] contains three sections: (1) counter-espionage (2) sectio[illegible] for operational espionage and (3) economic espionage.

In the whole of France there are possibly only seven agents of the IS who, however, work with a considerable number of French collaborators. Also, we know very little about the intelligence service of the Soviet. To date, we have never been successful in capturing the leader of one of the larger Soviet intelligence networks. It is only known that all active Communists are at the same time employed for the Russian intelligence service. Accounts of interrogations of Communist terrorists are therefore to be given by IV to VI because it can no doubt be assumed that among the members of partisan groups intelligence personnel is to be found.

The American information service has thus far hardly made an appearance. Apparently, it works through the cover of the Deuxieme Bureau. The Belgian espionage service which is the most important of all espionage services in France. At present, it is badly penetrated so that one can view its operational network. It is divided into two sections:

1. Passage Section, which, according to notes that have been found, succeeded in slipping about 30,000 Belgians capable of military service into neutral or enemy territory.

2. Intelligence Service Section, which is divided again into specialized services.

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"Mod's" central office was in Paris; [illegible] chief has not yet been captured; we only know his cover [illegible], "Delbos". "Mod" has its own transmitters, and two [illegible]er routes to Portugal and Spain. One branch of "Mod" [illegible]s toward Alsace-Lorraine, Luxembourg and into Germany and [illegible]so makes use of the mails sent to Germany. Each member [illegible]s three different cover names: one for his superiors, one for his informers and one for the couriers. Most of "Mod's" agents are French-men, but the directors are exclusively Belgians.

The Polish Information Service is likewise very well organized, but considerably weaker than the Belgian in numbers. It has also become partly uncovered. Until the present time, the Jugoslavian Intelligence Service has hardly appeared at all. The Deuxieme Bureau had to be dissolved in accordance with the Armistice, but in August, 1940, it was reorganized under the cover, "S.S.M.A.", as a so-called infor-mation Bureau for Combatting Bolshevism. In reality, the "S.S.M.A." set itself almost exclusively to the task of liquidating agents working for Germany. When this activity became known, it had to be dissolved in August, 1942. The "S.S.M." (Service de Surveillance militaire) arose in its place; it placed its officers in all Divisions of the Army, in Youth Camps and essential industries. Besides this, it built up an active Espionage Center, led by Captain Lafond who fled to North Africa. Branch offices of this organization were to be found in Toulouse, Lyon and Clermont-Ferrand. "Antennae" were subordinate to these branch offices; the so-called reporting agents were attached to the "Antennae." Along with the "S.S.M." was a second espionage organization of the Deuxieme Bureau; we only know that it was called T.R. for short, and that it was organized into Posts, Annexes, and Antennae. The T.R. was apparently built jointly with the English I.S., for agents who were appointed by the I.S. could also belong to the T.R. A large part of the Deuxieme Bureau's intelligence material has come into our possession. So far we have not succeeded in identifying the sub-agents and agents of the Deuxieme Bureau, since all the reports we have found use only numbers and cover names. A part of the most important material was carried off to North Africa by Captain LAFOND. Every resistance group has its own intelligence service; however, they have exhibited only small success until now. The English Ministry of War has there-fore made up with the I.S. its own resistance organization in France; this is called "French Section"; it is made up of French people but commanded by British officers. This "French Section"

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receives ammunition, explosives and weapons by air for the execution of sabotage and for the installation of weapon depots for guerilla fighting in the case of a landing. A further task of the organization consists of the location of suitable landing fields. The organization is divided into three sections:

1. Sabotage
2. Radio
3. Air landing

It takes care of nine sections in occupied territory. It maintains closest relations with the Communist Party, which it supplies with weapons, while it refused to supply the bourgeois resistance groups with weapons and ammunition. Eleven planes kept up regular contact with England; fourteen air fields were made available for this purpose. All sub-leaders of the organization were brought to England by plane for a training of several weeks. The "French Section" in Southern France has even larger supplies of weapons to be reckoned with.

Copies of the examinations of people active in the intelligence services will be passed on from IV to VI.

DUTIES OF ABTEILUNG VI

SS-Standartenführer Dr. KNOCHEN then undertook to review the most urgent duties of Abteilung VI. First of all, it is important to provide for one Government the bases which it needs. In order to explain effectively the situation in France. Secondly, it is important to get German V-Men who will help us to eliminate the duds in the Field Commands, and to unmask the grumblers and defeatists in the Armed Services and SS, as well as German occupation personnel. Thirdly, French agents must be won in all fields of activity. We need information on the Jews, on the free Masons, the Church, the administration, business, and professional associations, and only agents for use against Communism and the resistance movement. Intelligence service stewards should be established in the various divisions of the Police and Commanders, administration, business, farmers' associations and youth. Heads of Commands lack agents in the nobility, in sunday circles and in the Left Groups. We must strive for the closest collaboration with IV. IV must return information received from VI with the results

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of its own undertakings. Close collaboration with II-pol (Police) is also necessary; especially in the case of permission for trips out of France.

POLITICAL SITUATION IN FRANCE

SS-Standartenfuehrer RICKHER declared that 99 per cent of the French population are openly hostile to us. The French despise the Germans. They will not even forgive us for treating them so decently. A wind of insanity blows over the whole of France. Everywhere there is the possibility of an outbreak of collective hysteria, as in the times of Bartholomew's Eve and the great Revolution. The enforced shipment of French to Germany itself arouses the most cowardly Frenchmen to a state of fury, in which they are capable of any rash action. For that reason, Vichy is the most unpopular regime in the world: a mixture of reactionary narrow-mindedness and clericalism. By no means does Petain enjoy the great esteem, which is often attributed to him by the Germans. The majority of the people see in him only an old G.I. Laval is a contradiction himself; he is the most parliamentary of all parliamentarians, but he is so convinced of his own importance that he cannot tolerate anyone else. Our propaganda in France has completely miscarried; the enemy's propaganda, on the other hand, is becoming more effective every day, because it promises the French salvation. The state's authority is slowly beginning to disintegrate: obedience to it is refused. The exact recognition of all symptoms of illness in the French people is one of our most important jobs. France is the advanced area of Fortress Europe. What happens here has the greatest effect on our political and military situation. We must therefore learn to know this territory of France in all its details; that is the first requirement for any intelligence service work. The smartest and most adaptable people must be represented among the VI Desk Heads. They must approach their work without any predetermined attitude, they must know how to understand the mental attitude of their opponent, and yet always remain what they are. Their reports must be free of false optimism and describe the situation as it really is. VI-work is a full-time job; a VI worker therefore should not be drawn into other work, when it can be avoided. Also, when they wear civilian clothes, they must show their comrades that they are soldiers at one of the most important sections of the Front.

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[illegible] PROBLEMS OF OBTAINING INFORMATION IN FRANCE

[illegible] Lieutenant-Colonel MOSAK continued, saying that obtaining information in France concerned the following sections:

1. Information (Situation reports)
2. Secret section
3. Connection with North Africa
4. Radio network
5. French outside France
6. Procurement of intelligence service materials
7. Building a network of invasion agents
8. Germans in France
9. Courier network for the post-war

Reports on the work of parties, associations, and resistance groups and on the frame of mind in French society all belong to the Information Section. Every VI-Bess Head must without fail make social contacts with the most important members of the collaborationist parties. The Secret Section has the pressing task of furnishing proof of double-dealing in French Government positions. Particularly the regional prefects must be surrounded by a network of agents and informers — likewise the police superintendents. The material recovered from the Deuxieme Bureau proved that almost all of the regional prefects had conveyed secret reports to this Bureau.

North Africa can be made via former French
the many Mohammedans visiting France. People
frica should be contacted and systematically
immaterial communications can be of

ratus is not suited for use in the
ny radio set found should be reported
of wireless students must be stim-

important source of information. Members
, who have relatives abroad, are em-
latives. Certain intelligence tasks
to have the greatest interest in estab-
h people in Spain, Portugal, and Turkey.

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THE PROBLEM AND TECHNIQUE OF OBTAINING INFORMATION IN FRANCE

SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer MOSER continued, saying that obtaining information in France concerned the following sections:

1. Information (Situation reports)
2. Secret Section
3. Connection with North Africa
4. Radio network
5. French outside France
6. Procurement of intelligence service materials
7. Building a network of invasion agents
8. Germans in France
9. Courier network for the post-War

Reports on the work of parties, associations, and resistance groups and on the frame of mind in French society all belong to the Information Section. Every VI-Desk Head must without fail make social contacts with the most important members of the collaborationist parties. The Secret Section has the pressing task of furnishing proof of double-dealing in French Government positions. Particularly the regional prefects must be surrounded by a network of agents and informers — likewise the police superintendents. The material recovered from the Bourdieux Bureau proved that almost all of the regional prefects had conveyed secret reports to this Bureau.

Connection with North Africa can be made via former French colonists and through the many Mohammedans visiting France. People returning from North Africa should be contacted and systematically interrogated. Apparently immaterial communications can be of great significance.

Since German radio apparatus is not suited for use in the event of invasion, every enemy radio set found should be reported immediately. The recruiting of wireless students must be stimulated.

French abroad are an important source of information. Members of collaborationist parties, who have relatives abroad, are encouraged to visit these relatives. Certain intelligence tasks will be given them orally. We have the greatest interest in establishing contact with French people in Spain, Portugal, and Turkey.

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Still more French documents, rubber stamps, seals, letter-heads and signatures of leading officials at French border patrol stations must be procured. Also important are blank membership cards of the larger associations: anglers' clubs, football clubs, etc.

A network of especially reliable agents to be used in case of invasion must be set up in the shortest possible time. It must consist exclusively of persons who have made no appearance before.

German nationals who wish to remain in France after the war, must be tested now for aptitude in intelligence work.

A courier network for the post-War period must be prepared now.

Names of agents may never be mentioned in any reports. They should appear there only by number. The direction and vetting of agents is exclusively in the hands of VI. We have to assign to Abt. IV a number of agents for special tasks. VI must endanger their work whenever they appear in uniform. Wearing uniforms for guard duty in the central office building should be avoided.

POSSIBILITIES OF OBTAINING INFORMATION IN CHURCH CIRCLES

SS-Untersturmführer BORTHEN pointed out the necessity of a closer approach to leading church circles.

EVALUATION OF REPORTS AND MAKING OUT REPORTS

SS-Hauptsturmführer GEISSLER recommended close contact with the propaganda staff. There should not be so much attention to Party gossip. All important business should be reported spontaneously through the FS (Funkstelle).

SUPERVISION OF FASCIST PARTIES AND POLITICAL GROUPS

SS-Hauptsturmführer Dr. KUNZE continued: the SD also has a supervisory obligation toward the French administration. Close contact with the departmental representatives of the administrational staff is absolutely necessary, since the dismissal of a prefect or regional prefect is possible only with their consent. Concrete evidence is required for the dismissal of a high administrational official. In spite of this, all officials of the prefectures who are anti-German must be written up in card indexes. A list of collaborationists who would be suitable replacements for these people, if the occasion arises, should be prepared. Supervision

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of associations should be more strict, since important situation report material can be obtained through them. The militia created by the collaborationists may be trained in the use of weapons but they may not yet be given weapons. It can be used as substitute or auxiliary to the police and eventually for the continuation of essential utilities. The movement for release of P/W's demanded by Laval should be watched very closely, for its Schovinistic elements may come to the fore. The attitude of "Action Francais" is still of interest. In the case of the youth movement, reports need only be made when points of view appear.

OBTAINING INFORMATION IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer ALISCH stated that information from the Iberian Peninsula is now of the greatest importance. The VI co-workers there should make connections immediately with the Spanish Consulates in their territories, also get in touch with the Falange's local groups, but a contact with the 300,000 Spanish Communists must also be made. Arrested Spanish Communists who give an impression of intelligence, should always be transferred to VI after conclusion of inquiries at IV; at VI they will be examined for possible use as agents. The establishment of connections with Basque National Party circles is very important; unquestionably there are threads from the Party to the English Intelligence Service. A direct contact with the English Intelligence Service would be invaluable to the RSHA.

THE QUESTION OF OBTAINING INFORMATION FROM ENEMY COUNTRIES

SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer [redacted]CHRISTIAN declared that the question of contact with the British Intelligence Service is of urgent significance. Every VI co-worker should observe to what extent persons with international connections are present in his region, persons whom one could use to advantage. Neutral diplomats in France must also be contacted. A further source of information are the enemy foreigners still resident in France; as has been proved they still have at their disposal (almost as a group) connections with their native countries via the underground.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

SS-Standartenfuehrer MICHLER again emphasized the decisive importance for the War, of the work of VI. Under all circumstances it is necessary to penetrate the enemy's intelligence network.

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only in this way is it possible to ascertain the enemy's intentions. A VI co-worker must dedicate himself to these tasks exclusively. All general instructions apply to him only when they do not cause interference with his VI work.

S/
St-Hauptscharfuehrer

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XXXIV

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Tagung der VI - Referenten in Paris

am 17./18. Juli 1943.

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Die Tagung begann am 17. Juli 1943, 9 Uhr vormittags mit Begrüßung einleitenden Worten des Leiters VI/ SS-Standartenführer P f e i f f e r. Anwesend waren etwa 30 VI-Referenten und 6 Beamtelter der Aussenstellen.

Verwaltungstechnische Fragen:

SS-Obersturmführer P f e i f f e r wies darauf hin, dass für die VI-Arbeit ausschliesslich staatspolizeiliche Verfügungsmittel aufgewendet werden dürfen. Agenten, Zuträger und Auskunftspersonen sind aus diesem Fond mit Geld oder durch Prämien, vor Aufmerksamkeiten zu entschädigen. Wenn irgend möglich, ist eine Quittung dieser Leute über die erhaltene Summe beizubringen. Die Originalquittung ist zur Personalakte der Agenten zu nehmen, einen Durchschlag erhält die Kasse. Für Auftragsannahme Kassenlager können Agenten Entschädigungen im voraus gewährt werden. Entsprechende Anträge sind an Abt. I zu richten. Wenn der Grund von Agentenmitteilungen bei festgenommenen Personen, Devisen, Gold oder Schmuck vorgefunden werden, hat sich VI sofort einzuschalten, um aber den RdS die beschlagnahmten Vermögen dem RSHA auszuleiten, wo sie dringend zur Ausrüstung von Agenten, die ins Ausland reisen, benötigt werden. Alle Veränderungen in der Agentenkartei sind nach Paris weiterzuleiten. Die Karteikarten für die Agenten haben zu enthalten: Name, Beruf, sonstige Personalien, Hinweise auf Arbeitsgebiet und Arbeitsweise und laufende Zuwendungen. Die Vorgesetzten des Agenten enthält seinen Personalbogen, eine Beurteilung, die Originalquittungen und den Schriftverkehr betreffend Agenten. Jeder Agent ist eine [illegible] anzulegen, in der die [illegible] Agenten berichte [illegible] auf deren Richtigkeit [illegible] in Abgaben.

Die feindliche Nachrichtendienst und seine Abwehr.

SS-Hauptsturmführer S c h m a l l nannte folgende Nachrichtendienste, die in Frankreich tätig sind:

a.) die Nachrichtendienste der befreundeten Staaten,
b.) die Nachrichtendienste der neutralen Staaten,
c.) der Nachrichtendienst der Kirche,
d.) die Nachrichtendienste der Feindstaaten.

Die unter a.) genannten Staaten unterhalten Dienste Nachrichtendienste in Spanien und Italien. Der japanische Nachrichtendienst [illegible] Nachrichtendienst

festzustellen.

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festzustellen. Die Nachrichtendienste der neutralen Staaten sind verkappte Feindnachrichtendienste, was ganz besonders für den schweizerischen Nachrichtendienst gilt, der nur ein Anhängsel des I.S. ist. Der Nachrichtendienst der katholischen Kirche darf in keinem Fall unterschätzt werden. Er wird hauptsächlich durch Dominikaner und Jesuiten betrieben. Der feindliche Nachrichtendienst besteht aus dem I.S., dem Nachrichtendienst der Sowjets, der U.S.A., den Nachrichtendiensten der Emigrantenregierungen und dem Deuxième Bureau. Über den I.S., dem aktivsten und gefährlichsten aller Nachrichtendienste, besitzen wir noch keinen Organisationsplan. Aus Aussagen von festgenommenen kann nur gefolgert werden, dass er drei Sektoren umfasst,

1. Sektor Gegenspionage,
2. Sektor aktiver Nachrichtendienst,
3. Sektor Wirtschaftsspionage.

In ganz Frankreich gibt es wahrscheinlich nur 7 Agenten des I.S., die aber mit einer Unmenge französischer Zuträger arbeiten. Auch über den Nachrichtendienst der Sowjets sind wir kaum im Bilde. Es ist bisher noch niemals gelungen, den Leiter eines grösseren Sowjetnachrichtennetzes festzunehmen. Bekannt ist nur, dass alle kommunistischen Aktivisten auch gleichzeitig in den Nachrichtendienst Russlands eingespannt sind. Vernehmungsdurchschläge an VI zu geben, da mit Sicherheits angenommen werden muss, dass sich unter den Angehörigen der Partisanengruppen auch Nachrichtenmänner befinden.

Der amerikanische Nachrichtendienst ist bisher in Frankreich fast gar nicht in Erscheinung getreten. Angeblich arbeitet er unter der Tarnung des Deuxième Bureau.

Der britische Nachrichtendienst "MOE" ist der wichtigste aller Feindnachrichtendienste in Frankreich. Er ist z. Zt. schwer anzugreifen, sodass in sein Organisationsnetz Einblick genommen werden könnte. Er verfällt in 2 Sektoren:

1.) Sektor Passage, dem es nach den aufgefundenen Notizen gelang, rund 200.000 wehrfähige Belgier ins neutrale oder feindliche Ausland über Grenzschleusen.

2.) Sektor Nachrichtendienst, der wieder in Einzeldienste aufgegliedert ist.

Das Zentrale des "MOE" befand sich in Paris, der Chef ist noch nicht ermittelt. Bekannt ist von ihm nur der Deckname "Belbo". Er hat [illegible] Sender und zwei Kurierlinien nach [illegible], Irland, [illegible] und Deutschland. Einer in und bedient sich [illegible] Agenten, einen für seine Verbindungen, [illegible] Sender "MOE" und Finanzen, seine Leiter aber aus-

[illegible] Zusammenarbeit ist ebenfalls sehr gut

[illegible]

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[illegible] bedeutend schwächer als der [illegible]. Auch er ist z.Teil aufgerollt worden. Der jugoslawische Nachrichtendienst ist bisher kaum in Erscheinung getreten.

Das deutsche Bureau musste laut Waffenstillstandsvertrag aufgelöst werden, aber schon im August 1940 reorganisierte es sich unter der Firma "D.W.A." als angebliches Nachrichtenbüro zur Bekämpfung des Bolschewismus. In Wirklichkeit hat das "D.W.A." da gar wie ausschliesslich sich die Erledigung für Deutschland arbeitender Agenten zum Ziele gesetzt gehabt. Als diese Tätigkeit ruchbar wurde, musste es im August 1942 aufgelöst werden. An seiner Stelle entstand der "S.S.F." (Service de Surveillance militaire, der Offiziere an allen Divisionen der Armee, zu Jugendlagern und lebenswichtigen Betrieben abstellte.) Daneben bildete er eine aktive Spionagezentrale, deren Leitung der nach Nordafrika geflüchtete Hauptsturmführer Lafond hatte. "Posten" dieser Organisation befanden sich in Toulouse, Lyon und Clermont Ferrand. Diese "Posten" waren wieder "Antennen" unterstellt, an die die sogenannten Informatoren angeschlossen waren. Neben den "S.S.F." gab es noch eine zweite Spionageorganisation des Deuxième Bureau, von der nur bekannt ist, dass sie abgekürzt T.R. hiess und sich in Poitiers, Annexen und Antennen untergliederte. Die T.R. war anscheinend gemeinsam mit dem englischen I.S. aufgebaut worden, da auch Agenten, die gleichzeitig für den I.S. tätig waren, in den T.R. eingebaut werden durften. Ein [illegible] Teil des Nachrichtenmaterials des Deuxième Bureau fiel in unsere Hand gefallen. Es ist bisher noch nicht gelungen, die Informatoren und Agenten des Deuxième Bureau zu identifizieren, da alle vorgefundenen Berichte nur mit Nummern und Decknamen gezeichnet waren. Ein Teil des wichtigen Materials soll von Hauptsturmführer Lafond nach Nordafrika entführt worden sein. Jede Widerstandsgruppe verfügt über ihren eigenen Nachrichtendienst, die aber bisher nur wenig Erfolg aufzuweisen hatten. Das englische Free Emigratorium hat deshalb gemeinsam mit dem Deuxième Bureau eine eigene Widerstandsorganisation in Frankreich aufgebaut, die sich "French Section" nennt, aus Franzosen zusammengesetzt ist, aber von englischen Offizieren befehligt wird. Diese "French Section" erhält auf dem Luftwege Munition, Sprengstoff und Waffen zur Ausführung von Sabotageakten und zur Anlage von Waffenlagern für einen Kleinkrieg im Landungsfalle. Eine weitere Aufgabe der Organisation besteht in Ausforschungen geheimer Luftlandeplätze. Die Organisation gliedert sich in die drei Sektoren

1.) Sabotage,
2.) Funk,
3.) Luftlandung.

Im besetzten Gebiet verfügte sie über 9 Bezirke. Sie unterhielt geheime Beziehungen zur kommunistischen Partei, die sie mit Waffen, Sabotageakten, während sie es andererseits ablehnte, die [illegible] Widerstandsgruppen mit Waffen und Munition zu versorgen. Zu diesem Zwecke hielten die regelmässige Verbindung mit [illegible] aufrecht. Zu Luftlandungen waren zu diesem Zweck [illegible] genommen worden. Alle Unterführer der Organisation

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wurden mittels Flugzeug nach England gebracht, und erhielten dort eine mehrwöchige Ausbildung. In Südfrankreich muss noch mit grösseren Waffenlagern der "French Section" gerechnet werden.

In allen Fällen sind Durchschriften von Vernehmungen nachrichtendienstlich tätiger Personen von IV and VI weiterzugeben.

Aufgaben der Abt. VI

SS-Standartenführer Dr. Knochen ergriff nun das Wort, um die vordringlichsten Aufgaben der Abt. VI zu umreissen. Es gilt erstens, unserer Regierung die Unterlagen zu verschaffen, die sie benötigt, um die Lage in Frankreich nutzbringend auswerten zu können; es gilt zweitens, auch deutsche V-Männer zu gewinnen, die uns dann helfen sollen, die Mullen bei den Feldkommandanturen zu eliminieren und die Miesmacher und Defaitisten im Reichsgebiet, SD und deutschen Einsatzpersonal zu entlarven. Drittens müssen auf allen Gebieten französische Agenten gewonnen werden. Wir brauchen Nachrichten über das Judentum, die Freimaurerei, die Kirche, die Verwaltung, die Wirtschaft und die Emigrantenorganisationen, nicht nur Agenten zum Einsatz gegen Sabotageakte und Widerstandsbewegung. Nachrichtendienstliche Schwerpunkte sind zu bilden auf den Sektoren Polizei und Gendarmerie, Verwaltung, Wirtschaft, Bauernbewegung und Jugend. Bei den meisten Kommandos fehlen Agenten im Nachbarbereich, in den Generalsmehrheitskreisen und im Roten Kreuz. Engste Zusammenarbeit mit IV ist anzustreben. IV muss gegen die Informationen von VI seine Vernehmungsergebnisse austauschen. Auch mit Riedl muss eng zusammen gearbeitet werden, vor allen Dingen in der Frage der Nachrichtenverbindungen aus Frankreich.

Politische Situation in Frankreich

SS-Standartenführer Dr. Knochen erklärt, dass 99 % der Frankreich-Bevölkerung uns in offener oder geheimer Feindschaft gegenüber steht. Die Franzosen verachten die Deutschen. Sie verachten uns nicht etwa, dass wir sie so anständig behandelt haben. Dem ganz französischen Wesen sind das Verhandeln, die Intrige, die Möglichkeit eines Ausbruchs von Kollektiver Hysterie, wie in den Zeiten der Bartholomäusnacht und der grossen Revolution. Die zwangsweise Verschickung von Franzosen nach Deutschland seines selbst die letzten Franzosen langsam aber sicher in einen Zustand der Sauerei, in dem sie zu jeder Gemeinheit fähig wären. Dazu kommt, dass Ruby die verschleierte Beherrschung der Welt ist; eine Mischung aus reaktionärer Gesinnung und Klerikalismus. Petain geniesst keine Sympathie und Achtung im Lande, dass ihm von deutscher Seite ein gewisses Ansehen zu Teil wird. Die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung sieht in ihm nur einen alten Narren. Laval ist ein Widerspruch in sich selbst. Er ist der parlamentarischste aller Parlamentarier, aber auch derjenige von seiner Bedeutung überzeugt, dass er keinen neben sich dulden will. Unsere Propaganda hat in Frankreich vollkommen versagt. Die feindpropaganda dagegen wirkt sich um so stärker aus, weil sie mit französischer Gelassenheit entgegnet. Im Gegensatz zu uns, weil sie mit französischer Gelassenheit entgegnet.

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begnügt sich die staatliche Autorität zu zersetzen: man verweigert ihr den Gehorsam. Das genaue Abhören aller Krankheitssymptome des französischen Volkskörpers ist eine unserer wesentlichsten Aufgaben. Frankreich ist das westliche Vorfeld der Festung Europe. Was hier vor sich geht, ist von größter Rückwirkung auf die Gestaltung unserer politischen und militärischen Lage. Wir müssen daher diesen Raum Frankreich aus das Genaueste kennen lernen, das ist die erste Voraussetzung für jede nachrichtendienstliche Arbeit. Die Klügsten und anpassungsfähigsten Leute müssen in den VI-Referaten vertreten sein. Sie müssen ohne vorausgefaßte Meinung an ihre Arbeit herangehen, sie müssen es verstehen, sich in die Seele des Gegners hineinzuversetzen, aber stets das zu bleiben, was sie sind. Ihre Berichte müssen sich von jedem Zweckoptimismus freihalten und die Lage schildern, wie sie wirklich ist. Die VI-Arbeit füllt ihren Mann vollkommen aus; ein VI-Bearbeiter soll daher, wenn es irgend zu vermeiden ist, nicht zur Erledigung anderer Aufgaben herangezogen werden. Auch wenn sie stets in Zivil sind, müssen sie ihren Kameraden zeigen, daß sie Soldaten an einem der wichtigsten Frontabschnitte sind.

Problem und Technik der Nachrichtenerfassung in Frankreich:

Die Nachrichtenerfassung in Frankreich, führte SS-Hauptsturmführer H o s e k aus, hat sich mit folgenden Sektoren zu beschäftigen:

1.) Information (Lageberichte),
2.) Geheimsektor,
3.) Verbindung nach Nordafrika,
4.) Funknetz,
5.) Auslandsfragen,
6.) Beschaffung nachrichtendienstlichen Materials,
7.) Aufbau eines Invasionsagentennetzes,
8.) Deutsche in Frankreich,
9.) Kurierneta für die Nachkriegszeit.

Zum Informationssektor gehören Berichte über die Arbeit der Parteien, Vereine, Widerstandsgruppen und über die Stimmung in der französischen Gesellschaft. Jeder VI-Referent hat unbedingt gesellschaftliche Beziehungen zu den wichtigsten Mitgliedern der Kollaborationsparteien anzuknüpfen.

Der Geheimsektor hat die dringliche Aufgabe, Beweise über das Doppelspiel der französischen Regierungsstellen zu erbringen. Besonders die Regionalpräfekten müssen von einem Netz von Agenten und Informatoren umgeben werden, ebenso aber auch die Polizeidienststellen. Aus dem beim Quai d'Orsay erfaßten Material hat sich ergeben, daß fast alle Regionalpräfekten Geheimberichte an diese Zentrale geleitet hatten.

Verbindung nach Nordafrika können über frühere französische Kolonialsoldaten und die zahlreich in Frankreich weilenden Kommandeure geschaffen werden. Rückkehrer aus Nordafrika sind in Erfahrung zu bringen und systematisch auszufragen. Auch anscheinend nebensächliche Mitteilungen können von größter Bedeutung sein.

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Da die deutschen Funkgeräte sich zum Einsatz im Invasionsfalle nicht eignen, ist jedes erfasste feindliche Funkgerät sofort zu melden. Die Werbung von Funkschülern muss verstärkt werden.

Die Franzosen im Ausland sind eine wichtige Nachrichtenquelle. Mitglieder von Kollaborationsparteien, die Verwandte im Ausland haben, sind zu veranlassen, diese Verwandten zu besuchen. Es werden ihnen bestimmte nachrichtendienstliche Aufträge mündlich mitgegeben. Grösstes Interesse besteht an Verbindungen zu Auslandfranzosen in Spanien, Portugal und der Türkei.

Es müssen noch mehr französische Urkunden, Stempel, Siegel, Kopfbogen und Unterschriften leitender Beamter französischer Grenzüberwachungsstellen beschafft werden. Wichtig sind aber auch blanko Mitgliedskarten grösserer Vereine: Anglerclub, Fussballvereine etc.

Ein Mehr besonders zuverlässiger Agenten für den Invasionsfall muss in aller kürzester Zeit aufgestellt werden. Es darf nur aus Personen bestehen, die bisher noch nicht in Erscheinung getreten sind.

Reichsdeutsche, die nach Friedensschluss in Frankreich bleiben wollen, müssen jetzt schon über ihre Eignung zum nachrichtendienstlichen Einsatz überprüft werden.

Ebenso ist jetzt schon ein Kuriernetz für die Nachkriegszeit vorzubereiten.

In allen Berichten dürfen niemals die Namen von Agenten erwähnt werden. Sie haben dort nur unter ihren Nummern zu erscheinen. Die Führung und Betreuung der Agenten liegt ausschliesslich in den Händen von VI. Der Abt. IV sind eine Anzahl Agenten zum Anbieten für bestimmte Aufgaben von Fall zu Fall zuzuleiten. Die VI-Mitarbeiter gefährden ihre Arbeit, wenn sie irgendwie in Uniform in Erscheinung treten. Es ist zu vermeiden, dass sie zu Ehrenwachen usw., die Uniform erfordern, herangezogen werden.

Möglichkeiten der Nachrichtenerfassung in kirchlichen Kreisen:

SS-Obersturmführer S t e r n wies auf die Notwendigkeit hin, dafür zu sorgen, dass kirchliche Kreise herangezogen

Nachrichtenauswertung und Berichterstattung:

SS-Hauptsturmführer D r e k m a n n empfiehlt enge Fühlungnahme mit der Personalabteilung. Es soll stets zuvor auf Personalstand geachtet werden. Bei allen wichtigen Angelegenheiten ist unaufgefordert durch VI zu berichten.

Personelle Verbindungen, Partei- und politische Verbände:

SS-Obersturmführer D r e k m a n n führte aus, dass auch der SD eine Aufgabe habe, darüber das französischen Verwaltung habe. Eine enge Fühlungnahme mit den Fachreferaten der Verwaltungsstäbe sei unbedingt erforderlich, da nur mit deren Einverständnis die

Abteilung

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Eingang eines Präfekten oder Regionalpräfekten möglich ist. Für die Entfernung eines höheren Verwaltungsbeamten ist konkretes Material erforderlich. Trotzdem müssen jetzt schon alle Beamten der Präfekturen kartei-mässig erfasst werden, die anti-deutsch eingestellt sind. Eine Liste von Kollaborationisten, die geeignet wären, diese Leute gegebenenfalls zu ersetzen, ist ebenfalls vorzubereiten. Die Beaufsichtigung der Vereine muss strenger durchgeführt werden, da dadurch wichtiges Lageberichtmaterial erfasst werden kann. Die von den Kollaborationisten geschaffene Miliz kann i. Gebrauch von Waffen ausgebildet werden, darf aber jetzt noch keine Waffen in die Hand bekommen. Im A-Falle ist sie als Ersatz oder Hilfspolizei zum Schutz zum und evtl. auch zur Weiterführung lebenswichtiger Betriebe einzusetzen. Die von Laval geforderte Kriegsgefangenenbewegung ist besonders scharf zu beobachten, da in ihr nachrichtliche Elemente zum Durchbruch kommen. Die Haltung der "Action Française" interessiert immer noch. Über die Jugendbewegung braucht nur berichtet werden, wenn sich besonders wichtige neue Gesichtspunkte dabei ergeben haben.

Nachrichtenerfassung in Spanien und Portugal:

SS-Hauptsturmführer A l i s c h legte dar, dass Nachrichten aus der iberischen Halbinsel z. Zt. von grösster Bedeutung seien. Die VI-Bearbeiter hätten sofort Verbindung mit den spanischen Konsulaten ihrer Region anzuknüpfen und ebenso Fühlung zu Rotspaniern, die einen intelligenten Eindruck machen, sind auf jeden Fall nach Abschluss der Ermittlungen bei IV an VI zu überstellen, wo sie auf ihre evtl. Verwendbarkeit für Agentenzwecke zu überprüfen sind. Sehr wichtig ist die Aufnahme von Beziehungen zu den Kreisen der baskischen Nationalpartei, von der unbedingt Fäden zum englischen Nachrichtendienst gehen. Eine direkte Verbindung zum englischen Nachrichtendienst wäre von unschätzbarem Werte für das RSHA.

Fragen der Nachrichtenerfassung aus den Feindstaaten:

SS-Hauptsturmführer Z u c h r i e s e l a n n bestätigte ebenfalls, dass die Frage einer Verbindung mit dem englischen Nachrichtendienst von vordringlicher Bedeutung sei. Jeder VI-Bearbeiter habe sich umzusehen, wieweit in seiner Region Persönlichkeiten mit internationalen Beziehungen vorhanden seien, die man während eines Krieges verwenden könnte. Auch mit den neutralen Diplomaten in Frankreich solle man unbedingt Fühlung halten. Eine weitere Informationsquelle seien die in Frankreich noch anwesenden Feindausländer, die erfahrungsgemäss fast restlos noch über unterirdische Verbindungen zu ihren Heimatländern verfügten.

Lebensmittelversorgung:

SS-Standartenführer H i e k l e r betonte nochmal die kriegsentscheidende Wichtigkeit der Ortsgruppen der Falangue zu nehmen, aber auch zu den 300,000

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entscheidende Bedeutung der VI-Arbeit. Es gelte unter allen Umständen, in das feindliche Nachrichtennetz einzudringen. Nur auf diesem Wege sei es möglich, Gewissheit über die Absichten des Gegners zu erhalten. Der VI-Bearbeiter habe sich ausschliesslich diesem Auftrag zu widmen. Alle allgemeinen Anordnungen gelten sinngemäss nur dann für ihn, wenn dadurch seine VI-Arbeit nicht verändert wird.

gez.
SS-Hauptscharführer.

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SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25

MEMORANDUM

Date 23 September 1944

To: Mr. Charles S. Cheston, Asst. Director, O.S.S.
Washington, 25, D. C.

Subject: Providing Intelligence for Joint Post-War Committee.

Your memo to J.C.S. dated 2 September 1944, reference above subject, is returned herewith as per telephone conversation this date with Lt. E. J. Putzell.

CHARLES J. GRIDLEY,
Colonel, GSC,
Assistant Secretary.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

2 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT U. S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

1. On 18 August 1944, Military Intelligence Service, War Department, requested this Agency to produce all available intelligence on the following subjects for the Joint Post-War Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

German Police Forces
German Para-Military Organizations
Hitler-Jugend
SS and Subordinate Affiliated Orgaizations
German Espionage

The request stated that in the transmission of the intelligence received from OSS, full credit will be given to this organization.

2. Research and preparation of the material requested is proceeding and will be furnished as soon as available.

3. OSS will at all times be of any service possible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the War and Navy Departments and to all appropriate branches of this and Allied governments. It will, of course, be governed by the wishes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the method by which its intelligence and research materials are prepared and disseminated. However, in situations such as the present one (where materials from several agencies may be

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desired), it is respectfully submitted that a real saving of time and manpower will be effected if the committee or agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which desires intelligence and research materials will make request of the JIC, who will designate the agencies (such as G-2, ONI, State Department, FEA, OSS, etc.) to prepare studies and furnish materials. Thus, in accordance with its charter, the JIC would be able to tap all sources available to it and to coordinate the materials submitted for the use of the JCS and its organization.

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

X War Dept. MIS
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X JCS
X JIC
X JPWC — OSS

9 7/15.
PM 5 22

TO: Lt. E. J. Putrell

DATE: 4 September 1944

FROM: Edward S. Mason

SUBJECT: Comments on Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff Regarding Request from MIS.

The JIC ordinarily limits its activities to questions involving an evaluation of material coming from a number of Intelligence Agencies. The data requested by the Joint Post-War Committee does not appear to belong in this category. It seems to me that the thing to do is to send our material directly to the Joint Post-War Committee at the same time we send it to MIS, and perhaps accompany this dispatch by a note to the Post-War Committee indicating that we prefer to receive such requests directly.

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INFORMATION

ROUTING SHEET

SECRET

Subject

Originator

Date

Addressee

Date Rec'd Sep 5 10 58 AM '44

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd	Date Fwd'd	Initials	Comments Indicate action desired or taken
Lt. Col. Quasa		4 Sept	4 Sept	Taken	Memo to G. Pritzlaff
General Magruder's Office		9/5	9/5		Any reply?
Dr. Langer		4 Sept		RHL	Nothing to add.
Chief of SI		SEP 6 1944	SEP 7 1944	RHCF	
Lenygram		9/7	9/7	ack	
Chief of X-2			9/8	Rap	
Mrs. O'Donnell					
2 5 1 9					

Copies have been circulated - Ken Kuhn Chas Irby & C/

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5 August 1944

MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: Lt. Comdr. John Shahbaz

FROM: Frank T. Stone

SUBJECT: Captured German Equipment

With reference to your request for identification and evaluation of the captured German equipment which you delivered to us the other day, we have taken the matter up with Lt. Col. Henry Shore of the Communications Branch and he reports as follows:

"The piece of captured German equipment, which was turned over for our limited inspection and study, is a radio-sonde known as the Krieg-Marine type RS-1.

"It appears to be designed for low altitude work to transmit radio signals indicative of temperature, pressure and relative humidity.

"A single tube having twin elements provides two transmitters, one operating on a frequency of approximately 10 megacycles and the other on a frequency of 11.8 megacycles. The signals representative of the temperature are transmitted on the 10 megacycle frequency by having the mercury column of the thermometer short circuiting inductance through a variable resistance which shifts the transmitted frequency. Similarly the barometric pressure instrument short circuits an inductance to shift frequency in small steps and a second thermometer, apparently of wet bulb type, also changes frequency of the oscillator in large steps to supply the information from which the relative humidity may be calculated.

"A similar instrument of earlier construction apparently has been examined at considerable detail by a Signal Corps laboratory at Eatontown and is covered by a memorandum report to the Chief, Meteorological Section on September 24, 1943, Subject: Foreign Instruments, and signed by Leon Hillman."

Attached are photographs and the wiring diagram of the instrument, together with your correspondence file on the subject.

CONFIDENTIAL

Frank T. Stone, Deputy Director
Research and Development

Attachments

cc: Gen. W.D. Sumners

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Germany
Hitler
Reported by
Langer, Walter

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date: July 26, 1944

To: General William J. Donovan
and Colonel Mann

From: Walter C. Langer

Subject: Attempted Assassination of Hitler

Although the newspaper reports on the attempted assassination of Hitler are meagre, confused and contradictory and it is difficult to formulate any clear conception of what is happening in Germany, it is my belief that the attempt on his life was staged by himself. The reasons for this conclusion are:

(a) The time, place and manner of execution of the plot seem clumsy and unworthy of high-ranking German generals who planned to seize the government.

(b) It seems unlikely to me that high-ranking Germans, who plotted to seize the government, would want to eliminate Hitler. They are well aware of the peculiar bond existing between him and the German people and would be more inclined to hold him as hostage to guarantee order on the home front as well as on the military fronts.

(c) Any comprehensive plot by the army to seize power would almost certainly include the elimination of Goebbels and Himmler as well as Hitler.

(d) In view of Hitler's fear of death it is unlikely, even with his peculiar psychological make-up, that he would proceed with state business in the calm manner described.

(e) The text of his address after the incident (although it is difficult to judge from a newspaper version alone) is not what I would expect Hitler to say if the attempt had been genuine.

(f) The technique of staging events of this kind in order to justify a radical course of action is not uncommon in Hitler's career, the Reichstag fire being the notable example.

We may suppose that the situation in Germany is, briefly, somewhat as follows: As a result of the constant air-raids, the successful invasion and the defeats on the Eastern front particularly, the German people are losing all hope of winning the war

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Nazi are wondering what good purpose it serves to continue enduring hardships and making sacrifices. Their morale and their productivity are consequently diminishing. This alarms Hitler and the top-ranking Nazis. The old-line generals are undoubtedly disgruntled about the way the war is being run, particularly in view of the fact that one member of their group after another is being relieved of his command and is being replaced by a Nazi-trained officer. Many are probably of the opinion that the wisest course would be to make peace and salvage what they can of the German military machine and traditions.

Hitler knows that the SS has a sufficient hold on the home front to prevent a revolt of any consequence at this time. However, he would like to raise the morale of the people. The army is the only real threat to his power and position, and especially the old-line generals who command the respect and confidence of their men and the people at home. Many of the most famous among them consistently resisted his attempts to imbue them with the Nazi ideology. These are his greatest threat. The most obvious way of combatting this danger is to replace all those whose loyalty is doubtful with ardent Nazi supporters. Hitler has been doing this for some time, but it is a slow process because he must always wait until an occasion arises on which a given commander appears to be incompetent before he can justify the replacement in the eyes of the soldiers or of the people.

The recent succession of events has been such that Hitler fears the situation is getting out of his control. Something drastic must be done which will serve to speed up the elimination of old-line generals who might organize a revolt, frighten the more timid into blind submission, and at the same time win back or strengthen the allegiance of the rank and file at home as well as on the front.

When we look at the situation in this light there is only one possible event which could serve these purposes and that is an unsuccessful attempt on Hitler's life. The immediate reaction of all Nazi sympathisers would be: "We must no longer complain of our hardships or lose courage. We must try to be worthy of our Fuehrer who sets us such a wonderful example. He is not only exposed to the dangers of air-raids and enemy fire, but also to the bullets and bombs of a hidden assassin. Yet he carries on with undaunted courage and fortitude, confident of ultimate victory. He lives only for Germany and although the future seems dark, we must not fail him." This type of emotional appeal for his personal safety and comfort is an old trick in Hitler's repertoire and has been unusually successful with the women and younger people. From it he would expect a definite

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rise in the level of morale. On the other side, only such an attempt on his life would in any way justify the purging of large numbers of old-line generals without any waiting for a show of apparent incompetence. Since no trial is allowed, all suspects and undesirables can be permanently eliminated from the picture and their places taken by ardent supporters who can be trusted. The process is quick, thorough and impressive.

These are the more obvious aspects of the plot but there are subtle elements which are also extremely important. As failure looms ahead the aggression which has been directed against the enemy is gradually repressed by a fear of him. A new outlet for this aggression must be found. Since it can no longer be directed to the outside it begins to attach itself to persons within. Under these circumstances it most frequently becomes directed against the leaders who are responsible for their immediate predicament. In the present German situation this would be Hitler and the Nazis and if left to itself it would, in time, as these aggressive forces became stronger, lead to a general revolt against them.

Hitler undoubtedly senses this and in order to avoid such a catastrophe he must find a scapegoat to whom he can divert the mounting aggression in the people. The Jews served this purpose for Hitler after the last war and ever since but they cannot now be used in this way because they have had no part in the war effort. The only possible group which could serve in this capacity are the old-line generals whom Hitler has always hated and feared. The problem is how to shift the aggression of the people from himself to this particular group! In order to accomplish this successfully they must be placed in a position where they can, as a group, be accused of betrayal and disloyalty to the cause, while he appears to be working in behalf of the people. The attempted assassination serves this purpose beautifully for when it is translated, it says: "Do not blame me for our present predicament. I am doing my best to save you from disaster and willingly risk my life to do so. But how can we expect to succeed when these villains whom we trusted and who should be loyal in the performance of their duty betray us. You must hate them and not me." In order to satisfy their aggressive impulses he acts as the agent of the people in slaughtering the criminals. In this way he hopes to escape their vengeance as well as to absolve himself from any responsibility for his own failure.

In addition to diverting the mounting aggression, this technique also serves as a foundation for a future Nazi underground movement. In a short time the facts could be distorted, as they

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were after the last war, so that it would appear that the Nazi ideology and methods were sound and would have proved victorious if they had not been sabotaged by the Junkers and the old-line generals. The Nazi underground would presumably follow the same technique in arousing the people that they used after the last war and unless some radical measures are taken to offset them they would probably be just as successful, especially with the younger generation.

Mention should also be made of one other aspect of the assassination attempt. The miraculous escape from death is designed to strengthen the myth that Hitler is under the protection of Divine Providence which shields him from death in order that he may fulfill his mission of leading Germany to a new greatness. This is an important element in holding the German people together and helps to maintain the delusion that although things look black at the present time Adolph will yet, by some miracle, turn defeat into victory as he has done so many times in the past.

In view of all this, the conclusion that the assassination attempt was staged seems almost inescapable. Equally inescapable is the conclusion that Unless German morale was actually beginning to crumble, such a drastic measure would not have been necessary. Our problem is to capitalize on this knowledge. I would suggest that one of the best ways in which this can be done is to expose the plot as an attempt on the part of Hitler to trick the German people in the ways I have described. Every attempt must be made to prevent the transfer of aggressive impulses from Hitler and the Nazis, where they rightfully belong, to the old-line generals who are more likely to use commonsense in facing the reality of the situation. In order to do this we must point out in detail what Hitler hoped to accomplish and why. In this way we would be calling his cards before he can play them and at least partially explode his strategy. This part of the project can be carried out by means of leaflets as well as the black and white radio with varying emphasis. On the black radio we should use every means at our disposal to persuade the Army, if there is a plot to seize the government, not to assassinate Hitler but to take him prisoner. Any assassination will tend to strengthen the Hitler Myth and make the reformation of Germany in the future much more difficult. Our task would be much easier if he could be kept alive, but powerless, in order that he can be shown to the German people in his true light and be made to shoulder the responsibility for their disaster.

A word may also be said about Hitler personally. If the purge of the Army is as extensive as the newspapers would have us believe, it is almost certain that Hitler will go into a deep depression as he did after the Blood Purge in 1934. He will be

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unfit for human companionship and will avoid it as much as possible. He will seek it only when the ghosts of his victims threaten him and he needs others about him as protectors. The minute these "protectors" appear, he will shift his secret fears onto them and dismiss them before they have a chance to assassinate him. In his sleep as well as in his waking state, he will feel himself surrounded by avengers. His capacity for work will approach zero and he will not dare to make any decisions. By his own actions in the immediate future he should aggravate the dissension among the remaining officers in the army. This would be an ideal time to hasten his psychological deterioration by playing on his fears if we had the means of reaching him. Rumors and black radio programs of all kinds of plots to murder him might be helpful.

From a psychological point of view it seems certain that German morale will decline. The attempted assassination may cause a temporary upswing but the increased pressure and terror will soon make itself felt. Terror feeds on itself for a time, but when it is directed against a part of oneself it soon becomes intolerable and breaks under its own weight. From the progression of events it seems almost inevitable that Germany will sooner or later break out into a bloody revolution.

Walter C. Langer

Walter C. Langer, Consultant

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INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General Donovan

DATE: 14 August 1944

FROM: Wallace R. Deuel W.R.D.

SUBJECT: OWI Broadcasts to Germany, 8-9 August

1. OWI referred to the State Department the transcripts of the two broadcasts I recorded for transmission on 8-9 August, and somebody or other in the Department required that certain changes be made before the material be put on the air.

2. These changes weakened the material so much that I considered it was no longer worth broadcasting, and told OWI I was sorry but the whole thing had better be called off. This has now been done.

3. This experience with State Department policy, plus certain other aspects of the incident, seemed to me to make it clear that there is no possibility of my broadcasting for OWI the only sort of material I think is worth going on the air with. I have, therefore, told OWI that I don't see any point in my making further attempts to broadcast for them.

4. I should add that my discussions with OWI were altogether friendly on both sides throughout.

WRD:RH

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General Donovan

DATE: 8 August 1944

FROM: Wallace R. Deuel WRD.

SUBJECT: OWI Broadcasts to Germany 8-9 August.

Attached are carbon copies of two broadcasts to Germany which I have just recorded for OWI.

WRD:BS
ENC. (2)

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OWI BROADCAST TO GERMANY

August 8, 1944

The most profound satisfaction is felt in Washington as a result of recent events in Germany.

There is no inclination here to underestimate the difficulties which remain to be overcome before the Reich is defeated, or the price in blood and treasure which will have to be paid for victory. Nevertheless, it is clear that developments in Germany are presenting in exactly the manner in which the Governments of the United Nations have foreseen that they would present, and that they will continue to do so.

It has been obvious from the outset, of course, that as soon as it became clear beyond any doubt that Germany could not possibly win the war, important individuals and groups in the Reich would start trying to save their own lives and positions -- and as much else as they could. [illegible] It has also been obvious that the moves that

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military situation became, the larger and the more important would be the number of the individuals and groups that would try to save themselves, and the further they would be willing to go toward ~~sacrificing everybody else, and everything else in order to save themselves.~~

The Governments of the United Nations clearly foresaw all this long ago, and made complete preparations accordingly. They have, therefore, been able to take full advantage of each development as it has occurred, exactly as foreseen, and will be able to take even greater advantage of the further and even more sensational events which will now follow with the inevitability of dawn.

The first attempts by important individuals and groups in Germany to ~~break away by making a separate peace~~ with the United Nations began a good many months ago. Approaches were made both to the Soviet Union and to the Western United Nations. The Reich's military position was already hopeless. That is why the approaches were made. However, the Germans who wished to achieve

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were nevertheless so ill-advised as to try to stipulate conditions for doing so. There were several of these conditions. None of them, however, was of any practical importance then -- and none is of practical importance now -- because the United Nations were not interested in conditions. They are only interested in surrender. It was apparent, however, that the Germans who wanted peace were interested in a kind of peace that would spare them any too painful consequences which might result from the lost war.

For the rest, these gentlemen were simply not in a position to fulfill the offers they made. They were important and powerful men, and they occupied important and powerful offices. Their names are known all over the world. But they were not quite important and powerful enough, as the United Nations clearly perceived. These men wanted to surrender Germany, but most of them were not even in a position to surrender themselves. For one thing, they were under far too close surveillance at home, as subsequent events have proven.

The United Nations, naturally, rejected these overtures -- and waited for the further developments which were bound to follow. These developments occurred on July 20th.

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I shall explain, in a subsequent broadcast, how these developments of July 20th -- and those which have occurred since and those which will occur in future -- have resulted, and will result, with mathematical certainty, from the policies which the United Nations adopted long ago.

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OWI BROADCAST TO GERMANY

August 9, 1944

In my previous broadcast I reported that the most profound satisfaction was felt in Washington as a result of recent events in Germany. I explained that these events were the inevitable result of the approach of military disaster for the Reich and of policies adopted long ago by the United Nations, and I explained that these policies brought about their first climax in the events of July 20.

As I said in my previous broadcast, important individuals and groups in Germany began trying a good many months ago to negotiate with the United Nations for the surrender of the Reich, but these attempts failed because those who made the overtures to the United Nations were repulsed.

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What happened next? Exactly what the United Nations had foreseen would happen. For the Germans who wanted to surrender realized that there was only one way they could do so, and that was to surrender unconditionally. And as the military situation went from bad to worse, more and more Germans realized that if they were to save anything at all from the disaster which threatened, they themselves -- without any help or cooperation or payment of regards from the outside -- must eliminate by their own efforts the leadership which was driving the Reich toward a horrible catastrophe.

It was the combination of men and motives like these which led to the events of July 20.

The official Nazi accounts of what happened that day

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are, of course, ridiculous. They are ridiculous for two reasons. The first reason is that the Nazis who have given out the official accounts are lying, as usual. It must be said in all fairness, however, that these gentlemen are not altogether responsible for the fact that their version of the events of July 20 is so silly. There is another reason, and that is that Hitler and Goering simply do not know what happened that day, or why, or how, or who was involved, and still less do they know what is going to happen next. This is the principal reason why they are talking such complete nonsense -- and this is the principal reason why they are so close to panic.

Hitler and Goering are fighting against their fate at home exactly as cornered rats usually do fight -- with great courage and cunning, and therefore no discrimination whatever, but as usual, they have caught a few of the leaders of the plot against them. But they have also murdered a rather large number of perfectly good Germans who had nothing whatever to do with the plot, and they have completely overlooked an even larger number of equally good Germans who were among the leaders of the plot.

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The regime simply does not know where to look for these other leaders. Do Hitler, Goering, Himmler and Goebbels really believe that the only elements involved in the plot were certain Generals, aristocrats and old-fashioned upper civil servants? If they do believe this, they are even more ignorant of what is going on in the Reich than first appeared. For even this one plot which came so close to succeeding on July 20 included every sort and condition of German -- including, even, a certain number in the highest ranks of the Party itself. And this, of course, is not the only plot.

Military disaster comes closer to Germany with every hour -- and with every hour, events in the Reich develop precisely as the United Nations have foreseen they would.

There is only one way out -- the way of unconditional surrender. More and more individuals are choosing this way already. More and more Generals are surrendering, and more and more civilians have come over, openly or secretly, to the United Nations. The plan is working perfectly -- the more terrible the military pressure becomes,

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the more numerous and more important are the Germans who are prepared to make peace and the greater the price they are willing to pay for it.

The future holds only one question: Will Germans, whenever they get the chance, continue to surrender unconditionally as individuals until so many of them have given up that organized German resistance on a national scale becomes impossible? Or will one or another of the plots against the regime succeed in time to make an orderly liquidation of the war possible?

The United Nations are prepared for either of these two developments. Which occurs first depends entirely on the Germans themselves. But one or the other will occur before many months or perhaps before many weeks have passed. Then, at last, peace will come to Europe. -- and only then --

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General Donovan

DATE: 24 July 1944

FROM: Major R. Duel, A.U.S.

SUBJECT: Current Developments in Germany

1. The following ideas occur to me, on the basis of information at hand for example, concerning current developments in Germany.

2. It has been clear from the outset that the generals would try to take Germany out of the war as soon as either one or both of the following things should threaten:

(a) the destruction of the German Army in the sense that the Polish and French Armies were destroyed -- that is, their reduction to a state in which they could no longer effectively function;

(b) the approach of Allied armies, and most particularly of the Soviet armies, to German soil.

3. Since the second of these things is now happening, even if the first is not, I am convinced that further attempts will be made from now on to get rid of Hitler and take Germany out of the war, and that these attempts will be made by people much like those who seem to have made (or to be making) the present attempt. It would appear to be impossible to tell, at this distance and on the basis of the information available, what the chances of success are of such attempts.

4. At least this much is clear, though: Hitler is a much tougher individual than the last Kaiser was; there is probably no Doorn where he could be safe in exile; and, unlike the Kaiser, he has an alternative basis of power--namely, the SS. These factors obviously will tend to make it much more difficult for the Army to take Germany out of the war now than it was for the Army to do this the last time.

5. The basic purpose of Germany's Russian policy for generations has been, of course, to control Russian raw material, Russian space, and Russian manpower in Germany's interest. Germany's governments have resorted at different times to two methods of achieving this purpose: One, to win control of these factors of Russian power by means of friendship with Russia; two, to accomplish this purpose by conquering Russia. Hitler has now tried both these methods and has failed in both. It seems to be that the generals will now try to make a deal with Russia, since they and Hitler

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together have failed so catastrophically to conquer the Soviets.

6. The fact that Hitler and Goering have told their own people that there was a plot among high-ranking generals must surely have a shattering effect, in time, on the morale of the troops. It would seem to be the case, therefore, that Hitler and Goering would give out this account of what has happened only if they knew that this account would reach the people in any event -- which, in turn, would appear to indicate that the generals must have gotten access to German radio and/or [redacted] communications.

7. If it is true, as reported, that Brauchitsch and Halder have been involved in the plot, then chances are that the whole group represented by "Herman" must have been mixed up in it, since they were two of the leading members of the group he represented. If this is the case, it would follow that our refusal to dicker with these people-- or at least their inability to make a deal with us -- must have convinced them that they had to do their part first, without any help or promises from us.

8. One of the most interesting, and possibly one of the most important, political warfare angles of the past several days' developments obviously is that the Fourth Reich now has its alibi for the present war. We may expect to hear between now and the next German war the claim that Germany was not defeated in the field in this war, but that it was cheated out of the war by the disloyalty of a small group of traitorous [redacted]. I should like to suggest that both ourselves and OWI make the most strenuous efforts, in our propaganda to Germany, to put over the point that the generals are quitting because the German armies are, in effect, defeated in the field, and to counteract the argument that the armies are being defeated because the generals are deserting.

9. For the rest, I should imagine that the most effective MO (and OWI) tactics now will be those of sowing confusion.

[redacted]

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11 June 1945

Major General William J. Donovan
Director, Office of Strategic Services
Administration Building
25th and E Streets, N.W.
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

I have been informed that Dr. Hajo Holborn has terminated his connection with the Office of Strategic Services in order to return to his duties at Yale University. I am taking this opportunity to express my appreciation for the many services rendered to me and to my office by Dr. Holborn as a member of your staff.

For more than a year he served as a member of the Committee on Civil Affairs Studies. You are well aware of the importance of the work that has been done in the preparation of Civil Affairs guides.

Dr. Holborn was, during the entire period that he served upon the committee, one of its most enthusiastic and industrious members. As the result of his excellent opinions and the advice that he rendered as a member of the committee, the guides that have been prepared have proved to be documents which are a very real value in the conduct of the work of military government. In addition, I feel fortunate to have had the services of Dr. Holborn upon personal advisory in which capacity he has done much to assist me with the [illegible] problems.

It is with extreme regret that we see Dr. Holborn [illegible]

Sincerely,

J. H. [illegible]
Major General
Director, Civil Affairs Division

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TO: Dr. William L. Langer

From: Dr. Hajo Holborn

Will you decide whether or not a copy of this report should be sent to London.

No

MOD

file & memo for x-reference

FROM: Hajo Holborn - Room 726 Annex

Outside Edges of green card indicate the edges of the camera field

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Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET/CONTROL

TO : Dr. William L. Langer

DATE: 10 February 1945.

FROM : Dr. Hajo Holborn H.H.

SUBJECT: Conversation with Major-General Hildring on recent CA Developments.

In a conversation which took place on February 8, 1945 and lasted more than an hour and a quarter I had the opportunity of reviewing with General Hildring our relations with CAD and recent developments in the field of military government. General Hildring spoke with great frankness and his remarks should not be quoted.

We started with a discussion of the present formal status of the Civil Affairs Guides on Germany. The Civil Affairs Division and Mr. McCloy reached the conclusion that some of the Guides were not in line with the Combined Directives on MG of Germany, nowadays usually quoted as Document 1067. This criticism applies only to a few of the economic Guides and in addition to the Guide on the Jewish problem in Germany. We had been informed earlier that the Guides on the Jewish problem, on Price Control and on Repatriation and Care of Foreign Civilian Workers in Germany would have to be revised and re-issued. Otherwise, all the Guides will freely circulate. General Hildring stated that he had convinced McCloy and Stettinius of the inadvisability of re-examining the Guides all the time. He had told McCloy and Stettinius that the Guides had been written at a time when the presently existing directives had not been clearly defined. As a matter of fact, most of the work had been done at a time when no directives existed at all. He showed me the cable which he finally sent to General Eisenhower with the approval of Mr. McCloy and Mr. Stettinius. In this cable, Eisenhower was informed that the Guides, though in certain respects not representing the policy of 1067, should be used freely but should always be read in the light of existing directives.

General Hildring said that the more he had studied the Guides in recent months, the better he liked them as a panoramic expression of American attitudes with regard to AMG over Germany. He felt that their influence was bound

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to grow rather than to diminish. To illustrate his point, he mentioned the fact that the War Department had already drawn up a revised version of 1067 which, however, had no formal approval as yet. Secondly, he mentioned that at the moment when Eisenhower, Montgomery and a Russian commander (Zhukov?) would establish their headquarters in Berlin, they would feel the need for reaching a full understanding of German administrative problems. At that time the Guides would again serve as a useful basis for discussion.

In this connection, General Hilldring stated that agreement had been reached among the three Powers already on a machinery for joint allied control of Germany but that the European Advisory Commission had not produced an agreement on common policies. He strongly hinted that he did not expect EAC to produce such agreement within the small period of time left now. Actually he had never been too optimistic about the prospects of EAC and had already discussed the matter when meeting Eisenhower and Montgomery in November. He had told Eisenhower and Montgomery that together with their Russian colleague they would have sufficient authority to proceed quickly once they had arrived in Berlin. The most practical policy had been to create an American CA staff for Eisenhower which consisted of people with sufficient knowledge and courage to make decisions and to make them quickly.

In the meantime, however, each U. S. Government Agency would have to support the existing directives and Guides and it could not be tolerated that American officials and officers were criticising existing policies together with their British opposite numbers. This would ruin American influence in the Tri-Partite discussions of the problems. He showed me a letter he had written to Wickersham concerning these conditions.

The conversation then turned to the Pacific. I inquired about the present state of CA directives on Japan and learned that there are at present no directives formally approved by all Washington authorities. However, CAD had prepared drafts which soon would go to the Coordinating Committee of War-Navy-State (this committee has superseded the so-called Security Committee of former days). General Hilldring promised to let me look at these drafts.

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We discussed at greater length the organization of Civil Affairs staffs in the Pacific Theater. General Hildring indicated, though he did not say so, that he had had great difficulties to invade the realm of Admiral Nimitz. Originally he had to be satisfied with appointing General Christ as G-5 of an army of which nobody had heard as yet which was now preparing for a special task. Only recently he had been able to tackle the central problem. Colonel Boeckel had been made Deputy G-5 of Admiral Nimitz and the way seemed open now to build up a joint Army-Navy Civil Affairs staff at Nimitz's headquarters under Captain Jennings, USN, and Boeckel, USA. In addition he had just appointed a G-5 to General Richardson who headed the whole army show in the North Pacific Theater. The problem not yet settled, was the organization of the planning staffs. This probably would take about another month. His present expectation was that most of the planning would remain at CASA under the supervision of Nimitz's G-5. He promised to keep me advised about developments so that OSS could make the necessary arrangements.

Broadly speaking, this organization would not be too different from the organization under SHAEF. G-5, SHAEF in Wydewing would be represented in the Pacific by Nimitz's G-5. Richardson's G-5 would be the parallel to G-5, FUSAC. CASA would correspond to the staging center at Shrivenham. The only unsolved problem seems to be the location of the so-called country houses or country missions which in the case of SHAEF were located in Shrivenham, too.

Finally, we discussed the problem of China. Circumstances make it impossible to do any planning on CA operations in China and the Joint Chiefs will not issue any papers on China. However, if a decision should be made to take China bases, CAD will procure officers. General Olmsted has just taken up his appointment as G-5 to General Wedemeyer. No Guides or handbooks should be written on China, but General Hildring thought it worth while for OSS to look over its reports and studies on the China coast with a view to making this intelligence available to American Civil Affairs officers if such need should arise.

Hajo Holborn

Dr. Hajo Holborn.

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INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO General Donovan

DATE: 20 July 1944

FROM: William L. Langer

SUBJECT: Civil Affairs Handbook for Germany (G-5/SHAEF)

You asked me some days ago for a statement regarding the first draft of the Civil Affairs Handbook for Germany which was sent recently from London and on which we are making some comments.

The attached memorandum from Sherman Kent goes over this whole situation and points out where the Handbook differs from the policy lines taken in the Planning Guides. I want to underline Kent's remark that the Planning Guides were so late in getting proper clearance in Washington that they could not be taken into account in London as they should have been. The main point now, I think, is to see that a revised draft of this Handbook is more in accordance with the Guides.

William L. Langer

William L. Langer
Chief, Research and
Analysis Branch

attachment

Berlin
Chiefs

This bears on our
material towards drawing
C + A in Europe.

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. William L. Langer

DATE: 17 July 1944

FROM : Sherman Kent

SUBJECT: Civil Affairs Handbook for Germany (G-5/SHAEF)

With respect to the Civil Affairs Handbook for Germany (G-5/SHAEF) and an estimate of the amount of our direct and indirect contribution to it I submit the following preliminary appraisal.

1. Informational sections. There is convincing evidence that a very large amount of the informational parts of the two volumes stems from our information studies. It should be noted, however, that the primary function of the Handbook is to offer guidance in matters of MG policy rather than serve as a convenient reference work. The information which has been taken from our work is thus of secondary importance.

2. Policy recommendation sections.

General. In general it may be said that there is little evidence that our civil affairs guides, undertaken at the request of General Hilldring, were extensively used in the policy recommendation parts of this document. There are three factors worth mentioning which are germane: (1) The present document is a fairly rough draft. (2) The present document confines itself largely, though not exclusively, to the so-called mobile period of MG. As you know this has at other times been referred to as the wake of battle period--a period in which CAO's are attached to fighting units and have as yet not been merged under one central CA authority in Berlin. It should be noted that more often than not our guides emphasized the later period. In fact I believe it is safe to say that the Editorial Committee and the line which emerged from its discussions stressed the importance of writing directives for the static period when MG was established on a tri-partite central basis. (3) The guides were so late in receiving inter-agency clearance in Washington that G-5/SHAEF could not have had full advantage of them. It is hoped that another draft of the present document will make greater use of them; by now all but about half a dozen are fully cleared.

Specific. Listed below are some specific instances where the present document does not conform to suggestions made in our civil affairs guides:

(a) In Chapter I, Section 1, Health and Social Welfare are left as part of the Labor and Interior administrations, while our guide General Principles of Administration and Civil Service suggests setting up a special administration.

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(b) Chapter II, List of CAO's Duties, item 2 suggests use of the Landrat or the next senior official (there may be none in a county) while our guide on Adaptation of Administrative Machinery on the Local Level suggests use of pre-Nazi personnel, to be followed by elections.

(c) Chapter II, List of CAO's Duties, item 3 (in contrast to Chapter X, Sec. 3, p. 5) states that the Chief of the local police can be used by MG, while our guide Police and Public Safety in Germany is of the opinion that MP's may have to be used.

(d) Chapter III, Section 6 and the appendix on Displaced Persons do not consider the suggestions developed in our guide on Repatriation and Care of Foreign Civilian Laborers.

(e) The treatment of "German Christians" in Chapter V, Section 2 (5-c) does not correspond with our guides on the Protestant and Catholic Churches in Germany and on General Principles for the Dissolution of the Nazi Party and the Elimination of Nazis.

(f) The Handbook considers the sifting out of Nazi civil servants a pure control responsibility of MG (Chapter X, Section 1 (III-C)) and does not discuss the detailed suggestions developed in our guide on General Principles of Administration and Civil Service, nor does it take into account the principles to be followed in selecting German personnel for use under MG. A short paragraph on the suspension of discriminatory laws (Chapter I, Sec. 1, IV-3 and Chapter XII, Art. III-8) does not refer to the wider provisions of the guide on Elimination of Nazi Political Laws.

(g) The suggestions made in our guide on Police and Public Safety in Germany regarding retention of the old-line Kriminalpolizei are disregarded in the Handbook (Chapter X, Sec. 3). On the other hand, Land- und Stadtwacht are deemed worthy of continued operation, while we suggested their dissolution as unreliable organizations.

This list gives only a few typical examples. A detailed study would be necessary to establish the full extent to which the suggestions of the civil affairs guides have not been taken into account.

Sherman Kent
Chief, Europe-Africa Division

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Y

3 July 1944

X William, Hugh R

Honorable William L. Clayton
Surplus War Properties Administrator
Office of War Management
R.F.C. Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Will:

Herewith is a brief resume of the views I put to you last night.

Germany is feared on the Continent on two fundamental counts, (1) the demographic factor -- that there are some seventy odd million resourceful, patient, obedient fighting folk under one roof, and (2) that a vast proportion of the heavy industry of Western Europe is also consolidated under one roof.

These thoughts naturally lead to the idea of the separation of Germany into several parts, possibly three. Roughly they might be (1) the Rhineland, (2) Bavaria, Wurttemberg, Baden, perhaps with Austria, (3) the rest minus the slices of East Prussia, perhaps a portion of Pomerania, and Upper Silesia that will presumably go to Poland.

The advantages of separation are obvious, as fear is removed all problems become simplified. An enduring control becomes possible to be replaced by a short time control. This could be written in vast detail but it seems unnecessary. As to whether the units could live as separate states, I believe they could, particularly if their industry became closely integrated with the industry of other sections of Europe. (I am having some papers prepared on this phase of the problem and would be happy to send copies when completed if you are interested.)

However, when we think of separation we are faced with the certainty that if we bring it about by force we create a condition under which every patriotic German will spend the rest of his life trying to re-achieve unity for the simple reason that disunity was forced on them by foreigners. Since separation is so desirable an end, we must consider how it may be possible to bring it about through the voluntary act of the Germans themselves, thus giving it a chance to endure.

When I was in England a few weeks ago, General MacSherry invited me to his headquarters to talk with his German planners for civil affairs. I spent hours with his principal planners, and further

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hours with his principal functional administrators. They explained their purposes, and I got the conviction that they will penetrate every phase of German life through men in key positions. The men, British and American, are competent and intelligent. Through the exercise of key positions they can exert a political influence of the highest order.

I believe that these men, properly coached and indoctrinated, could bring about a situation in Germany where portions of the Reich would petition the Allies to allow them to separate. It could be done by the selection of the proper German functionaries in the various services, and by the permission for assembly and discussion judiciously granted. No public declaration regarding a separation need be made, indeed its very announcement might defeat its purpose. But if editors, chiefs of police, bankers and others were selected with this in mind, there would be a high probability of success.

I make the statement in the preceding paragraph having a vivid recollection of Germany in the years immediately following the last war. Then the Germans were flat, they urgently wanted counsel, they were ready to follow anyone who spoke decisively. The suffering of this war is going to be much more terrible for them, their receptivity should be so much the greater. Further, separatist elements have always been present in Germany. They flourish in direct proportion to the misery Germany is enduring. They were strong immediately after the last war. Surely they will be stronger after this one, in which they will have passed through so much more misery for which they will hold Prussia accountable.

Such an attempt as I suggest can only be made by agreement with the British and Russians, it can only be made through decision taken in the highest quarters. It can only have a chance of success if the Civil Affairs officers are most carefully instructed in advance of the time for exercising their functions.

It may not work, nothing in international life is a certainty. But if it did, it would have more possibility for good than any peace treaty that could be written. It might even be the basis for a genuine peace in Europe. It is entirely compatible with total disarmament, with punishment of the guilty, with all our declared purposes in this war.

I have spoken of this matter with Secretary Hull, and with one or two others in the Department of State. I have tried to make this so compact and brief that a busy man can read it.

Regards,

Sincerely,

Hugh R. Wilson

HRW/hmc

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Wilson, Hugh R

20 May 1944

TO: Mr. James C. Dunn

FROM: Hugh R. Wilson

SUBJECT: Appended State Department Documents on Germany.

Please accept my thanks for showing these most interesting papers. I have gone over them with considerable care and in general with a large measure of sympathy.

The detailed recommendations as to methods of handling various problems strike me as not only ingenious but wise and consonant with historical experience.

I recognize that the paper does not attempt to deal with the ultimate fate of Germany but rather with the mechanical details of the period of occupation.

However, it is predicated upon a Germany which is largely the same Reich as we have had for seventy years.

I submit that there is a possibility of so handling affairs as not only to diminish the fear that its neighbors hold for Germany, avoid in large measure the necessity for enduring and onerous controls, but also to minimize to a considerable degree the difficulties which the Department's papers set forth, most of which in their essence arise from the fear of Germany.

Now this fear is predicated upon two broad elements. (1) The demographic aspect the apprehension aroused by the presence in the midst of Europe of seventy million aggressive people; and (2) the fact that an enormous proportion of Europe's industry, particularly heavy industry, is emitted within the borders of the Reich.

I must emphatically and vehemently concur with the recommendation set forth on page seven of the basic paper, quoted herewith "Partition - it is recommended that this government oppose the forcible partition of Germany." A forcible partition is certain to arouse rancor, deep seated resentment against the rest of the world, a feeling of being cheated. Every right thinking German will make it his life-long purpose to re-establish unity if they are forcibly deprived of unity.

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On the other hand, there are still some Germans, elements of people who have never become reconciled to a centralized Reich under Prussian dominance and who, as a consequence, have always agitated with greater or less fervor for separation. The vehemence of agitation has been in direct ratio to the depth of misery which the Germans are suffering. It was a potent phenomenon of the years 1919 to 1933. At the end of this war, Germany will be worse beaten, more miserable. Hence, it is a safe assumption that there will be considerable agitation in favor of separation, widespread resentment against Prussia for bringing about the war. Indeed it is my personal conviction that the end of this war will bring about genuine and powerful movements for separation.

I am always skeptical of those who predicate argument upon what they call human psychology. You can, however, count upon identical experiences to traverse certain patterns of behavior under analogous conditions. In 1918 to 1933, the Germans were fed on their hopes with their guns in the air. They wanted someone to tell them what to do. They looked for guidance to any voice which spoke authoritatively. Also, the voices spoke authoritatively but in completely contradictory tone. At the end of this war we may hope that unity of purpose coupled with better foresight and preparation will give to the voice of authority a single purpose that will sway an apathetic folk in any direction we want.

Let us assume that Russia, Great Britain, and the United States are united on a policy of giving encouragement to those elements in Germany which desire separation. The Civil Affairs Section is laying plans to guide and control every phase of German life. They are perfectly competent to do so. They would provide the individuals possible instrument to carry out a given policy if they are interested in advancing our collective security so that they may receive detailed training at home to accomplish their purpose. In case we guarantee the success of a policy by force, all we can say is that the Civil Affairs Section of the Allied Governments working to a common purpose would have an admirable chance to accomplish the partitioning of Germany by that segment of the German people which desires separation.

It would take a book to point out the advantages of such a solution if it could be achieved. I will only mention a few. It would, in effect, be the end of the German people and of German industry as we formerly knew them. It would make the problem of rebuilding Germany's military machine, one of the most difficult problems of the post-war period, an affair of the past. The Germans would be divided into a number of small, and relatively impotent states, and the burden and responsibility of the control, of the occupation,

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Mr. James C. Dunn - 3 20 May 1944

In the event that the effort failed, it would still have been worth while, for it would at least have helped to bring about that decentralization of the Reich which the Department's paper advocates.

The policy I am advocating would necessitate most intimate negotiations with both Great Britain and Russia. We, or I should say I myself, do not know how they would feel on such a matter. Russian intentions appear cloaked in obscurity, even the British seem not too clear as to ultimate intentions. Nevertheless, Russia has usually had well defined intentions however little they are revealed. A discussion on this matter might well smoke them out. If we enter Germany with only good intentions, while Russia has clearly defined power objectives, it's as sure as that God made little apples that the power objectives will prevail.

I have dictated this exposé in condensed form, since I have already discussed this matter with you at length and there seems no need to fill in the gaps.

Hugh R. Wilson

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4 July 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Grace:

Will you please hand the attached memorandum to the President? I believe it will be of interest to him. Thank you.

Sincerely

William J. Donovan
Director

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4 July 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is a summary of a study prepared by us on the age distribution of dead in the German ground forces from June 1941 to March 1943.

"The age-distribution of dead in the German ground forces was derived from obituaries of German soldiers published in those German newspapers available in Washington. For the period as a whole, roughly 95 per cent of the dead were 34 years of age or younger, indicating a very significant concentration of deaths in those ages most fit for combat duty. The estimated age-distribution of dead affords further confirmatory evidence that for this period the dividing line between those age-groups considered fit for combat duty and those used principally in a non-combat capacity falls between ages 34 and 35.

A comparison of the early months of the total period

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with the later months shows a very sharp decline in the percentage of total deaths in the age-group which was 20-30, inclusive in 1941, counterbalanced principally by an increase in that age-group which was 16-19 in 1941 and to a much lesser extent by an increase in that age group which was over 30 in 1941."

Should you desire the detailed report, please advise me.

William J. Donovan
Director

Taken from R+A # 1057.2.

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Mr President

Here is a

Summary of a

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Rumania in the

German program

from June 1941

through 1943 of

Should you desire this

detailed report please

advise me

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RESTRICTED

Germany 44-500
X Reaction
20 May 1944 X Occupation Plans

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT U. S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Germany - Internal Reactions to Rumored Allied Occupation Plans

Attached is a copy of an OSS cable on this subject from Bern, Switzerland dated 13 May 1944. A copy of this cable has been sent today to the President.

C. Edmund Buxton
Acting Director

Attachment

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10 May 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I am attaching hereto copy of a dispatch received from our office in Bern, which I think may be of interest to you.

We will be glad to furnish the name of the individual from whom this information came, if you are interested.

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

Attachment.

[illegible]heiter

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 13 May 1944 #138

FROM

Berne (via radiotelephone) BRG

PRIORITY

TO

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION)

R. Joyce Hall

(FOR INFORMATION)

Director, [illegible], Magruder, Shepardson, Berliner, Hugh Wilson, Bolin

RECEIVED IN PLAIN TEXT

RESTRICTED

I have seen a report regarding the formation in the United States of a "Council for Democratic Germany". It would be very helpful to get some information on the personnel of this committee and how its activities are viewed. Also, what is the "sponsoring American group" to which the report refers.

Yesterday's press carried a rather sensational Reuter report from London about plans for the occupation of Germany, stating that General Eisenhower would be in supreme command of the occupation, and giving the names of his deputies. The report also set forth the difference between the program for the occupation of Germany, and countries such as France, Holland, Belgium, etc. This subject has immense potential value from the angle of psychological warfare, and publicity should be handled with the greatest care. Unfortunately, this Reuter dispatch had the dearth of appearing to be authoritative, but at the same time left one very much puzzled, since the report indicated that there was an understanding with Russia on the subject. A second Reuter dispatch commenting on the occupation plans stated boldly that the Balkans were the sphere of influence of Russia. Whatever decisions are reached on the German occupation plans, when the time comes to make them public, this should be done with the greatest clarity and in as unequivocally official manner, and if possible Austria should not be lumped in with Germany or mutually overlooked, as was done in the Reuter dispatch.

This is in reply to your inquiry regarding the psychological surrender Germany as viewed from here. Recently this subject has almost disappeared from the German propaganda. Goebbels tried to make his move and did it fairly effectively, and has now turned to other issues. He carefully separated the fate of the German people that unconditional surrender must mean bitter misery and humiliation for the German people at large, and used the threats with some effect to stiffen German morale.

Russia, and much was done on our part to indicate what is meant exactly by the formula. It is obscure also, inasmuch as the Germans gave it their interpretation, while the leaders of the Council have really said that is meant. If we want by unconditional surrender -- and it's to stand -- that there could be no compromise with Nazism or German militarism in any form, but that we did not seek misery for the German people, the formula

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FROM Berne TO DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES REF. NO. 138

RECEIVED

might have done good. Several factors have tended to confuse the issue regarding the unconditional surrender formula. It is not understood that Russia is committed to it, and this tends to make people feel that there is a divergence between Russia and the West on the subject. Secondly, no one seems to know here whether it applies to the satellite states: Hungary, Finland, Bulgaria, Romania. Many a Rumanian and Hungarian has asked me how his country could make an effective "unconditional surrender" to the Anglo-Saxons. Hungary walked the tight-rope hoping the time to surrender unconditionally to the West would come before the Germans did, but finally Germany took her over, and our friends there are either jailed, shot, or refugees. Thirdly, the Italian experience seems to indicate that unconditional surrender is not an entirely happy formula in practical application. It seems to be a sort of glove preamble to the real business to follow. The defeated country admits that it surrenders unconditionally, and then you proceed to work out the armistice terms, and, in the case of Italy, even make your unconditionally surrendered foe a co-belligerent in a few weeks.

In fact, viewed from here, the formula, standing alone and uninterpreted, does not seem to have been of great help. It was hardly necessary to adopt it to convince people that the United States and England would not compromise with Nazi Germany or its military clique.

Once adopted, however, the formula should not be dropped, but there are three things that might well be done. (1) Tell clearly what we mean by the formula. (2) Get Russia, on the basis of that interpretation, to accept and apply the same interpretation as the United States and England. (3) Limit this application to those states -- Germany and Japan -- whose governments have freedom of choice. This is meaningless as applied to occupied or semi-occupied states, like Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, and probably would have little value in our relations with Finland, if in fact it has any application here, in our case, since we are not at war with them.

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

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